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Abstract
Cryptographic hash functions have always played a major role in most cryptographic
applications. Traditionally, hash functions were designed in the keyless setting, where a
hash function accepts a variable-length message and returns a fixed-length fingerprint.
Unfortunately, over the years, significant weaknesses were reported on instances of some
popular “keyless” hash functions. This has motivated the research community to start
considering the dedicated-key setting, where a hash function is publicly keyed. In this
approach, families of hash functions are constructed such that the individual members
are indexed by different publicly-known keys. This has, evidently, also allowed for more
rigorous security arguments. However, it turns out that converting an existing keyless
hash function into a dedicated-key one is usually non-trivial since the underlying key-
less compression function of the keyless hash function does not normally accommodate
the extra key input. In this thesis we define and formalise a flexible approach to solve
this problem. Hash functions adopting our approach are said to be constructed in the
integrated-key setting, where keyless hash functions are seamlessly and transparently
transformed into keyed variants by introducing an extra component accompanying the
(still keyless) compression function to handle the key input separately outside the com-
pression function. We also propose several integrated-key constructions and prove that
they are collision resistant, pre-image resistant, 2nd pre-image resistant, indifferentiable
from Random Oracle (RO), indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs)
and Unforgeable when instantiated as Message Authentication Codes (MACs) in the
private key setting. We further prove that hash functions constructed in the integrated-
key setting are indistinguishable from their variants in the conventional dedicated-key
setting, which implies that proofs from the dedicated-key setting can be naturally re-
duced to the integrated-key setting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the science of secret communication, and along with cryptanalysis (the
science of breaking cryptographic schemes), it constitutes what is known as cryptology.
Cryptography has a long history [90] dating back to the A.D. era where it was first
used when humans realised the importance of information secrecy, confidentiality and
authenticity. Motivated mainly by political interests, cryptography played a major
role in preserving the secrecy of classified information. Generally, cryptography can be
categorised as either symmetric or asymmetric. In symmetric cryptography, both the
sender and the receiver share a secret key which they use to encrypt/decrypt the (sen-
sitive) messages they exchange. Obviously, symmetric primitives make the assumption
that the secret key is securely generated and exchanged among the sending and receiv-
ing parties prior to the encryption/decryption process. On the other hand, asymmetric
cryptography (also called public key cryptography [60]) removes this requirement by
cleverly generating two keys, such that if a message is encrypted by one key, it can
only be decrypted by the other. Breaking public key schemes usually reduces to solving
some hard mathematical problem.
Beside the symmetric and asymmetric primitives, there is another (controversial)
class of cryptographic primitives that can be classified under both categories. Crypto-
graphic hash functions (depicted in figure 1-1) are deterministic cryptographic prim-
itives that transform an arbitrary size input into a fixed size output. Today, crypto-
graphic hash functions have evidently become among the most active research areas in
cryptography, spanning a wide space of applications from digital signatures [118] and
key distribution schemes [102] to password protection [97]. Figure 1-2 illustrates the
rapid growth that the literature of hash functions has witnessed in recent years1 illus-
trating, in particular, the spike around 2005 when Wang et al. published their popular
1Figure 1-2 is based on estimated number of annual (not cumulative) hash functions publications.
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attacks agains MD5 and SHA-1 [154, 155, 156], which later drove the U.S. National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to announce their SHA-3 competition
(more on this in chapter 3).
H
...
Figure 1-1: Sample hash function
On the one hand, it can be argued that hash functions are symmetric primitives
because they are usually built from symmetric primitives such as block-ciphers and
stream-ciphers, and in fact “any” block/stream cipher can trivially be used to build a
hash function. Hash functions can also be keyed, in which case they clearly resemble
symmetric primitives. On the other hand, hash functions are commonly used in con-
junction with public key primitives, mostly with digital signatures. We will not delve
into this argument, but we noticed that historically hash functions have been generally
considered symmetric primitives.
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Figure 1-2: Growth of the cryptographic hash functions literature
The properties that typical cryptographic hash functions should preserve are usually
application dependent, but it is widely accepted that cryptographic hash functions
should be collision resistant, pre-image resistant and 2nd pre-image resistant.
• Collision resistance means that it should be infeasible for an adversary to find
two different messages that would both hash to the same value.
• Pre-image resistance means that given a particular hash value, it should be in-
feasible for an adversary to invert it and find the message that produced it.
• 2nd pre-image resistance means that given a message and its hash value, it should
be infeasible for an adversary to find a second message hashing to the same value.
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However, collisions, pre-images and 2nd pre-images in hash functions are unavoidable
due to the fact that these primitives are many-to-one functions. A “good” hash function
would instead make finding collisions and (2nd) pre-images computationally infeasible2.
For convenience, in the rest of the thesis we will often refer to cryptographic hash
functions as simply hash functions, but they should not be confused with the non-
cryptographic hash functions such as those used for table and database lookups, which
are also called hash tables [95]. In such non-cryptographic applications, the hash func-
tion is exposed to much less stringent requirements than those that the cryptographic
hash functions are expected to possess. For example, in non-cryptographic applica-
tions, it is sufficient that collisions in hash functions (two different messages producing
the same hash value) are rare, but not necessarily computationally infeasible as the
case with cryptographic hash functions.
1.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the introduction, formalisation and security anal-
yses of a (relatively) new class of cryptographic hash functions, named the integrated-
key hash functions. Hash functions belonging to this class are said to have been con-
structed in the integrated-key setting. In this setting, keyless hash functions are seam-
lessly and transparently transformed into keyed hash functions and thus becoming
families of hash functions. This conversion potentially strengthens the hash function
and contributes towards more robust security arguments. Concisely, the contributions
of the thesis can be summarised as follows:
• Introducing and formalising the integrated-key approach of designing hash func-
tions, where keyless hash functions are transparently converted to keyed ones.
• Showing that the integrated-key setting is indistinguishable from its dedicated-
key counterpart, where in the latter, keys are fed directly to the compression
function. Thus, when converting a keyless hash function to a keyed variant in the
dedicated-key setting, the internal structure of the compression function needs to
be (sometimes significantly) modified to accommodate the key input. This result
means that proofs of hash functions in the dedicated-key setting can be lifted and
will still apply on their variants in the integrated-key setting.
2As a result of the rapid advances in computational resources, the term computationally infeasible
is becoming somewhat vague. In fact, the amount of computation that might be considered infeasible
today, may not be so in the near future. Currently, a computation with complexity 2128, for example,
can be safely considered infeasible, but this may cease to be the case at some point in the future
according to Moore’s Law [114], which states that the number of transistors that can be fitted in an
integrated circuit doubles approximately every 2 years.
3
1.2. Notation 1. Introduction
• Proposing three integrated-key hash constructions, after which the rest of the
thesis is dedicated to analyse their security. While arguing about their security, we
adopt generic proof approaches making the proofs applicable to other integrated-
key hash functions with similar structures. In particular, we prove that our
proposed integrated-key hash constructions are:
• Collision resistant, pre-image resistance, and 2nd pre-image resistance (these
are briefly described above, but more details are in section 2.2).
• Indifferentiable from Random Oracle (RO): it is infeasible for a distinguisher
to be able to differentiate between our proposed constructions and a genuine
RO. In this case, the hash function is said to behave like a RO.
• Indistinguishable from a Pseudorandom Function (PRF): a distinguisher
cannot distinguish between our integrated-key constructions and a random
function (a randomly chosen function from the set of all functions having a
particular domain and range), except with negligible probability.
• Unforgeable when instantiated as MACs: if our integrated-key construc-
tions are secretly keyed, it is infeasible for an adversary to generate a valid
message-tag pair without access to the secret key.
• Integrated-key hash functions, like the dedicated-key hash functions, exhibit un-
avoidable efficiency loss due to the processing of extra key input. Therefore,
as a marginal contribution, appendix A provides a general discussion about im-
proving the efficiency of hash functions implementations and demonstrates how
following some (even minor) optimisation techniques may significantly improve
the efficiency of a hash function implementation. These optimisation guidelines
are generic and applicable to any implementation, not necessarily hash functions
or cryptographic implementations.
1.2 Notation
We already provided comprehensive lists of symbols and notation used throughout this
thesis. Those lists were written for the convenience of the reader, below we elaborate.
General Notation. We use the notation x $←− X to indicate that a particular value is
chosen uniformly at random from the set X and is assigned to the variable x. Similarly,
by x $←− {0, 1}n we denote the process of choosing the value of x uniformly at random
from the set of all binary strings of size n. When we write x $←− X\{y}, we mean
that the value of x is chosen uniformly at random from the set X , excluding the value
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y. By y $←− A(x) we mean that the adversary A on input x outputs a value and
assigns it to the variable y. If no input is specified, A generates the output without an
input. A function is usually defined in terms of the spaces of its inputs and outputs,
for example H : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n defines a function H with two inputs
of lengths m-bit and n-bit, respectively, returning an output of length n-bit. We let
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n ≡ {0, 1}m+n and {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n ≡ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m. We denote
by |M | the length of the string M and by 〈M〉β the β-bit encoding of the length of
M . Concatenation of n blocks is denoted by M1|| . . . ||Mn, but for convenience we may
sometimes simply use M1 . . .Mn or M1, . . . ,Mn. If a message M consists of n blocks,
we refer to the i-th block by M [i] where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Slightly abusing the notation,
we use M i to refer to the sequence of blocks M1,M2, . . .Mi where i ≤ n, this is not to
be confused with exponentiation. Note that M i is equivalently to M [1 . . . i]. We denote
by M (i) the input to the i-th application of a compression function (this notation is
only used in chapter 6). We use [X]n and [X]n to refer to the most (respectively, least)
significant n-bit of the string X, that is [X]n = xi||xi+1|| . . . ||xn, where n > i > 1, and
[X]n = x1||x2|| . . . ||xn. The notation XY indicates that a component X has an oracle
access to another component Y (oracle access here means that Y is a public component
that replies to any query it receives). The conditional probability that a system F will
output Y given the input X is denoted by PFY |X . This is not to be confused with the
conventional conditional probability notation Pr[Y |X] denoting the probability that
event Y will occur given that event X has already occurred. The ceiling function is
denote by dxe where the value of x is rounded to the smallest integer larger than x. By
Dom(F ) and Rng(F ) we denote the domain and range of function F , respectively. We
denote a function taking a key K as an input by g(K, .) or gK(.). The empty string is
denoted by ⊥. We refer to all values in the column xˆ of the table TK by TK(xˆ). We use
the subscript (underscore) to index an arbitrarily chosen row in a table, e.g., x refers
to the value of the x field of a random row in a table (table notation is only used in
chapter 5). We use the symbols ◦,M to denote full and partial sequential composition
while using ? to denote an arbitrary composition operation. We also use the symbol ./
to denote indistinguishability (see chapter 6). The notation (X → Y)-R indicates that
the system R accepts input in the space X and returns output in the space Y.
Games-playing Notation. An adversary A is a probabilistic algorithm that takes
input, processes it, and either succeeds and returns an output or fails and terminates
returning ⊥. The advantage of A in the xxx game, denoted by AdvxxxA or Advxxx(A),
is characterised by (tA, qA, L, A)-xxx, where tA is the running time of A, qA is the total
number of queries A sends throughout the game, L is the length of the largest query
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generated by A, and A is the probability that A will succeed in the xxx game. Note
that the advantage of a game is actually its success probability, hence AdvxxxA = A. We
will often be explicit with the advantage and denote it by AdvxxxH (A) which formalises
the advantage of an adversary A in breaking the primitive H (usually a hash function
in this thesis) in the xxx sense. Furthermore, the success probability (advantage) of
A is taken over any probabilistic (random) choices that A makes during its execution,
this is referred to as “the random coins of A” or “the random coins used by A”.
1.3 Preliminaries
This section provides basic background of some mathematical concepts that will be
used heavily throughout the thesis, but it is by no means comprehensive. The reader
is advised to consult standard college textbooks for this purpose, e.g., [137].
Probability Theory. Probability theory is a fundamental security analysis tool in
cryptography, used as a robustness measure of a system or algorithm against attacks.
Considering the hash function H :M→ Y, we first give several definitions. The set Y
is called the sample space, which is the set of all possible outcomes of an experiment.
An experiment, in turn, is a procedure yielding a point in Y (in our scenario, the
experiment is the actual hashing). An event is a subset of Y (i.e. one or more points
from Y). The complement of an event A is the set of all points in Y that do not belong
to A, and is denoted by A¯, that is A¯ = Y − A. In cryptography, functions are usually
defined on discrete spaces, that is, the setsM and Y above contain discrete points. Each
outcome (point) in Y as returned by H occurs with a particular probability. Random
variables are functions assigning probabilities to points of Y following a probability
distribution. The most commonly used probability distribution in cryptography (and
the one assumed throughout this thesis) is the uniform distribution which states that
all outcomes of an experiment are equally likely, that is P (y) = 1/|Y|. It is generally
accepted that modern probability theory is based on three fundamental axioms:
1. the probability of events is non-negative: P (y) ≥ 0 where y ∈ Y,
2. the sum of the probabilities of all events is 1:
∑|Y|
i=0 P (yi) = 1, and
3. Additivity of disjoint events.
Two events, A and B, are said to be disjoint (or mutually exclusive or independent) if
the occurrence of one does not influence the occurrence of the other, in which case the
probability that both events occur at the same time is P (A∧B) = P (A) ·P (B), while
the probability that either (or both) events occur is P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B).
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Birthday Paradox. Consider the following surprising (and quite astonishing) fact:
There is at least 50% chance that there will be two people having the same
birthday in a group consisting of as little as 23 randomly chosen people,
and a 99% chance for a group of only 57 people.
This paradoxical phenomena is called the Birthday Paradox. Formally, for a group of
N people, the probability that there are at least two people having the same birthday
is as follows (assuming that the birthdays of the N people are uniformly distributed
over a “common year” whose days is 365):
P (N) = 1−
N−1∏
i=0
(
1− i
365
)
= 1− 365!
365N (365−N)!
The birthday attack is based on the Birthday Paradox and entails choosing q random
messages x1, x2, · · · , xq from the domain D and compute their hashes y1, y2, · · · , yq,
where yi = H(xi) and H is a hash function. The birthday attack succeeds if there are
yi = yj while xi 6= xj , which is called a collision between xi and xj . That is, for a hash
function H : M → {0, 1}n, where M is a message space and |M| > n, a collision is
expected to occur after q queries with probability:
P (q) =
(
q
2
)
· 1
n2
=
q(q − 1)
2
· 1
2n
=
q2 − q
2n+1
≈ q
2
2n
implying that a collision can be found after around q ≈ √2n = 2n/2 messages chosen
uniformly at random [29]. This attack can also be parallelised as discussed in [152],
which significantly improves its efficiency.
However, as reported in [29], in order for this bound to hold, the hash function
H :M→ Y should be regular, which means that every point in the range Y should have
the same number of pre-images in the domainM (recall that collisions are unavoidable
as long as M > Y). Otherwise, collisions in H can be found faster than q2/2n. This,
however, does not pose a significant practical concern, as it seems that most popular
hash functions, e.g., MD5, SHA-1 etc., are “close enough” to being regular functions.
This attack, nonetheless, usually produces meaningless collisions because it searches
for “any” two colliding messages. This behaviour may not have significant effect in prac-
tice as applications usually restrict the message scope. What and adversary would aim
for is to produce meaningful collisions such that a collision finding algorithm returns
two related messages, one seemingly “good” and another seemingly “bad”, then the ad-
versary can use these two messages interchangeably for malicious purposes. Examples
from the literature demonstrated that such meaningful collisions are possible [145, 146].
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1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis consists of three main parts (excluding chapters 1, 7 and appendix A). Part
I comprises chapters 2 and 3, and provides general background information on the state
of the art of cryptographic hash functions. Part II comprises chapter 4, while part III
comprises chapters 5 and 6, these two parts constitute the contributions of the thesis,
where we introduce the integrated-key paradigm, propose several constructions in this
setting and thoroughly analyse them.
• Chapter 1: Introduction. In this chapter we provide a brief and general (but
informal) overview of cryptographic hash functions and their applications. We
also discuss the contributions of the thesis and introduce the notation that will
be used throughout the thesis. Finally, we describe how the rest of the thesis
is organised, we give concise summaries of each chapter, and discuss how the
chapters are related to each other.
• Chapter 2: Security of Hash Functions. In this chapter we take a close look
at the various security notions and properties of hash functions. We provide
both formal and informal definitions and discussions about the various security
properties, such as collision resistance, pre-image resistance and 2nd pre-image
resistance. We also provide extended discussions about several important notions
such as the indifferentiability from Random Oracle (RO), the indistinguishability
from Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) and the unforgeability of Message Authen-
tication Codes (MAC) algorithms. Most of these properties will be used in later
chapters while analysing the security of our proposed integrated-key hash func-
tions.
• Chapter 3: Design of Hash Functions. In this chapter, we provide a thorough
discussion on the state of the art of hash functions design and what approaches
were/are being adopted in constructing them. We describe the various design
approaches and give examples from the literature. In particular, we discuss the
popular Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, describe the various generic attacks re-
ported against it, and briefly discuss several variants of it showing how they were
designed to thwart some of its generic attacks. Beside iterative hash functions,
we also briefly discuss the parallel ones, though these are less common. Finally,
we discuss how compression functions are being designed and describe several
approaches.
• Chapter 4: Integrated-key Hash Functions. In this chapter, we introduce, define
and formalise our integrated-key approach of constructing hash functions (where
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we discuss how to seamlessly convert a keyless hash function to a keyed one with-
out modifying the underlying keyless compression function). We propose three
integrated-key hash constructions based on the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction,
and prove that they are collision resistant, pre-image resistant and 2nd pre-image
resistant.
• Chapter 5: Indifferentiability of the iMD Constructions. Continuing our security
analysis of the three integrated-key constructions proposed in chapter 4, in this
chapter we further prove that these constructions are indifferentiable from RO.
We provide a detailed indifferentiability proof and show how such proofs are
constructed in the integratd-key setting. Even though we explicitly developed
the proof to argue about the indifferentiability of several specific constructions,
the proof is generic and may be applicable to other hash functions constructed
in this setting.
• Chapter 6: Indistinguishability and Unforgeability of the iMD Constructions.
The contributions of the thesis are concluded in this chapter by first showing
that hash functions constructed in the integrated-key setting are indistinguishable
from their variants in the dedicated key setting, which (using the indifferentia-
bility result in chapter 5) immediate implies that they are indistinguishable from
Pseudorandom Functions (PRF). Using this indistinguishability result, we also
prove that our proposed integrated-key constructions are unforgeable when used
as MACs (i.e., secretly keyed). Unforgeability means that an adversary cannot
output a valid message-tag pair, except with negligible probability.
• Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work. The thesis concludes in this chapter
with final remarks and a few brief discussions about several possible interesting
extensions to the work presented in this thesis.
• Appendix A: Engineering Aspects of Hash Functions. Finally, we provide an
investigation in how to improve the efficiency of hash functions’ implementations.
We provide a set of optimisation guidelines to help implementers optimising their
implementations. Although the discussion is mainly based on Intel platforms,
most of the optimisation techniques are generic and platform independent.
At the beginning of each chapter, we provide a gentle overview of the chapter’s con-
tributions and what results from previous chapters are being used there; each chapter
also concludes with a brief summary. Figure 1-3 depicts the dependency among the
chapters. An arrow from chapter X to chapter Y means that results/definitions/notions
from chapter X were used in chapter Y, then chapter X should preferably be read or
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Hash Security
Chapter 3
Hash Design
Chapter 4
Integrated-key
Chapter 5
Indifferentiability
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Conclusion
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Unforgeability
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Hash Engineering
Figure 1-3: Dependencies among the chapters of the thesis
at least skimmed through before chapter Y. Apart from chapters 1, 7 and appendix
A, most of the later chapters are built on definitions and results from earlier chapters.
While chapters 2 and 3 present general background material, most of the details and
notions discussed in these chapters are extensively utilised in the rest of the thesis as
we develop the various security arguments and proofs. Chapter 4 provides definitions
and results that would later be used in chapters 5 and 6, where chapter 6 also use
results from chapter 5. Similarly, while chapter 5 does not directly use results from
other chapters, it is based on our lengthy discussion of the indifferentiability framework
in chapter 2 (specifically, section 2.3), so it is highly recommended to read that section
before chapter 5. Parts of chapters 2 and 3 were published in [5] (extended version is
in [6]). The material in appendix A was published in [2]. Papers forming the basis of
chapters 4, 5 and 6 have been submitted for publication in peer-review venues [3], [4],
and, at the time of writing, are still under review.
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Chapter 2
Security of Hash Functions
The security of hash functions can be evaluated based on many criteria and
is usually application dependent, where hash functions are expected to pre-
serve a number of properties. However, if a particular hash function H
failed to preserve a particular property X, that does not immediately ren-
der that hash function broken in practice, it just means that H cannot be
“safely” used in applications where property X is required. In this chap-
ter, we discuss the various hash functions security properties and notions.
We also elaborate on how hash functions security proofs are developed in a
provable security framework, which we would then use extensively in later
chapters. The contents of this chapter was published in [5],[6].
2.1 Introduction
Hash functions are essentially many-to-one functions since they map arbitrary length
inputs to fixed length outputs and the input is usually larger than the output (hash
functions are compressing primitives). Thus, collisions (different messages hashing to
the same value) in hash functions are unavoidable due to the pigeonhole principle1.
Yuval [164] was the first to discuss how to find collisions in hash functions using the
Birthday Paradox, leading to what is commonly known today as the birthday attack.
In this attack, a collision is found with probability q2/2n after q queries to a hash
function outputting values of length n-bit [29]; see section 1.3 for more details about
this attack. While collision resistance is certainly an important property that hash
functions are expected to possess, it is not the only one, and in some applications it
is not even required. Pre-image resistance (non-invertibility), for example, is a more
1The pigeonhole principle states that if m pigeons are distributed over n holes, and m > n, then
there is at least one hole with more than one pigeon.
11
2.2. Classical Properties 2. Security of Hash Functions
difficult and more practical property. In fact, in most applications it is more devas-
tating to be able to invert a hash value, than finding a collision between two arbitrary
messages. For example, applications such as password storage only require pre-image
resistance since here the aim of an adversary is to reverse a given hash to obtain the
corresponding password. Digital signatures is another example of applications that are
only minimally affected by collision resistance, where an adversary not only required to
generate meaningfully related colliding messages, but also sign them using the signer’s
private key, which should be accessible only to the singer. Therefore, the application
that the hash function is targeted for determines the security properties that it should
preserve. In this chapter, we present and discuss hash functions’ most common security
properties and notions. In preparation for the following chapters, we also discuss how
hash functions security proofs are developed.
Chapter Outline. This chapter is organised as follows. First, in section 2.2 we pro-
vide a discussion about the three classical hash function security properties, namely
collision resistance in section 2.2.1, pre-image resistance in section 2.2.2 and 2nd pre-
image resistance in section 2.2.3, as well as some other properties (including statistical
and application-specific ones) in section 2.2.4. We then describe in length the indiffer-
entiability framework in section 2.3, which is later used in chapter 5. Brief descriptions
of the indistinguishability from Pseudorandom Function (PRF) and the unforgeability
notions are provided in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. We also talk about some
other security notions in 2.6. In section 2.7, we discuss the multi-property-preserving
paradigm (MPP) and give a few examples of recent MPP constructions. Finally, we
conclude this chapter in section 2.8 with a brief discussion on how proofs of hash
functions are commonly developed in a provable security framework.
2.2 Classical Properties
The basic (classical) properties a hash function is expected to preserve are: collision
resistance, pre-image resistance and 2nd pre-image resistance; figure 2-1 illustrates
these properties graphically. Although these are thought to be the universal security
properties that most hash functions should preserve, there may be other application-
specific security properties that hash functions should additionally (or instead) preserve
if they are to be used in a given application; here we provide an elaborate discussion
on the basic definitions of these properties. In this chapter, and throughout the thesis,
when we say that an attack succeeds in breaking a particular hash function, that does
not necessarily mean that the hash function is deemed broken in practice. If an attack
12
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Figure 2-1: Graphical representation of the collision, pre-image and 2nd pre-image
resistance properties
succeeds to prove that a hash function can be exploited (e.g., finding a collision, or
pre-image, or second pre-image) with work less than that required by the birthday or
brute force attack, the hash function is considered broken, even if the work required
to break it is still infeasible in practice (this is sometimes called a theoretical break).
Indeed, finding such flaws in a hash function is an evidence of structural weaknesses
that may be exploited at later stages to turn this theoretical break into a practical
one; the prime example is MD5, which was first theoretically broken, then the attacks
eventually evolved and today practical collisions can easily be found in MD5 [94, 146].
2.2.1 Collision-Resistance (CR)
A hash collision occurs when two (arbitrary) different messages hash to the same value.
That is, for a collision resistant hash function H, it should be computationally infeasible
to find any two messages M and M ′ such that H(M) = H(M ′) while M 6= M ′. This
also applies to families of hash function (i.e., keyed hash functions, where members of
the family are indexed by different keys). Formally, the advantage of an adversary A
of finding a collision in a hash function H is defined as follows:
AdvcrH(A) = Pr
[
(M,M ′) $←− A : M 6= M ′ ∧H(M) = H(M ′)
]
For a secure hash function, the best collision finding attack should not be better than
the birthday attack (i.e., not better than work complexity of 2n/2 for a hash func-
tion outputting n-bit hash values). Collision resistance was first formally defined by
Damg˚ard [54], and is sometimes called Strong Collision Resistance. Some authors use
the term multi-block collision to refer to 2 colliding messages, each consisting of at least
2 blocks. This is not to be confused with multi-collision, where multiple messages col-
lide at the same hash value regardless of their sizes (sometimes also called K-collision,
where K is the number of the colliding messages). Finding a K-collision should have
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a complexity of at least 2(K−1)n/K . In [134], Rogaway discussed the foundation-of-
hashing dilemma which states that collision resistance cannot be formally defined for
keyless hash functions, that is, there will always be collisions, it is just that us, humans,
may not be able to find them, but such a concept cannot be formalised mathematically
for keyless hash functions. Rogaway proposed a solution to this dilemma by means of
explicit security reduction, which he called the human-ignorance framework.
2.2.2 Pre-image Resistance (Pre)
For all practical purposes, hash functions should be computationally non-invertible.
When a message is hashed, it should be (computationally) infeasible to retrieve the
original message from which the hash value was obtained. That is, for a pre-image
resistant hash function H, given a hash value H(M) of a particular message M , it
should be computationally infeasible to retrieve the original message M , or indeed
generate any message M ′ 6= M such that H(M ′) = H(M). Succinctly,
Advpre[m]H (A) = Pr
[
M
$←− {0, 1}m;Y ← H(M);M ′ $←− A(Y ) : H(M ′) = Y
]
For a hash function to be pre-image resistant, the best attack against the hash function
should be the brute force attack (i.e., work complexity of 2n operations for a hash func-
tion with output size n). Pre-image resistance is also sometimes called One-wayness.
Generally, collision resistance does not guarantee pre-image resistance [54], but in [135]
it was shown that pre-image resistance can be implied by collision resistance if the
hash function was sufficiently compressing (i.e., its domain is significantly larger than
its range), otherwise if the hash function was length preserving, length increasing or
compresses its input by only a few bits, the advantage of reversing its output signif-
icantly increases. Similarly, Stinson [147] argued that it is possible to obtain good
reduction from collision resistance to pre-image resistance under several assumptions,
but he then showed that these assumptions are difficult/impossible to satisfy in prac-
tice. For example, he showed that a collision resistant hash function is also pre-image
resistant if the hash function is “close” enough to being uniform, but while uniformity
of a function can be verified for random hash functions, it cannot be accurately verified
for practical ones.
Stinson also introduced the zero pre-image notion, where an attacker finds a message
M such that H(M) = y = 0. He remarked that there is no obvious reduction between
zero-pre-image (where a specific value of y is inverted) and normal pre-image (where a
random value of y is inverted), and that one may be harder or easier to find than the
other.
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2.2.3 2nd Pre-image Resistance (Sec)
Given a 2nd pre-image resistant hash function H, and a message M , it should be
computationally infeasible for an adversary A to find a different message M ′ such that
M 6= M ′ and both M and M ′ hash to the same value, H(M) = H(M ′). Succinctly,
Advsec[m]H (A) = Pr
[
M
$←− {0, 1}m;M ′ $←− A(M) : M 6= M ′ ∧H(M) = H(M ′)
]
For H to be considered 2nd pre-image resistant, the best attack against H should be the
brute force attack (i.e., work complexity of 2n for a hash function with output size n).
2nd pre-image resistance is also sometimes called Weak Collision Resistance. Although
it is frequently claimed in the literature that collision resistance implies 2nd pre-image
resistance [110, 135], Contini et al. [47] argued that interpreting some formal definitions
of 2nd pre-image resistance in the literature (e.g., [110]) invalidates this claim, but
generally this claim is true if both collision and 2nd pre-image resistance are defined
properly. Like collisions, a generalisation of 2nd pre-image is K-way 2nd pre-image
where, given a message M and its hash value H(M), an adversary A finds K different
messages colliding at H(M), that is, H(M1) = H(M2) = · · · = H(MK) = H(M), while
M1 6= M2 6= · · · 6= MK 6= M . Similarly, K-way pre-image occurs when, given H(M),
an adversary A finds K different messages colliding at H(M). Finding a K-way (2nd)
pre-image should have a complexity of at least K.2n.
Remark. In [160], Yasuda showed that the compression function of a Merkle-Damg˚ard
hash function (see section 3.3.1) does not have to be CR for the whole hash function
to be Sec or Pre. The author argued that it only suffices for a compression function to
preserve weaker-than-CR properties, namely cs-SPR (chosen suffix second pre-image)
and cs-OW (chosen suffix one-wayness), for the corresponding hash function to preserve
Sec and Pre, respectively. This is indeed an important result since many compression
functions used with the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction were recently found to be not
CR, which directly implies that their corresponding hash functions are not CR [111, 55],
but that does not necessarily mean that they are also not Sec and/or Pre when their
compression functions are modelled as cs-SPR and cs-OW (which are weaker than CR).
2.2.4 Other Properties
Other desirable properties that hash functions should preferably preserve include [110]
(some of these properties are application specific, i.e., some hash function applications
may not require some of these properties):
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• Near-collision resistance: hash values of two different messages should differ sig-
nificantly (even if the messages that produced them differ slightly), that is, a
near-collision occurs if for two different messages M 6= M ′, then H(M) differs
from H(M ′) by only a small number of bits.
• Semi-free-start collision resistance: a semi-free-start collision occurs when two
different messages with the same (but random) IV hash to the same value. In
practice, though, hash functions are usually specified with fixed IVs.
• Pseudo-collision resistance: a pseudo-collision (or free-start collision) occurs when
it is possible to find a collision between two messages by only controlling their
IVs (again, this attack is not practically relevant because most hash functions
are shipped with fixed IVs, so an attacker cannot control the IV in practice). A
variant of this property is pseudo-near-collision, which results in a near-collision.
• Partial pre-image resistance: also sometimes called local one-wayness, states that
it should be equally difficult to retrieve part of the original message from its hash
value as retrieving the whole message, even if a portion of the message is already
known (in chapter 4, we will introduce full and partial inversion, which are similar
to pre-image and partial pre-image).
• Non-correlation (correlation freeness): hash function inputs and outputs should
not be statistically correlated; that is, even a small change in the input should
drastically affect the output bits; this phenomenon is called the avalanche effect.
• Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) pre-image resistant [91]: applications that
need to resist the herding attack [91] (see section 3.3.2) need to preserve this
property, which prevents an attacker from finding a string S such that given P
and H, then H(P ||S) = F where F is a hash value computed before learning P .
A particularly problematic situation arises when trying to evaluate the security
of sponge-based constructions [33] (see section 3.3.4). Traditionally, security bounds
are based on the function’s output length n, where collision requires 2n/2 and pre-
image/2nd pre-image require 2n. However, the sponge construction produces a vari-
able length output. Realising this problem, the authors of the sponge construction
introduced a reference security model, called the Random Sponge, which they use in
their security analysis. Detailed discussion of the security of the sponge construction
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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2.3 Indifferentiability from RO
Security analysis and proofs of many cryptosystems are carried out in the Random
Oracle Model (ROM) [26], which assumes the presence of a Random Oracle (RO). A
RO is an abstract ideal primitive that returns infinite random response every time
it is queried [26], though such response is usually truncated. Responses of RO are
consistent for similar queries (a particular query will always receive the same RO
response regardless of when and how many times it is made) and since RO is an atomic
entity (i.e., it cannot be decomposed), it is often said to be monolithic. In practice,
ROs do not exist [40] and are instead instantiated by hash functions which are not
monolithic by nature since hash functions are structured entities that usually process
messages by repeatedly and iteratively calling an underlying primitive (commonly, a
compression function). In particular, in [40] Canetti et al. showed that there exist
schemes that are secure in the ROM but become insecure when the RO is replaced by
“any” practical implementation. Therefore, for proofs in the ROM2 to hold in practice,
the adopted hash function should emulate a RO. A hash function H emulating a RO
in this sense implies that H cannot be “differentiated” from a genuine RO and that
systems proven secure in the ROM will remain secure if the RO is replaced by H.
Based on Maurer’s indifferentiability framework [108], Coron et al., introduced their
popular hash function indifferentiability from RO framework in [48], which can be
used to prove that a hash function, with access to an ideal compression function, is
indifferentiable from a genuineRO. In this framework, the two building blocks of a hash
function, namely a construction C and an ideal compression function G, constitute a
system (System 1) and the random oracle F (which the hash function needs to emulate)
constitutes another system (System 2), then a distinguisher algorithm D with oracle
access3 to both systems tries to challenge the systems and distinguish between them4. If
we do not introduce an extra component in System 2, D can easily distinguish between
the two systems since System 1 consists of two components while System 2 consists of
only one component. Thus, we introduce a simulator S in System 2 to simulate the ideal
2Even though proofs in the ROM may not always guarantee security when the RO is instantiated by
a practical hash function, if a scheme is proven secure in the ROM, there is strong “heuristic” evidence
that this scheme exhibits sound structure, or at least do not suffer from serious inherent structural
weaknesses.
3When a X has oracle access to Y , X can publicly query Y and receive response back. However,
oracle access does not necessarily imply a black-box access, where in the latter X can only query Y ,
but cannot access its internal components (if there is any).
4In the context of cryptography, there is a distinction between indifferentiability and indistinguisha-
bility. In indistinguishability, a distinguisher algorithm D is merely given black-box access to the two
systems. In indifferentiability, on the other hand, D is further given access the underlying primitives
of the systems and can query them independently. Thus, indifferentiability is clearly a generalisation
of indistinguishability.
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compression function G of System 1. The simulator S should be defined very carefully
to simulate not only a conventional compression function operation (such that given
an input it returns a compressed random output), but also how to behave consistently
with the way C and G interact to handle D’s queries. This is indeed a non-trivial task
for S because all messages sent to C will be processed by G (i.e., G can see all messages
sent to System 1, including those sent to C), but that does not hold for S in System
2 because the random oracle F is an atomic component and will return its responses
independently from S (i.e., messages sent to F are not observable by S). It is important
to note that here D challenges the systems by sending multiple queries to the different
components of the systems and observes the responses, D then distinguishes between
the systems based on their overall observed behaviour not just the individual responses
of the queries. That is, if D sent a query to both systems and received different
responses, that does not necessarily mean that D has succeeded in the distinguishing
game because both responses are still random. However, if D observed a pattern in
a series of responses from a particular system but did not observe similar behaviour
in the other system, then it is apparent that one of them is behaving differently than
the other and D succeeds in the distinguishing game. Although D does not necessarily
have to tell which system is which, it will be obvious that the system that behaves in
a more random manner is the RO system. Figure 2-2 illustrates the general setting
where D has oracle access to both Systems 1 and 2.
Systems 1 and 2 are also sometimes called the Real System and the Random System,
respectively. In System 1, C has oracle access to G, while in System 2, S has oracle
access to F . However, whereas in System 1, C always queries G to obtain responses for
any query it receives, in System 2, S may choose to query F or generate its responses
uniformly at random. For Systems 1 and 2 to be indifferentiable from each other, it is
important that S is programmed in such a way that F and S behave consistently with
how C and G behave (note that S is the only customisable component). To illustrate
this point, let’s look at how G (which S should simulate) behaves. When G receives a
query (which may be from C or D) it merely generates a random response since it is
modelled as an ideal primitive. Having to simulate G, the simulator S, in turn, should
do the same, but S is not an ideal primitive, so it can either query F to get a random
oracle response (i.e., a response from an ideal primitive), or just return a uniformly
random response from some randomness generation source. Since it is usually more
expensive to query F , S will always return uniformly random responses, unless it really
has to query F ; when exactly to query or not to query F is (the main) part of the
simulator’s definition and depends on how System 1 behaves. In Merkle-Damg˚ard-like
hash functions (when C is modelled as a Merkle-Damg˚ard construction), the main
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differences between System 1 and System 2 can be summarised as follows:
D
System 1 System 2
C S
Figure 2-2: Distinguisher’s view in the indifferentiability game
1. C vs. F : since C is an iterative construction, it processes its input as a sequence
of blocks which are sent to G in turn; however, this is not the case with F because
F processes the whole message (no matter how long it is) independently at once.
2. G vs. S: it is clear that G will necessarily be aware of all queries sent to System
1 because C will eventually process its queries through G, but S, on the other
hand, cannot see queries sent to F , and thus may not be aware of them.
It is, therefore, the job of the simulator S to account for these differences to resist D’s
distinguishing attacks. However, this is only possible if C is a good construction; in fact,
there are cases where D will always succeed in exploiting these structural differences no
matter how intelligent and efficient S is. To illustrate how D can typically exploit the
differences between the systems and distinguishes between them, we describe an attack
against the popular Merkle-Damg˚ard construction [111, 55] as reported in [48], which
shows that the plain Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is not indifferentiable from RO;
figure 2-3 illustrates the steps of the attack (see section 3.3.1 for a description of the
Merkle-Damg˚ard construction). Basically, here D exploits the fact that C processes its
queries iteratively by calling G, and that S cannot see queries sent to F (the differences
listed above). The attack proceeds in three steps:
1. First, D sends the query m1 to both C and F and receives C(G(IV,m1)) = Z
and F(m1) = Z ′; the IV is hardcoded at C and added automatically.
2. Then, D sends the 2-block queries Z||m2 and Z ′||m2 to G and S, respectively,
and receives G(Z,m2) = Y , and S(Z ′,m2) = Y ′; here it will not make a difference
whether S used F to generate Y ′ or it generated it uniformly at random.
3. Finally, D sends the 2-block query m1||m2 to C and F and receives C(m1,m2) =
C(G(G(IV,m1),m2)) = C(G(Z,m2)) = Y and F(m1,m2) = W .
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D then outputs 1 (i.e., success) in System 1 if G(Z,m2) = C(m1,m2), and 0 other-
wise (note that D decides on the success conditions which may be different when D
programmed at different settings). Similarly, D outputs 1 in System 2 if S(Z ′,m2) =
F(m1,m2). It is easy to see that D will always output 1 when interacting with System
1, but will output 0 with overwhelming probability when interacting with System 2
(this is because S cannot see m1, so it can only guess it, but this has a low probability
of success). In this case, D succeeds in its distinguishing game. In summary, proofs in
C
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Figure 2-3: Indifferentiability attack against the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction
the indifferentiability framework proceeds in two steps:
1. First, we define a simulator S in System 2 (the Random System) to play the role
of G in System 1 (the Real System), and whose relationship to the random oracle
F mimics that of G to C.
2. Then, we prove that the view of a distinguisher D is similar when it interacts
with the system consisting of the random oracle F and the simulator S (System
2), and the system consisting of the construction C and the ideal primitive G
(System 1), except with negligible probability. Formally, the success advantage
of an adversary D in the indifferentiability game (also called the Pseudorandom
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Oracle (PRO) game [24]) is as follows:
AdvproC (D) =
∣∣∣Pr [DCG ,G → 1]− Pr [DF ,SF → 1]∣∣∣
This setting can also be generalised for a construction accessing more than one
primitive, in which case multiple simulators will need to be introduced in System
2 (Random System); see chapter 4.
The RO is sometimes realised as a pseudorandom oracle (PRO) [24], which is compu-
tationally indistinguishable from a genuine RO (we will use RO and PRO interchange-
ably to mean the same primitive). When a construction is proven to be indifferentiable
from a RO, it is sometimes referred as PRO-Pr (Pseudorandom Oracle Preserving).
2.3.1 Game-playing
The game-playing technique was first used in [93], then formalised in [28], and has been
a popular technique for analysing cryptographic primitives ever since. This technique
is usually used when we need to prove that two systems cannot be distinguished from
each other. Let these systems be System 1 and System 2. We start with System 1 and
write it as a game (pseudocode), we then introduce minor syntactical modifications to
the game and calculate the probability that a distinguisher will be able to distinguish
between the original game and the one with the minor modifications. The probability
is usually calculated by introducing a flag bad that is originally set to false, and upper
bounded by the probability that a distinguisher will set bad = true, where it succeeds in
its distinguishing attack. We then keep introducing similar minor syntactical changes to
the games and track the probability that the distinguisher will set bad = true between
the consecutive games. The simulation ends when we reach the game that is identical
to System 2. The overall distinguishing advantage is then easily upper bounded by
recalling all the probabilities of setting bad = true. This technique is primarily used
in the indifferentiability and indistinguishability proofs, e.g., [48], and indeed is being
extensively used in chapter 5 (though, we make the use of a the flag bad implicit).
2.3.2 Salvaging differentiable Constructions
A serious problem arises when trying to use Coron’s indifferentiability framework with
hash functions based on mathematical primitives (such as those presented in section
3.5.2) because they are easily differentiable from RO due to the rigorous mathematical
structure they exhibit (whereas RO are unstructured entities). However, while it seems
that this class of hash functions cannot be considered practical hash functions (since
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they are clearly differentiable from RO), Ristenpart and Shrimpton [131] pointed out
(and proved) that such hash functions can be slightly modified to be indifferentiable
from RO. They proposed a construction called Mix-Compress-Mix (MCM), which
basically wraps the hash function with two injective mixing steps to mix the input and
the output of the hash function and hide its (mathematical) structure.
In [121], the authors adopted a slightly different approach which gives hope to
the constructions that failed to be indifferentiable from RO. Their approach involves
introducing weaker RO variants and then proving that the constructions that failed
to be indifferentiable from RO are indifferentiable from these weaker RO variants.
Cryptosystems, such as FDH, OAEP and RSA-KEM, are then secure under those
constructions if they are secure in these weaker RO variants. This approach was
demonstrated on the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction which was shown to be not indif-
ferentiable from RO in [48]. The authors proposed three RO variants as follows (in
descending order from strongest to weakest): LeakyRO (LRO)5, TraceableRO (TRO)
and Extension attack simulatable RO (ERO). The authors proved that FDH is secure
in LRO, OAEP is secure in TRO, and RSA-KEM is secure in ERO, then they proved
that Merkle-Damg˚ard is indifferentiable from LRO, TRO and ERO, which means that
Merkle-Damg˚ard is secure in FDH, OAEP and RSA-KEM.
2.4 Indistinguishability from PRF
In the keyed setting, a hash function is indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Function
(PRF) if there is no adversary able to distinguish it from a random function [76]. A
random function is a function that has been chosen randomly based on a given domain
and range; this does not imply that the output of the function should be random, the
randomness here refers to the function selection process not the output of that function.
Indeed, the function with constant output (e.g., always outputs 1) is a random function
if it was selected randomly. Being a random function (or indistinguishable from one) is
an idealisation of hash functions because when a hash function is modelled as a random
function HK : K ×M→ Y, every key K ∈ K should trigger the selection of a random
function (member of the function family) that maps an input M ∈M from the domain
to a random output in the range Y ∈ Y. Given such hash function family, it should be
infeasible for an adversary A with black-box access to HK to distinguish a randomly
5The LRO was proposed earlier by Yoneyama [163], also called pub-RO, in [64].
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chosen member of HK from a genuinely (pseudo) random function. Succinctly,
AdvprfHK (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K $←− K : AHK → 1]− Pr [R $←− Func(Dom,Rng) : AR → 1] ∣∣∣
where Func(Dom,Rng) denotes the set of all functions mapping inputs from the do-
main Dom to outputs in the range Rng, with R a randomly chosen function from such
a set. In this setting, adversary A has access to both a family of hash functions HK and
a genuine (pseudo) random function R, both mapping inputs from the domain Dom to
the range Rng. Adversary A queries one of the components (which may equally be HK
or R) and outputs 1 if it thinks that it is interacting with HK , for example, 0 otherwise.
A then repeats this process when it interacts with the other component and succeeds
if it can make many correct guesses. Like the PRO game, in the PRF game the adver-
sary A’s view should be similar when it interacts with a PRF (or a random function)
as it is when it interacts with the hash function H, where the latter selects its keys
(members) uniformly at random; that is, A cannot distinguish between H and a PRF,
except with negligible probability. A hash function proven to be indistinguishable from
PRF is sometimes referred to as PRF-Pr (Pseudorandom Function Preserving). Note
that Indistinguishability from PRF and unforgeability (section 2.5) only make sense in
the keyed setting.
2.5 Unforgeability
MACs (Message Authentication Code) are popular cryptographic primitives used for
authentication and integrity checks. One of the most established approaches of design-
ing MACs is based on keyed hash functions6, where the hash function is secretly keyed
(and only legitimate parties possess the key). That is, both the sender and the receiver
share a secret key (that is assumed to have been exchanged securely) which they use
in conjunction with a hash function to check the integrity and authenticity of a par-
ticular message. Precisely, a MAC scheme consists of a tag generation algorithm and
a tag verification algorithm. The sender uses the tag generation algorithm to generate
a tag for a particular message (using its secret key), then it sends the message and
the tag to the receiver. Once the receiver receives the message-tag pair (which may
have been tampered with en-route), it runs them through the tag verification algorithm
using its own secret key. If the message-tag pair is valid, the tag verification algorithm
returns 1 and the message is authenticated, otherwise it returns 0 and the message is
rejected/discarded. Note that here the tag verification algorithm basically just runs
6Another very popular approach is designing MAC based on block-ciphers [65], but block-cipher
based MACs are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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the tag generation algorithm on the message and the receiver’s secret key, then com-
pares the tag it generates with the tag the receiver received. Essentially, MACs are
secret-key primitives, the counterpart of MACs in the public-key setting is digital sig-
natures, where the sender uses its own private key to sign a message, which can then
be verified using its public key. Digital signatures generally provide better authenticity
than MAC because in MAC any party that is able to verify a tagged message can also
produce a similar one, which means that if the secret key used to tag a message is
shared by multiple parties, a particular tagged message could have been produced by
any one of them. On the other hand, in digital signatures, once a message is signed
by a sender, it is bound to that particular sender and no one else could have signed it
because (presumably) no one else has access to the sender’s secret key. Thus, digital
signatures preserve an important property called non-repudiation, where a signer of a
message cannot deny signing it. Digital signatures is yet another central applications
of hash functions, but we do not address digital signatures in this thesis. For a hash
function to be a good MAC, it needs to be unforgeable. Given an adversary (forger)
A, the formal unforgeability definition is as follows:
AdvmacHK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K, (M,T ) $←− AHK : HK(M) = T ∧M is not queried
]
The advantage definition of MAC implies that it should be difficult for A (a forger) to
find a valid pair of a message M and a tag T which can then be successfully validated
by a MAC algorithm (this message-tag pair is called a MAC forgery). A’s aim is to
find any valid pair of M and T (it is not about recovering the secret key K that the
MAC algorithm used while generating T ). That is, A builds the forgery pair (M ′, T ′)
by repeatedly querying HK with a set of adaptively chosen messages M1, . . . ,Ms and
observes the returned tags T1, . . . , Ts, then A succeeds if it can generate a new message
M ′ 6∈ {M1, . . . ,Ms} and a valid tag T ′ such that HK(M ′) = T ′.
Another, slightly non-standard, approach is to prove that a MAC algorithm is
indistinguishable from an ideal MAC function (an ideal primitive), where the latter
basically behaves as a random mapping from the domain (the function’s input, i.e., the
message and the key) to the range (the function’s output, i.e., the tag) [71]. In this
thesis, we will consider the pervious, more standard approach.
2.6 Other Notions
It has also been suggested that hash functions should behave as a randomness extractor
(extracting uniformly random bits from an input generated by imperfect randomness
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source) [61, 62]. However, in order for a hash function to possess randomness extraction
properties, it may be necessary to make strong assumptions on the compression function
that may not even be practically relevant.
Another notion is PrA (Pre-image Awareness) proposed by Dodis et al. in [62],
which states that if an attacker can find a pre-image M of a previously published hash
value Y , then it must have already known (was aware of) M ; that is, a hash function
is PrA if there is no adversary that can find a pre-image of a previously published
hash value, unless it is already aware of that pre-image (Dodis et al. showed that
strengthened Merkle-Damg˚ard preserves PrA). A strengthened variants of PrA, called
adaptive pre-image resistance [98], allows the adversary to make adaptive queries to the
underlying compression function. It was shown that a collision resistant compression
function that preserves the adaptive pre-image resistance property can yield a hash
function indifferentiable from RO.
2.7 Multi-Property-Preserving
One would naturally think that having a hash function provably preserving some strong
security property (such as indifferentiability from RO) is enough to imply a sufficient
security margin. However, in [24] Bellare and Ristenpart refuted this assumption by
providing counterexamples showing that the constructions proposed by Coron et al.
in [48] are in fact not collision resistant while they are still indifferentiable from RO,
a supposedly strong security notion7. Thus, the authors suggested that a reasonably
secure hash function should be multi-property-preserving (MPP).
In [135], Rogaway and Shrimpton provided a formal discussion about the relations
between collision resistance, pre-image resistance, 2nd pre-image resistance and several
variants of the latter two. They considered families of hash functions (keyed hash func-
tions) while studying these properties, because the keyed setting is easier to formally
analyse than the keyless setting [134]. These properties are CR, Pre, Sec, aPre, ePre,
eSec, aSec, whose advantages are as follows (keyless CR, Pre, Sec were extensively
discussed in section 2.2, here we repeat their advantages in the keyed setting):
7However, that does not degrade the importance of the indifferentiability as a property.
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AdvcrHK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K; (M,M ′) $←− A(K) : M 6= M ′ ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
AdvPre[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}m;
Y ← HK(M);M ′ $←− A(K,Y ) : HK(M ′) = Y
]
AdvaPre[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
(K,St) $←− A();M $←− {0, 1}m;
Y ← HK(M);M ′ $←− A(Y, St) : HK(M ′) = Y
]
AdvePreHK (A) = Pr
[
(Y, St) $←− A();K $←− K;M ′ $←− A(K,St) : HK(M ′) = Y
]
AdvSec[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}m;
M ′ $←− A(K,M) : M 6= M ′ ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
AdvaSec[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
(K,St) $←− A();M $←− {0, 1}m;
M ′ $←− A(M,St) : M 6= M ′ ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
AdveSec[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
(M,St)← A();K $←− K;
M ′ $←− A(K,St) : M 6= M ′ ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
Let xxx ∈ {Pre, Sec}, then saying that HK is a-xxx means the hash function HK is
always xxx-resistant for a fixed key K and random challenge, while e-xxx means the
hash function HK is everywhere xxx-resistant for a fixed challenge and random key K.
The challenge in Sec is the original message M (domain point) to which we need to
find a 2nd pre-image, while it is the hash value HK(M) (range point) in Pre which we
need to invert to find M . Occasionally, the adversary A may return a state variable St,
which contains information that the adversary may need in later stages of the attack
(this is how extra information is usually modelled in formal definitions). For example,
if A generates a key K, A may wish to keep track of any random choices he made
during the generation of K, so A stores this information in St.
The eSec property is also called Target Collision Resistance (TCR) [27] which is,
in turn, another name for the popular Universal One Way Hash Function (UOWHF)8
notion of Naor and Young [116]. Strengthened variants of some of these properties
8In UOWHF (or TCR or eSec), an adversary A generates a message M , then given a random key
K, A generates another message M ′ 6= M , such that HK(M) = HK(M ′). This is not to be confused
with universal hash functions where A chooses both M and M ′ before it knows K. A strengthened
variant of TCR is eTCR where A aims to find M 6= M ′ such that HK(M) = HK′(M ′) and K 6= K′.
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were proposed in [78, 160, 130], namely s-CR, s-Sec, s-aSec, s-eSec, s-Pre, s-aPre (it
was argued that ePre cannot be strengthened because if it was strengthened, then there
will always be a trivial adversary succeeding in the s-ePre game).
Backward Chaining Mode (BCM) proposed by Andreeva and Preneel in [15] pre-
serves the three classical security properties of hash functions, namely CR, Pre and
Sec. Similarly, in [14] Andreeva et al. proposed the ROX (Random Oracle XOR)
construction which preserves seven properties: CR, Pre, ePre, aPre, Sec, eSec and
aSec. However, later work by Reyhanitabar et al. [129] showed that ROX is surpris-
ingly not indifferentiable from RO even though ROX uses two ROs in its padding
algorithm. Moreover, in [25] Bellare and Ristenpart proposed the ESh (Enveloped
Shoup) construction that preserves: CR, eSec, PRO-Pr, PRF-Pr and MAC, but later
Reyhanitabar et al. [129] showed that ESh does not preserve Sec, aSec, Pre and aPre.
2.8 Cryptographic Proofs
There are two popular general approaches that proofs of cryptographic hash func-
tions usually adopt, either constructing the proof in the standard model, or in the
ideal model (regardless of whether the hash function was keyless or keyed). Proofs in
the standard model assume the presence of primitives preserving/possessing standard
(practical) properties, such as collision resistance, pre-image resistance, 2nd pre-image
resistance etc. A standard model proof is then developed to argue that a hash function
preserves such properties if it is given access to (or built from) primitives preserving
those properties. For example, the hash function H is said to be xxx-secure if we can
construct a standard model proof that demonstrates the following:
If a hash function HG has oracle access to a standard primitive G, and G
is xxx-secure, then HG is also xxx-secure.
Such proofs are said to be constructed in the standard model. On the other hand, proofs
in the ideal model assume the presence of ideal primitives and proceed by proving that
if a hash function has oracle access to (or built from) such primitives, it possesses a
particular property (or set of properties). For example, a hash function H is said to
possess the property xxx if a proof can be develop to argue about the following:
If a hash function HG has oracle access to an ideal primitive G, then HG
provably possesses the property xxx, or indifferentiable from G.
The ideal primitive G can be any idealised component, such as an ideal permutation,
but the most commonly used ideal primitive in cryptography (in generally) is a Random
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Oracle (RO), which we discussed fairly thoroughly in section 2.3. Thus, the Random
Oracle Model (ROM) can be thought of as the most popular ideal model, but it is
not the only one. In fact, in chapter 5, we will develop our indifferentiability proof by
adopting the Ideal Cipher Model (ICM), which assumes the presence of an ideal block-
cipher since hash function are usually (directly or indirectly) built from block-ciphers.
While proofs in the standard model are more practically relevant, it is sometimes
extremely difficult to carry out such proofs for some schemes, potentially making the
ideal model the only (feasible) option. Clearly, nonetheless, proofs in the ideal model
provide weaker security guarantees because they assume the presence of ideal primitives
that may not exist in practice. In both approaches (and in this thesis), the adversary
is usually assumed to have finite computational resources.
2.9 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed (both formally and informally) the most popular hash
functions security properties and notions. We elaborated on the three classical notions
of collision resistance, pre-image resistance and 2nd pre-image resistance, then discussed
other properties such as near-collision resistance and pseudo-collision resistance. We
then provided a lengthy discussion on the indifferentiability from Random oracle (RO)
framework and showed how proofs in this framework are generally structured. In the
keyed setting (where hash functions accepts a key beside the message), a hash function
should also be indistinguishable from a pseudorandom function (PRF), and, further,
be unforgeable when used as a MAC in the secret key setting, these requirements are
formalised by the notions PRF-Pr (PRF Preserving) and MAC-Pr (MAC Preserving),
respectively. We also discussed the multi-property-preserving (MPP) paradigm, where
hash functions preserve multiple properties simultaneously; we discussed a few examples
of constructions from the literature preserving MPP. Finally, we briefly (and informally)
discussed how security proofs of hash functions are generally developed in a provable
security framework, namely by adopting either the standard model or the ideal model.
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Chapter 3
Design of Hash Functions
Recent years have witnessed an exceptional research interest in cryptographic
hash functions, especially after the popular attacks against MD5 and SHA-1
in 2005. In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) has also boosted this interest by announcing a public competition
to select the next hash function standard, to be named SHA-3. Not sur-
prisingly, the hash function literature has since been rapidly growing in an
extremely fast pace. According to [124], around 50-60 hash functions were
available in 1993, followed by at least 30-40 others developed since then
[126], in addition to the 64 SHA-3 submissions (some of these were stan-
dardised in ISO/IEC 10118). In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive,
up-to-date discussion of the current state of the art of cryptographic hash
functions design. In particular, we present an overview of how (and why)
cryptographic hash functions evolved over the years, and then elaborate on
some of the most common design approaches. The contents of this chapter
was published in [5],[6].
3.1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions have indeed proved to be the workhorses of modern
cryptography. Their importance was first realised with the invention of public key
cryptography (PKC) by Diffie and Hellman [60] in 1976, where it became an integral
part of PKC ever since. Unfortunately, recent advances in cryptanalysis revealed in-
herent weaknesses in most of the popular hash functions triggering an urgent call for
further research in this area. In response, two main approaches have been adopted:
either patching the existing constructions by slightly modifying them to fix a particular
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set of weaknesses, or designing new hash functions from scratch. In the first approach,
if inherent weaknesses were discovered, they imply that the design principles on which
the hash function is based are flawed and unless they are thoroughly revised, it is most
likely that those weaknesses will still exist, even if they appear to have been fixed by
some minor modifications. Likewise, in the second approach, if a hash function is de-
signed from scratch, it may sufficiently resist a particular set of weaknesses, but may
also covertly suffer from other (possibly more severe) weaknesses that might not have
been spotted at early development stages. Existing constructions, on the other hand,
have the advantage that they have been extensively studied and analysed over time,
thus, unless very carefully designed, structurally new hash functions may well be sus-
ceptible to more attacks than those that they resist. However, the sponge construction
(discussed in section 3.3.3) is an example of a new hash function built from scratch
based on totally new design principles, but, at the time of writing, no serious security
flaws were reported on the sponge construction.
SHA-3 Competition. For a long time, SHA-1 and MD5 hash functions have been
the closest to a hashing de facto, this, however, has changed in 2004 and 2005 when
Wang et al. [154, 155, 156] showed that finding collisions for MD5 can be easy while
substantially reducing the work needed to find collisions on SHA-1 to 269, which is
much less than the expected 280. Although a break with complexity of 269 is still (at
the time of writing) theoretical, it showed that SHA-1 is not as strong and collision-
resistant as it is supposed (and thought) to be. This has driven the U.S. National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in November 2007 to announce an open
competition1 to select a new hash functions standard, to be named SHA-3 [117]. NIST
received 64 submissions, 51 of which were accepted for round 1 of the competition in
December 2008. In July 2009, only 14 round 1 candidates successfully progressed to
round 2; these are briefly analysed in [12]. In December 2010, the 5 finalist candidates
where chosen (these are, BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak and Skein), and the winner is
expected to be announced in the second quarter of 2012.
Chapter Outline. This chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2, we classify
hash functions as keyed and keyless. Section 3.3 then provides a relatively lengthy and
up-to-date discussion about various iterative hash functions, this is indeed the most
common approach (at least contemporarily) in designing hash functions. In particular,
we discuss the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction (in section 3.3.1), generic attacks against
1For a comprehensive resource about SHA-3 competition and all its candidates, see http://ehash.
iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/The_SHA-3_Zoo
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Merkle-Damg˚ard (in section 3.3.2), and how accordingly the research community tried
to patch the construction (in section 3.3.3). Beside iterative functions, tree-based ones
have also been proposed, these are briefly discussed in section 3.4. Finally, section
3.5 discusses the most popular approaches of designing compression functions, namely,
e.g., based on block/stream-cipher and provably secure hash functions.
3.2 Keyless vs. Keyed Hash Functions
Generally, hash functions are classified as keyless or keyed. Keyless hash functions
accept a variable2 length message M and produce a fixed length hash value, H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. Keyed hash functions, on the other hand, accept both a variable
length message M and a fixed length key K to produce a fixed length hash value,
HK : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. Keyed hash functions can be further classified based
on whether the key is private or public. Secretly keyed hash functions are usually
used to build Message Authentication Codes (MAC), the canonical example is HMAC
[120, 1]; see section 2.5 and chapter 6 for more information about MACs. If, however,
the hash functions are publicly keyed, they are commonly known as dedicated-key hash
functions [55, 25]. Hash functions designed in the dedicated-key setting are families
of hash functions where individual member functions are indexed by different keys.
In this setting, if a member of the hash function family was broken, this should have
minimal effect on the other members of the same family (this is not the case in the
keyless setting where a single attack against a function breaks the function entirely,
e.g., [155, 156]). An obvious drawback of hash functions in the dedicated-key setting,
however, is a degraded efficiency since in this case the function is required to process
an extra input (the key) beside the message input.
In general, a hash function (keyed or keyless) is built out of two components: a
compression function f and a construction H. The compression function is a function
mapping a larger (but fixed) sized input to a smaller fixed sized output f : {1, 0}m →
{1, 0}n, where m > n. The construction is the way the compression function is re-
peatedly called to process a message; refer to table 3.1 for brief (informal) definitions
of some hash functions terminology which will be used interchangeably throughout
the thesis, also see [47] for a discussion about the lack of standard terminology and
definitional consistency in the hash functions literature.
2The term variable in this context indicates that the length of the message is upper bounded by
a large number of bits, M = {0, 1}≤λ (e.g., λ = 64), that is sufficient to represent any message
in practice. The term arbitrary [109], on the other hand, describes messages with infinite length,
M = {0, 1}∗. However, some authors use the two terms interchangeably. In this thesis, unless stated
otherwise, we will always use variable length messages, but for convenience, we will use the notation
{0, 1}∗ (that of arbitrary length messages).
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Terminology Informal Definition
Compression/Compressing Function A standard building block of a hash
function, with its domain larger than
its range.
Construction, Transform, Mode of
Operation, Chaining Mode, Domain
Extension Transform, Composition
Scheme
An algorithm that systematically
makes repeated calls to a building
block (often a compression function)
to hash a message.
Chaining Variable, Chaining Value,
Intermediate Hash, Internal State
The output of a compression function
to be used as input to the following
compression function call.
Hash value, Hash Code, Hash Result,
Hash, Digest, Fingerprint
The final result of hashing a message,
which is a fixed length string.
Table 3.1: Hash functions terminology
3.3 Iterative Hash Functions
When hash functions first emerged, it was realised that the most convenient way to
hash a message is by first dividing it into several blocks and then iteratively and sys-
tematically processing these blocks. Today, this sequential hashing approach is still, by
far, the most widely used, even with the advent of parallel processors (which, at least in
principle, should have given advantage to the parallel hash functions). In the following
subsections, we review some popular iterative hashing constructions and discuss how
recent designs tried to fix weaknesses in earlier ones. However, note that the absence
of a particular construction in the sections below does not imply that we disfavour it;
indeed it is nearly impossible to be exhaustive in such a rapidly growing literature.
3.3.1 Merkle-Damg˚ard Construction
Most of today’s popular hash functions, such as MD5 and SHA-1, are based on the in-
famous Merkle-Damg˚ard construction (also called the cascade construction) proposed
independently by Merkle [111] and Damg˚ard [55] in 1989 (though, Damg˚ard’s con-
struction was keyed while Merkle’s was keyless). However, it appears that similar
construction has previously been proposed by Rabin [128] in 1978, raising some contro-
versy in whether it should be called Rabin’s construction instead. Nevertheless, while
Rabin did indeed propose this construction, it was Merkle and Damg˚ard who formally
proved that it is collision resistant if its underlying compression function is collision
resistant. In the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, the message M is first divided into
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equally sized blocks, M = M1,M2, . . . ,M`. If the message M fell over or below the
block boundaries, it is padded. To be collision resistance, the length of the message is
appended to the message after padding it, this is termed Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthen-
ing (first coined by Lai and Massey in [96], though already proposed by Merkle [111]
and Damg˚ard [55]); figure 3-1 illustrates the padding algorithm3, where L is a 64-bit
encoding of the the length of the message and m is the length of a single block. The
message is then iterated repeatedly by calling a Fixed-Input-Length (FIL) compression
function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n accepting two inputs: a message block Mi (of
length m) and either an Initialisation Vector IV (when hashing the first block) or a
chaining variable (which is the output of the previous f call), both of length n; figure
3-2 provides a depiction and a pseudocode of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction.
M1 M2 LMl...
PadOriginal Message
10*
Algorithm Pads(M)
d = M + 1 + 64 mod m
M ||1||0d||〈M〉64 → Mˆ
Mˆ →M1 . . .M`
Figure 3-1: (Strengthened) Merkle-Damg˚ard padding algorithm
M1 M2 Ml
IV ylf f f...
n
m
n
Algorithm MDf
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = f(Mi, yi−1)
return y`
Figure 3-2: The Merkle-Damg˚ard construction
3.3.2 Generic Attacks Against Merkle-Damg˚ard
Eventually, several weaknesses were found in the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction giving
raise to a class of generic attacks that is applicable to any hash function based on the
plain Merkle-Damg˚ard construction. Note the difference between generic and dedicated
attacks, where dedicated attacks exploit internal structures specific to a particular hash
function and thus only affect that hash function (e.g., the attacks against MD4, MD5
and SHA-1 by Wang et al. [155, 156] are dedicated attacks). Below we discuss generic
attacks against the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction; even though their practical relevance
is not clear, they still demonstrate intrinsic structural weaknesses in the construction.
3While the padding algorithm illustrated in figure 3-1 is the most commonly used, it is not the only
one. The Enveloped constructions such as ESh and CS (section 3.3.3) use different padding algorithms.
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The Extension Attack. It is often claimed that this attack was first reported by
Ferguson and Schneier [70] in 2003 where it was described as a “surprisingly serious
(and simple) flaw” in the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction. However, it seems that the
basic idea of this attack was discovered long before 2003 by Solo and Kent who called
it the padding attack [151]. We present four variants of this attack as follows:
• Collision Attack. Suppose we have a message M with length |M | = L that hashes
to H(M), then given any hash function H(.) based on the Merkle-Damg˚ard con-
struction, a collision is trivially found as follows: H(M ||pad||x) = H(H(M)||x)
where pad is the padding appended to the message M before being hashed and
|pad| = L mod m, where m is the length of a single block in M , which is usually
|H(M)|; note that |pad| can indeed be 0 if the message was perfectly aligned
at block boundaries. However, this attack does not consider Merkle-Damg˚ard
strengthening (appending the message length to the message before hashing it).
• Second Collision Attack. In this attack, a collision can easily be found by extend-
ing equally sized already colliding messages. That is, if we have H(M) = H(N)
while M 6= N and |M | = |N |, a second collision can be obtained by extending
M and N with an arbitrary string (suffix) S, H(M ||S) = H(N ||S). This will
work with Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthening, but without strengthening, a second
collision is even easier as the colliding messages no longer have to be equally sized.
• Related Message Attack. With Merkle-Damg˚ard, one can easily compute a re-
lated/extended message M ′ for an unknown message M by only knowing L
(length of M) and H(M), that is, H(M ||L||x) is the hash of a message consisting
of the original M and extended by a suffix L||x; again, since the attacker knows
L, it is trivial to figure out how M has been padded before being hashed. This
attack indeed does not affect collision resistance, but it shows that the Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction does not behave like a random oracle, which is a desirable
property that hash functions should possess; see section 2.3 and chapter 5.
• MAC Forgery Attack [48]. In this attack, one can compute (forge) a valid message
without knowing the secret key K used by a MAC algorithm based on Merkle-
Damg˚ard that generates a tag T from M . Suppose we have a MAC algorithm that
processes a message using a Merkle-Damg˚ard based hash function H by prepend-
ing its key to the message MAC(K,M) = H(K||M). Now, one can update
the message M by appending a suffix Y and obtain a tag T ′ matching the new
message M ||Y without even knowing K, i.e., MAC(K,M ||Y ) = H(K||M ||Y ).
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The Multi-collision Attack. In [89], Joux showed that finding multiple collisions
(more than two messages hashing to the same value) in a Merkle-Damg˚ard hash func-
tion is not much harder than finding single collisions. In his multi-collision attack,
Joux assumed access to a machine C˙ that given an initial state, returns two colliding
messages (C˙ may use the birthday attack or any other attack exploiting weaknesses in
the corresponding hash function). Figure 3-3 illustrates the attack.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
y1 y2 y3 y5y4 yl
Ml
Ml
IV ...
'
1M
'
2M
'
3M
'
4M
'
5M
y(l-1)
'
Figure 3-3: Multi-collision attack
In figure 3-3, initially, the IV is sent to C˙ which returns M1 and M ′1 colliding at
y1, then y1, in turn, is sent to C˙ which returns M2 and M ′2 colliding at y2, this process
continues until reaching y`. It is easy to see that any combination of the messages
preceding y` will collide in y`. In fact, in the example in figure 3-3, there are 2`
messages all colliding in y` and the cost of generating these collisions is only ` times
the cost of generating single collisions (as generated by machine C˙).
2nd Pre-image Attack. This attack was first proposed by Dean in [58] and later
generalised by Kelsey and Schneier in [92]. The attack assumes the existence of a
set of expandable messages; these are messages of different lengths but produce the
same intermediate hash value (chaining variable) given a particular IV. Expandable
messages, however, do not produce the same final hash value due to Merkle-Damg˚ard
strengthening. These messages can easily be found if the hash function contains fixed
points4. While not an intrinsic weakness of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, fixed
points can be found in many Merkle-Damg˚ard implementations (e.g., SHA-1) because
the compression functions are usually modelled as Davies-Meyer functions where the
chaining variable input of the compression function is further XORed with its output.
Let H be a Merkle-Damg˚ard hash function, and f be its compression function. Suppose
we have a set of such messages E = E1, . . . , El which all produce an intermediate hash
value yE . Let M = M1,M2 . . . ,M` be a very long message consisting of ` blocks,
and C = c1, . . . , c`−1 be the set of all the intermediate hash values of M (for a message
consisting of ` blocks, there are `−1 intermediate hash values). Now, search for a block
Mi in M , such that f(yE ,Mi) ∈ C. Suppose Mi is found (finding Mi has complexity
4A fixed point is found when two consecutive chaining values collide, that is f(hi−1,Mi) = hi = hi−1,
where f is a compression function.
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less than 2n since M is a very long message, where n is the length of the final hash value
of H) and it matches cj (the j-th intermediate hash value of M), now search E (the
set of expandable messages) for a message Es of length j-1 such that the number of
blocks of Es||Mi is j. Let the original message M without its first j blocks be M ′, then
H(Es||Mi||M ′) = H(M). This attack finds a 2nd pre-image for a message of size 2k in
2n/2+1 + 2n−k+1 steps rather than the expected 2n. For example, using RIPEMD-160,
it finds a 2nd pre-image for a 260 byte message in around 2106 steps, rather than the
expected 2160 steps, where RIPEMD-160 produces a hash digest of size 160 bits [92].
The Herding Attack. This attack is due to Kelsey and Kohno [91] and is closely
related to the multi-collision and 2nd pre-image attacks discussed above. A typical
scenario where this attack can be used is when an adversary commits to a hash value
D (which is not random) that he makes public and claims (falsely) that he possesses
knowledge of unknown events (events in the future) and that D is the hash of that
knowledge. Later, when the corresponding events occur, the adversary tries to herd
the (now publicly known) knowledge of those events to hash to D as he previously
claimed. The attack is based on a diamond structure and proceeds in two main phases.
• phase 1: construct the diamond and calculate the value D.
• phase 2: given a prefix, find a suffix and herd it to D through the diamond.
IV
M
F-1
M
F
D
M
1
M
2
…
…
…
.
…
…
…
…
……
……
Figure 3-4: Diamond structure
In phase 1, the attacker constructs a diamond structure as shown in figure 3-4,
where the vertices are hash values and the edges are messages. If two messages meet
in a vertex, they collide at that vertex. Initially, the attacker randomly generates an
arbitrary large number of initial messages, M1, . . . ,MF , hashes them and tries to find
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collisions, then repeats until reaching the root of the diamond, D. Once the diamond
is constructed, any path from the initial messages to D will hash to D. In phase 2, the
attacker herds a given prefix P to hash to D as follows: first, the attacker searches for
a suitable 1-block suffix S that if concatenated with P , it will produce a hash colliding
with one of the hash values of the initial messages H(Mi) where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , F}; for
2k initial messages, 2n−k trials are required to find such a suffix (where n is the length
of the final hash). Once a match is found, P , S and the sequence of messages from the
matching H(Mi) to D are concatenated, and this whole string will eventually hash to
D. The herding attack was recently extended to non-Merkle-Damg˚ard constructions
[67, 10]. A more detailed complexity analysis of the herding and diamond-based attacks
are presented in [148], which points out a flaw in the construction proposed in [91]
to produce a diamond structure, and provide computational complexity analysis for
constructing the diamond. To resist this attack, hash functions should possess the
Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) pre-image resistance property; see section 2.2.4.
3.3.3 Variants of Merkle-Damg˚ard
The discovery of the weaknesses reported in section 3.3.2 drove the research commu-
nity to propose modified variants of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction that patch such
weaknesses. In this section, we present a few examples of both keyless and keyed con-
structions (most of which trade off efficiency for security). Note that some of these
constructions use different padding algorithms than the standard one in figure 3-1.
Wide and Double Pipe. One of the earliest proposals to enhance the Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction is the wide/double pipe by Lucks [101] who showed that in-
creasing the size of the internal state (i.e., the chaining variable) to become larger
than the size of the final hash value, would significantly improve the security of the
hash function. This modification clearly thwarts the extension attack since in the
wide/double pipe the final hash value is truncated, so in order to append an extension,
the unknown discarded bits have to be guessed, which is clearly difficult if the number
of the discarded bits is non-trivial. Furthermore, by increasing the size of the internal
state, finding collisions for the compression function becomes harder, which complicates
the other generic attacks. An obvious drawback of the wide/double pipe, however, is
a degraded efficiency as the compression function now has larger input/output while
keeping the hashing rate constant (length of message block is fixed) since the chaining
variable input is increased. Also, adapting existing hash functions for the wide/double
pipe may be difficult since it might be the only reasonable way to increase the internal
state is to use multiple compression function calls in parallel for every iteration. Re-
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cently, Yasuda [161] adopted a slightly modified variant of the double pipe construction
and proved its unforgeability beyond the birthday barrier.
The 3C Construction. Another variant of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is the
3C construction [75] which basically maintains a variable containing a value produced
by repeatedly XORing the chaining variables while hashing a message; this variable
is then processed in an extra finalisation call to the compression function. Figure 3-5
illustrates the 3C construction (where P is a padding function). An enhanced variant
of 3C is 3C+ which uses extra memory, but makes finding multi-block collisions more
difficult (not to be confused with multi-collision attack, see section 2.2). However,
in [88], it was shown that both 3C and 3C+ are indeed susceptible for multi-block
attack; this was demonstrated using a recent attack against MD5 that was found to
be applicable for both the plain Merkle-Damg˚ard and 3C/3C+. Furthermore, 3C does
not resist multi-collision, 2nd pre-image and herding attacks [73, 74].
M1 M2 Ml
IV yFf f f... f
p...
n
n
m
n
Algorithm 3Cf
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV, t = 0
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = f(Mi, yi−1)
t = t⊕ yi
return
yF = f(P (t), y`)
Figure 3-5: The 3C construction
The Prefix Free, Chop, NMAC and HMAC Constructions. Several construc-
tions were proposed by Coron et al. in [48] as immediate fixes to the Merkle-Damg˚ard
construction after showing that the latter is not indifferentiable from RO (see sec-
tion 2.3 for details about the indifferentiability notion). However, Bellare and Risten-
part [24] later showed that even though these constructions are indifferentiable from
RO, they are not collision resistant. The prefix-free construction does not modify the
Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, instead it modifies the padding algorithm to make sure
that the message is prefix free. One way to do this is by prepending or appending
the length of the whole message to every message block. However, beside wasting a
few bits to represent the length of the message in every block and so degrading the
efficiency, this obviously does not work well with streaming applications (where the
length of the message is not known beforehand). The chop construction basically re-
moves a non-trivial number of bits from the final hash value. This, while it solves the
38
3.3. Iterative Hash Functions 3. Design of Hash Functions
indifferentiability issue, unfortunately lowers the security bounds of the hash function.
In NMAC, an independent function g is applied to the output of the last application of
the compression function, while in HMAC an extra compression function call is intro-
duced. The NMAC and HMAC constructions proposed by Coron et al. in [48] are not
to be confused with the popular NMAC/HMAC [1, 21] developed as MACs. Coron’s
NMAC and HMAC constructions are illustrated in figure 3-6.
Ml
IV yFf f... g
M2
f
n
m
n
M1
Algorithm NMACf,g
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = f(Mi, yi−1)
return yF = g(y`)
Ml
IV f f...
M1
f
n
m
yFf
n
0m 0m-n
Algorithm HMACf
M →M1 . . .M`
M0 = 0m, y0 = f(M0, IV )
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = f(Mi, yi−1)
return
yF = f(y`||0m−n, IV )
Figure 3-6: The NMAC and HMAC constructions
The Merkle-Damg˚ard with Permutation. In [81] Hirose et al. proposed the
Merkle-Damg˚ard with Permutation (MDP) construction which introduces very minor
modification to the plain Merkle-Damg˚ard. The only difference between the plain
Merkle-Damg˚ard and MDP is that in MDP the chaining variable input of the last com-
pression function is permuted. The authors proved that MDP is indifferentiable from
RO while the collision resistance of MDP follows trivially from the collision resistance
of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction as the former introduces minimal changes to the
latter. The authors also discussed the security of possible simple MAC constructions
based on MDP. However, although with such a simple modification, the authors suc-
ceeded in proving a significant security gain, MDP seems to be able to thwart only
the extension attack, but not other Merkle-Damg˚ard generic attacks. Also, recently it
was shown that MDP is neither pre-image nor 2nd pre-image resistant [11]. Figure 3-7
illustrates MDP, where pi(.) is a permutation function.
Randomized Hashing. Randomized hashing [78] is not quite a variant of Merkle-
Damg˚ard, rather it is a generic fix that can be applied to any construction (including
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Algorithm MDPf
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to `− 1 do
yi = f(Mi, yi−1)
return y` = f(pi(y`−1),M`)
Figure 3-7: The MDP (Merkle-Damg˚ard with Permutation) construction
Merkle-Damg˚ard). In randomized hashing the input of the hash function is randomised
using a salt, leaving the construction unmodified; figure 3-8 illustrates the RMX trans-
form [79], which is an instantiation of the randomized hashing paradigm. The authors
claim that randomized hashing will strengthen any hash function, even the weakest
ones. Randomized hashing was originally proposed for digital signatures where a mes-
sage M is first randomised with a salt r to produce a randomised message M ′. A digital
signature sig is then generated from M ′. The original message M , the salt r and the
signature sig are then sent to the verifier. When the verifier receives these parameters,
it first randomises M with r to produce M ′ and carries out standard signature verifi-
cation using M ′ and sig. Randomized hashing for digital signatures are standardised
by NIST in [57].
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Algorithm RMXfr
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = f(r, IV )
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = f(Mi ⊕ r, yi−1)
return y`
Figure 3-8: The RMX construction
HAIFA Framework. HAsh Iterative FrAmework (HAIFA) is a modified Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction proposed by Dunkelman and Biham [66], see figure 3-9 for an
illustration. HAIFA modifies Merkle-Damg˚ard by introducing extra input parameters
to the compression function. These are: a salt value (used as a key to create families
of hash functions—if only one hash function is needed, the salt is set to 0), and the
number of bits hashed so far, which thwarts many of the generic attacks against the
plain Merkle-Damg˚ard construction since the input to every compression function call
becomes (with high probability) unique and highly dependent on where the compres-
sion function call is made through the hashing chain. In fact, HAIFA can be considered
a dedicated-key hash function [25]. The idea of adding additional input parameters to
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the compression function has been previously proposed by Rivest through a process
called dithering [132]; though a 2nd pre-image attack against dithered hash functions
was reported by Andreeva et al. in [9]. An obvious drawback of HAIFA is efficiency
degradation since the compression function now has more input parameters to pro-
cess. Furthermore, HAIFA cannot be (easily) used to patch existing Merkle-Damg˚ard
based hash functions because a compression function designed for the Merkle-Damg˚ard
construction would not naturally accommodate the extra HAIFA parameter inputs.
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Algorithm HAIFAhs
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = h(Mi, yi−1, bi, s)
return y`
Figure 3-9: The HAIFA framework
Enveloped Merkle-Damg˚ard. The Enveloped Merkle-Damg˚ard (EMD) construc-
tion was proposed in [24] by Bellare and Ristenpart when they were introducing their
multi-property-preserving notion, where they recommend that a particular hashing
scheme should preserve multiple properties at the same time. This stemmed from the
fact that they were able to prove the four constructions proposed by Coron et al. in
[48] are not collision resistant while still being indifferentiable from RO. Bellare and
Ristenpart showed that EMD preserves collision resistance, indifferentiability from RO
and indistinguishability from Pseudorandom Function (PRF). Figure 3-10 illustrates
EMD.
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Algorithm EMDfIV1,IV2
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV1
for i = 1 to `− 1 do
yi = f(Mi, yi−1)
return
y` = f(yi−`||M`, IV2)
Figure 3-10: The EMD (Enveloped Merkle-Damg˚ard) construction
Nested Iteration. An and Bellare proposed the Nested Iteration (NI) mode of op-
eration while they were proving that the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction can be used
to construct a Variable-Input-Length (VIL) MAC from a Fixed Input Length (FIL)
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MAC. NI is basically a keyed variant of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction making use
of two keys k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1}k. Figure 3-11 illustrates the NI construction. Beside being
unforgeable, Bellare and Ristenpart later proved in [25] that NI is also indistinguishable
from PRF, indifferentiable from RO, and if strengthening was used, NI is also collision
resistant. However, neither NI nor its strengthened variant is target collision resistant
(TCR); see section 2.7 for discussion about the TCR property.
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Algorithm NIhK1,K2
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to `− 1 do
yi = h(K1,Mi, yi−1)
return y` = h(K2,M`, y`−1)
Figure 3-11: The NI (Nested Iteration) construction
Shoup (Sh) Construction. In [141], Shoup proposed an elegant keyed construction.
In addition to the key input of the compression function, the chaining variables of every
compression function iteration in Sh is further XORed with a key mask; figure 3-12
illustrates the Sh construction. A variant of the Sh construction has been proposed by
Bellare and Ristenpart in [25] that makes the last compression function call a wrapping
call (this last application of the compression function is called an envelop). Thus,
this variant is called the Envelop Shop (ESh), which has been proven to preserve
five important properties, namely: collision resistance, unforgeability, indifferentiability
from RO, indistinguishability from PRF and TCR. In [129] Reyhanitabar et al. further
showed that ESh preserves the ePre property but not Sec, aSec, Pre and aPre (for
information about these properties, see section 2.7 and [135]).
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Algorithm Shh
K,Kmask
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = h(yi−1 ⊕Kmask,Mi)
return y`
Figure 3-12: The Shoup construction
Chaining Shift. The Chaining Shift (CS) construction CS: {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n+n ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n was proposed by Maurer and Sjo¨din in [109] as a more efficient solu-
tion than the NI construction for constructing AIL-MAC from FIL-MAC; figure 3-13
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depicts the CS construction, which uses a FIL compression function f : {0, 1}m+n →
{0, 1}n. The CS construction was shown to be unforgeable [109], indistinguishable
from PRF [25], indifferentiable from RO [24], and the strengthened variant of it (with
strengthened padding) is collision resistant. Maurer and Sjo¨din have also simultane-
ously proposed the Chaining Rotate (CR) construction, which is similar to CS.
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Algorithm CShK,IV1,IV2
M →M1 . . .M`
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to `− 1 do
yi = h(yi−1,Mi)
return
y` = h(IV2||y`−1,M`)
Figure 3-13: The CS (Chaining Shift) construction
3.3.4 Sponge Construction
Based on totally different design principles than Merkle-Damg˚ard’s, the Sponge con-
struction is a newly proposed and promising hashing construction [33]. Basically,
sponge hashing proceeds in two phases, the absorbing phase and the squeezing phase
(and hence its name). The sponge operates on a fixed-length state b = {0, 1}r+c,
composed of r bits (called bit-rate) and c bits (called capacity), through a function
p : {0, 1}r+c → {0, 1}r+c which produces a transformation or permutation of b. In
the absorbing phase, the message is divided into r-bit blocks (padded if necessary)
and each block is XORed with the r part of b (initially, b = 0r+c), p then iteratively
processes b until all blocks are exhausted. In the squeezing phase, the state continues
to be transformed/permuted by p but this time the r parts of the states are returned
at every iteration as output blocks. Since the sponge construction supports variable
length output, the user chooses the length of the final hash value which determines
how many of the returned blocks in the squeezing phase need to be returned. Figure
3-14 illustrates the sponge construction. An example of a hash function based on the
sponge construction is Keccak [35] which has recently been selected (along with 4 oth-
ers) to advance to the final stage of the SHA-3 competition (see section 3.1). Recently,
Andreeva et al. introduced a generalisation of the sponge functions, which they call
“The Parazoa Family” [13].
Although still considered an iterative construction, the sponge is completely differ-
ent from the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction; which obviously means that the generic
attacks discussed in section 3.3.2 are not applicable. Moreover, the sponge construc-
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Algorithm Spngpn
M →M1 . . .M`
r = 0, c = 0
for i = 1 to ` do
p(r ⊕Mi, c) = (r, c)
for i = 1 to n do
Y = Y ||r
p(r, c)
return Y
Figure 3-14: The Sponge construction
tion has been proven to be indifferentiable from RO in [34]. However, that does not
mean that the sponge construction is not susceptible to other kinds of attacks, it is
just that (at the time of writing) such attacks have not been discovered yet. Recently,
Gorski et al. [77] showed that hash functions based on the sponge framework may be
susceptible to slide attack. An obvious disadvantage of sponges is that their relatively
large state slows down the full diffusion of bits, hence, the sponge construction may be
more suitable for hashing large messages.
3.4 Tree-based Hash Functions
Figure 3-15 illustrates a typical tree-based hashing construction. This is the most par-
allelisable class of constructions and is mainly suited for multi-core platforms where
multiple processors can independently operate on different parts of the message si-
multaneously. An early tree-based mode of operation was proposed by Damg˚ard [55]
which was later optimised by Sarkar and Scellenberg [140], and Pal and Sarkar [122].
Similarly, Bellare and Rogaway [27] used a tree-based approach to build UOWHFs
[116] which are weaker than collision-resistant hash functions. More recent works for
building tree-based UOWHFs include [99] and [139]. In [23] Bellare and Micciancio
proposed the randomize-and-combine paradigm, where the message is split into blocks,
randomised individually and then combined by an operation such as XOR (though
XOR-based combiners are broken by a linear algebra attack on long messages [103]).
Although this structure was originally proposed to build incremental functions5, it can
be thought of as a 2-level tree and can still be parallelised since the randomisation
process of the individual blocks are independent (i.e., can be carried out by different
threads/processors). Tree-based constructions are slightly less popular than the iter-
5An incremental function can efficiently update the digest of a previously hashed message to reflect
any changes without having to re-hash the whole message.
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Figure 3-15: Sample tree construction
ative ones because they are not as suitable for low-end platforms such as smart cards
and RFID, which limits their utility. Skein [69] and MD6 [133] hash functions (SHA-3
candidates) provide a tree hashing mode beside the conventional iterative mode.
3.5 Compression Functions
Some hash functions are built from scratch such as MD5 and SHA-1, these are called
dedicated hash functions. Others are built based on existing cryptographic or mathe-
matical components that were not originally designed to be used for hashing but could
be tailored to. So far, we have not explicitly discussed how to construct compression
functions because when we design a hash function, one would assume the presence of
a “good” compression function and design a construction accordingly. This obviously
becomes an issue in practice. Thus, some proposals were exclusively concerned with
building a compression function that preserves some property X and then adopt a suit-
able construction that is provably preserves X if the underlying compression function
also preserves X (e.g., the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is collision resistant if the
underlying compression function is also collision resistant).
3.5.1 Hash Functions Based on Block and Stream Ciphers
Building hash functions based on block ciphers is the most popular and established
approach. In this approach, the compression function is a block-cipher with its two
inputs representing a message block and a key. Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle
[127] studied the 64 possible ways of constructing hash functions from a block-cipher
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. These 64 constructions are sometimes called PGV
constructions after the authors’ initials who used an attack-based6 analysis approach
to study the security of these constructions. It was then reported that 12 out of the
64 PGV constructions are collision resistant, but later Black et al. [38] showed (using
proof-based approach this time) that another 8 PGV constructions are also collision
6Constructions that resisted the authors’ attacks were deemed secure.
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resistant if they were properly iterated, even if their underlying compression functions
are not collision resistant. The most widely adopted construction of these 20 PGV
construction is the one attributed to Davies and Meyer [110]: yi = f(yi−1,Mi)⊕ yi−1,
where yi−1 and Mi are the input of the compression function f , and yi is its output.
Another popular PGV construction is the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas construction [38], which
is the opposite of the Davies-Meyer one. In Matyas-Meyer-Oseas, the output of the
compression function yi is further XORed with the message block input Mi (rather
than the chaining variable yi−1 in Davies-Meyer). Further analyses and proofs of the
collision resistance and pre-image resistance of these PGV constructions in the ideal
cipher model can be found in [68] and [144]. Although PGV functions are provably
secure, they are inefficient because the key (which represents the message block input
of the compression function) is changed with every compression function call, and
this is undesirable with block-ciphers since changing the key rapidly requires huge
amount of computation (due to key setup). Thus, another approach is to use fixed-
key block-cipher based compression functions [37, 136, 142, 143]. In this approach, a
small non-empty set of keys are fixed and used for the block-cipher (when called by the
compression function), while wrapping the block-cipher with other arbitrary functions
to process the other compression function’s input that was previously used as a key.
However, Black et al. [37] proved that such construction, making a single call to the
fixed-key block-cipher, although efficient, cannot be collision resistant.
An inherent problem with designing hash functions based on block-ciphers is that
block ciphers usually have small block size (e.g., 128 bit) which is insufficient to main-
tain an acceptable hash function security7, unless the result of the hash function can be
expanded, which proved to be even more difficult. A particularly interesting solution to
this dilemma is designing double block length (DBL) compression functions where the
compression function outputs double the size of the underlying block-cipher [115, 80].
Clearly, however, DBL based hash functions still scarify some efficiency.
Although the stream-cipher-based approach is less popular than the block-cipher
one, in the recent SHA-3 competition, some of the successful second round candidates
were based on stream-ciphers (e.g., CubeHash [31]). The main differences between
block-cipher and stream-cipher based hash functions are the block size and the number
of rounds. In block-cipher-based, message blocks are usually large, and iterated a small
number of rounds, while in stream-cipher-based, message blocks are small, with more
rounds. Thus, in block-cipher-based, a good compression function is necessary but in
stream-cipher-based, even a weak compression function may provide sufficient security.
7For a block size of 128 bit, a collision can be found in 264 operations due to the birthday attack,
which may be at the edge of feasibility with the recent supercomputers processing technologies.
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3.5.2 Hash Functions Based on Mathematical Problems
The majority of today’s well known hash functions process the message by mixing its
bits in such a way that fulfils the various security and statistical requirements, but
their security cannot usually be mathematically proven since they are not based on
mathematical models. Provably secure cryptographic hash functions, on the other
hand, is a class of hash functions that are based on mathematical problems where a
rigorous mathematical proof can be derived such that it reduces breaking these hash
functions to finding a solution to some hard mathematical problems. Examples of
such hash functions include: hash functions based on the discrete logarithm problem
[39, 45], hash functions based on the factorisation problem [46], hah functions based on
finding cycles in expander graphs [44], etc. Designing several cryptographic primitives,
including hash functions, based on the Knapsack problem8 was more popular during
the 90’s. Although these schemes had good software and hardware performance, most
of them are broken [125] which made knapsack based design approach less attractive.
An example of such hash functions is the one proposed by Damg˚ard [55] based on
additive knapsack which was cryptanalysed in [123], and the LPS hash function [44]
based on a multiplicative knapsack, which was cryptanalysed in [149].
Another example of provably secure hash functions is syndrome-based hash func-
tions [17, 18] which are based on an NP-complete problem known as Regular Syn-
drome Decoding. However, even though syndrome-based hash functions are provably
secure, cryptanalytic results were published against several versions of these functions
[49, 138, 72]. A recent syndrome based hash function is FSB [16] which was submitted
to the SHA-3 competition, but failed to progress to round 2 of the competition, mostly
due to its slow performance and excessive memory consumption, which seems to be the
case with most hash functions based on mathematical problems (e.g., while the authors
of DAKOTA [56] claim that it performs better than many other modular arithmetic-
based hash functions, it is still approximately 18 times slower than SHA-256). Recently,
Bernstein et al. [32] proposed an enhanced variant of FSB, called RFSB (Really fast
FSB), and claimed that it runs at 13.62 cycles/byte, which is faster than SHA-2.
3.5.3 Other Approaches
Occasionally, attempts were made to adopt less common approaches when designing
hash functions, most of which have not attracted much interest. In this section, we
discuss two such approaches: chaos-based and cellular automata based hash functions.
8Knapsack is a famous combinatorics problem, requiring the optimised selection of items d1, . . . , dn,
where each item has a value vi and a weight wi, such that the sum of the values
Pn
i=1 vi is maximised
while keeping the sum of the weights
Pn
i=1 wi less than a particular threshold T .
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Chaos-based Hash Functions. Chaos theory is the mathematical representation
of dynamic systems. These systems possess many desirable properties that suit the
requirements of hash functions. For example, chaotic systems are very sensitive to
changes in their initial values, potentially fulfiling the desirable hash function property
requiring the output of the hash function to be highly sensitive to changes in its input;
this phenomena is called the avalanche effect (also called butterfly effect in the chaos
theory literature). Moreover, chaotic systems are one way functions and unpredictable.
Hash functions based on chaos theory use chaotic maps, which are functions that exhibit
particular chaotic behaviours; examples of these maps include: logistic map [104],
tent map [162], and cat map [59]. Unfortunately, most chaos-based hash functions
suffer from poor efficiency due to their inherent complex structure, which makes them
unattractive as a practical approach for building hash functions.
Cellular Automata-based Hash Functions. Cellular Automata (CA) are discrete
time models consisting of collections of cells organised in a grid, and each cell has a
current state. The states of the cells evolve over time depending on their current states
and the states of the neighbouring cells. CA were originally used by von Neumann [153]
while he was studying self-reproducing systems and then popularised by Wolfram’s
substantial work in this area [158] who observed that based on simple rules, very
complex behaviours can be obtained. Damg˚ard was the first to propose a hash function
based on CA [55], but his proposal was cryptanalysed by Daemen et al. [51] who, in
turn, proposed another CA-based hash function, called CellHash. The same authors
later proposed SubHash [52] which is an improved version of CellHash; both CellHash
and SubHash are hardware-oriented and were cryptanalysed in [42]. Another hash
function based on CA was proposed by Mihaljevie et al. [112].
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we provided a thorough discussion of the state of art of hash functions
design. Roughly speaking, hash functions can either be keyless or keyed. Each class
has different applications and is based on different design principles. Hash functions
can also be classified as iterative or parallel. While iterative functions are indeed the
most common, parallelisable hash functions are increasingly being popularised with the
rapid advent of parallel systems. We provided a lengthy discussion about the popular
Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, how it fell prey to various generic attacks and what
modifications were proposed to patch it. Finally, we also discussed how compression
functions are being designed and what approaches are adopted.
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Integrated-Key Hash Functions
Traditionally, hash functions were designed in the keyless setting, where a
hash function accepts a variable-length message and returns a fixed-length
fingerprint. Unfortunately, over the years, significant weaknesses were re-
ported on instances of some popular keyless hash functions. This has moti-
vated the research community to start considering the dedicated-key setting,
which also allows for more rigorous security arguments. However, it turns
out that converting an existing keyless hash function into a dedicated-key
one is non-trivial since the keyless compression function does not normally
accommodate the extra key input. In this chapter we formalise an approach
that can potentially solve this problem. In this approach, keyless hash func-
tions are seamlessly transformed into keyed variants by introducing an extra
component accompanying the (still keyless) compression function to handle
the key separately. Hash functions constructed in this setting are called
integrated-key hash functions. We propose several integrated-key construc-
tions and prove their collision, pre-image and 2nd pre-image resistance.
4.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a research proliferation in the cryptographic hash func-
tions. Hash functions have traditionally been designed in the keyless setting where a
construction (iteration mode) Hf :M→ {0, 1}n with access to a keyless compression
function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n hashes a variable-length message M ∈M by it-
eratively calling f . However, as a result of the recent attacks [154, 155, 156] against sev-
eral widely used keyless hash functions, such as MD5 and SHA-1, another approach has
increasingly been popularised. In that approach hash functions are constructed in the
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dedicated-key setting [25], where a family of hash functions Ch : K×M→ {0, 1}n, with
access to a publicly keyed compression function h : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n,
is constructed, such that instances (members) of Ch are indexed by different public keys
ki ∈ K. Hash functions constructed in the dedicated-key setting are not to be confused
with secretly keyed hash functions usually used to build Message Authentication Codes
(MACs); these are discussed extensively in chapter 6.
Dedicated-Key. In [25], Bellare and Ristenpart discussed in length the benefits of
the dedicated-key setting and showed how adopting this setting potentially improves
hash function heterogeneity, which enables users to utilise different instances of the
same hash function family. That is, if an attack against an instance (member) of the
hash function family (specified by a particular key) was found, then it only breaks that
particular instance while very likely having almost negligible (or even no) effect on
other instances (indexed by different keys). The dedicated-key setting also improves
the security guarantees of hash functions and gives an easy solution to Rogaway’s
foundation of hashing dilemma [134], which states that keyless hash functions cannot
be collision resistant due to the pigeonhole principle (see section 2.1) where he solved it
by means of explicit (but slightly complex) problem reduction. Instead, the dedicated-
key setting allows for simpler and more straightforward theoretical arguments about
collision resistance of hash functions. An obvious drawback of the dedicated-key setting
is slight efficiency loss due to the introduction of an extra input (i.e., the key) that the
hash function needs to process beside the message input, but such efficiency loss seems
to be unavoidable in any keyed setting.
Integrated-Key. Unfortunately, in most cases, existing keyless hash functions can-
not be easily turned into dedicated-key hash functions1 because their corresponding
keyless compression functions do not naturally accommodate the key input introduced
in the dedicated-key setting. This means that the dedicated-key approach may, in most
cases, only be used in designing new hash functions, not to patch/strengthen existing
ones. Thus, in this chapter we try to answer the following question:
Given a keyless hash function Hf : M → {0, 1}n, where f : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, how to construct a keyed hash function C : K ×M →
{0, 1}n from Hf without modifying the internal structure of f , while still
keying the compression function as in the dedicated-key setting?
1MAC schemes (e.g., HMAC) can trivially turn keyless hash functions into keyed ones, but these
schemes are secretly keyed, while here we are interested in the dedicated-key setting, where keys are
publicly-known.
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While here we explicitly require keyless hash functions to be keyed as in the dedicated-
key setting (where the key is processed with every application of the compression
function), there are other approaches that can key a hash function without strictly
adhering to this requirement, which makes adapting a keyless hash function to accept
a key input easy and efficient. So, why do we insist on matching the dedicated-key
setting, while there are other cheaper and more convenient approaches? To answer
this question, let’s consider an example where a keyless hash function is keyed by
processing the key only at the last compression function call (e.g., EMD [24]). Now
suppose that an attack exploiting the intermediate chaining variables was found, this
should readily break the whole function family because apart from the last compression
function call, the whole hashing procedure is common for all members. Clearly, this
is not the case with the dedicated-key hash functions. Therefore, in this chapter, we
introduce a bridging approach that seamlessly transforms a keyless hash function into
a dedicated-key one without modifying the internal (keyless) structure of the former,
we call hash functions constructed in this setting integrated-key hash functions.
Related Work. There is a distinction between merely creating families of hash func-
tions and creating them in the dedicated-key setting, where the latter explicitly states
that all applications of the compression function should be keyed. Examples of con-
structions forming families of hash functions, but without keying all compression func-
tion applications, are EMD (Enveloped Merkle-Damg˚ard) [24], and BCM (Backward
Chaining Mode) [15]. EMD was originally proposed as a keyless hash function intro-
ducing a second IV which can be used as a key. On the other hand, BCM was explicitly
proposed as a way of creating families of hash functions out of keyless compression func-
tions, but it still does not strictly follow the dedicated-key approach since the keys are
not applied to every applications of the compression function. A proposal that can be
seen as a variant of an integrated-key construction is RMX [79] which is based on the
randomized hashing paradigm [78] (see section 3.3.3 for detailed description of the RMX
construction). RMX performs some sort of key whitening (a block-cipher technique)
by combining a random salt (i.e., a key) with every message block before sending it
to the compression function. However, randomized hashing is more suitable for digital
signatures where the hash function is used by the signature algorithm as a black-box.
That is, since the message M in RMX is merely XORed with the publicly available key
K, it is possible to retrieve parts of M via some differential and linear cryptanalysis
techniques [36, 106], but if RMX is used in digital signatures, the signature algorithm
will further process the hash value produced by RMX, potentially resisting differen-
tial/linear cryptanalysis. Other recent hash functions such as Skein [69] and MD6 [133]
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support both keyless and keyed modes, but to the best of our knowledge, there is cur-
rently no formal work considering integrated-key-like constructions (creating families
of dedicated-key hash functions out of keyless primitives).
Chapter Outline. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2 we
introduce and formally define the integrated-key approach of designing hash functions
and discuss both its advantages and drawbacks. In section 4.3 we proposed several
Merkle-Damg˚ard-based integrated-key constructions, and then proceed in section 4.4
to prove that these constructions are collision resistant (in section 4.4.1), 2nd pre-image
resistant (in section 4.4.2) and pre-image resistant (in section 4.4.3).
4.2 Integrated-key Hash Functions
In the integrated-key setting, we start with a keyless hash function Hf and convert it
to a dedicated-key hash function2 Cˆf,g by leaving the (keyless) compression function f
untouched and introducing a lightweight mixing function g that handles the extra key
input independently outside f , we call g the integration function. In particular, the
integrated-key approach creates families of hash functions Cˆf,gK = {Cˆf,gk1 , Cˆ
f,g
k2
, . . . , Cˆf,gkn }
out of keyless hash functions, where each member is indexed by a different key ki ∈ K.
Formally, the integrated-key hash functions are defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.1 (Integrated-key hash functions). A hash function family Cˆf,g :
K×M→ {0, 1}n, with access to a keyless compression function f : {0, 1}m×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, and a keyed integration function g : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}b → {0, 1}b with b ∈ {n,m},
is said to be in the integrated-key setting if given a variable-length message M ∈M and
a fixed-length key k ∈ K, M is iteratively processed by f in fixed-length blocks, while k
is processed by g at least with every application of f .
In the integrated-key setting, both the compression function and the integration func-
tion can still be treated as a single composite component and thus simulating the
dedicated-key setting. Indeed, in chapter 6 we formally show that the integrated-key
variant of a particular hash function is indistinguishable from its dedicated-key variant,
except with negligible probability. We emphasise that the integrated-key approach cre-
ates families of hash functions from keyless hash functions by only changing the way
the key input is handled, it will not, however, strengthen or remedy any construction-
2We denote a dedicated key hash function by C. (with access to a keyed compression function),
while its integrated-key variant is denoted by Cˆ.,. (with access to both a keyless compression function
and an keyed integration function).
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based weakness of a keyless hash function should its dedicated-key variant3 be already
vulnerable to such weakness. That is, if a particular keyless hash function is susceptible
to some attacks and those attacks can be thwarted if we transform that function to
a dedicated-key one, then transforming it to an integrated-key hash function will still
thwart those attacks. However, if such attacks cannot be thwarted at the dedicated-key
setting, they will not be thwarted at the integrated-key setting. This obviously holds
because the two settings are indistinguishable as we will show in chapter 6.
Key Generation and Usage. Like the dedicated-key setting, keys in the integrated-
key setting are fixed, meaning that once a key is specified, the same key is repeatedly
used at every hashing iteration; using more than one key to hash a single message
implies that more than one members of the hash function family are used to hash a
message, which is an uncommon practice and clearly further degrades the efficiency.
We also require the key to be random. In fact, in section 6.2.2, we show that if keys are
generated randomly, integrated-key hash functions are indistinguishable from Pseudo-
random Functions (PRF), where the latter is an idealisation of a hash function, see
section 2.4 for information about PRF. Finally, we assume that the keys are generated
by honest parties, but this is not a major concern since most practical hash functions
applications, such as digital signatures, message authentication codes (MAC) etc., only
require security for honestly generated keys [25].
Efficiency. Obviously, the integrated-key approach is less efficient than the keyless
one, increasing the computational overhead of hashing a message M by at least ` · τg,
where τg is the cost of the integration function g, and ` is the number of message
blocks of M . The efficiency of an integrated-key hash function highly depends on the
implementation of g, which ideally should be a lightweight (but sufficiently mixing)
function. In the dedicated-key setting, on the other hand, the mere introduction of the
key increases the input space of the compression function so even with a lighter im-
plementation of the compression function (which may trade off security for efficiency),
the function still needs to deal with a larger input; see appendix A for a comprehensive
investigations in how to optimise the efficiency of hash functions implementations.
Compatibility. The main motivation for introducing the integrated-key setting is
to conveniently convert a keyless hash function to a dedicated-key one. In this sense,
3We obtain the dedicated-key variant of a keyless hash function by modifying the latter’s keyless
compression function to accommodate the key input introduced in the dedicated-key setting (a process
that is usually expensive and non-trivial in practice).
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the integrated-key setting can be considered a variant of the (more general) dedicated-
key setting. Thus, the two settings are clearly compatible (you can convert one to
another if required). This is also immediate from our indistinguishability result in
section 6.2.1 where we showed that an adversary cannot distinguish between the two
settings. In fact, in an abstract level, both the compression and integration functions
at the integrated-key setting can be seen as a single compressing entity accepting a key
input, which resembles a conventional dedicated-key compression function (i.e., thus,
abstractly, the dedicated-key and integrated-key settings are equivalent).
4.3 The iMD Constructions
In this section, we propose three integrated-key constructions based on the popular
(strengthened) Merkle-Damg˚ard construction [111, 55], namely4 x-iMD (input-based
iMD), y-iMD (chaining-based iMD), c-iMD (output-based iMD), which we collectively
called the “iMD constructions”. Figure 4-1 illustrates the constructions graphically
and provides pseudocode. Before initiating the hashing process, the message is padded
by the padding function Pads(.), which appends a 1 bit followed by 0r bits, such that
r + 1 + 〈M〉β mod d = 0, where 〈M〉β is a β-bit encoding of the message length |M |
(the most common value of β is 64); this algorithm is illustrated in figure 3-1. In x-iMD
and y-iMD, the message block Mi, respectively the chaining variable yi−1, is processed
by the integration function before calling the compression function. In contrast, c-iMD
calls the integration function only after calling the compression function. In all the
constructions, the compression functions fx, fy, fc : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and
the integration functions g1 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, g2 : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
are treated as black-boxes that are called iteratively by the constructions while hashing
the message. All constructions additionally apply an extra application of g2 before
returning the final hash value; as will be shown in section 4.4, this “enveloping” call
hides the internal structure of the schemes and thus improves their security. Our iMD
constructions bear some resemblances to the NMAC construction proposed in [48] at
the keyless setting.
The integration function can be any lightweight sufficiently mixing function. We
suggest adopting the prepend-permute-chop (PPC) paradigm, which was proven in-
differentiable from RO in [133, 63]. The integration function can then be defined as
follows: g(K, c) = [pi(K||c)]n, where pi is a random permutation and [X]n is the most
significant n-bits of X. A practical example of a function adopting the PPC approach
4The names of the constructions are derived from the notation used in representing their in-
puts/outputs and indicate where the integration function is placed around the compression function.
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Algorithm x-MDfx,g1,g2(M)
M1...M` ← Pads(M)
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = fx(g1(K,Mi), yi−1)
return z` = g2(K, y`)
IV
n nn
... g2g2g2 g2 zl
KMlK
mk
M2M1 K K
fy fy fy
Algorithm y-MDfy ,g2(M)
M1...M` ← Pads(M)
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = fy(Mi, g2(K, yi−1))
return z` = g2(K, y`)
K
IV ...
KK
m
n
k
nn
K
zlg2 g2g2 g2
M2M1 Ml
fc fc fc
Algorithm c-MDfc,g2(M)
M1...M` ← Pads(M)
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = g2(K, fc(Mi, yi−1))
return z` = g2(K, y`)
Figure 4-1: Graphical representation and pseudocode of the iMD constructions
is the compression function of MD6 [133], where the random permutation pi is repre-
sented by a series of operations, but unlike the MD6 compression function, for the sake
of our integration function, these operations should be sufficiently light to maintain
acceptable overall hashing efficiency. There might be other potential candidates for the
integration function, but we do not discuss the design of the integration function any
further; in chapter 7, we list this as an extension to the thesis.
4.4 Security Analysis
In the following subsections we prove that x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD are collision resistant
(CR), pre-image resistant (Pre) and 2nd pre-image resistant (Sec). The CR and the
Sec proofs are provided in the standard model, while the Pre proof is provided in the
Random Oracle Model (ROM). The proofs of this chapter adopt similar approaches
to the ones in [14, 15, 109] while being conducted in the integrated-key setting. In
the following proofs we adopt the standard cryptographic proof approach which proves
that a construction preserves a particular property given that its underlying primitives
already preserve this property (see section 2.8 for details about cryptographic proof
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approaches). However, it can be argued that one of the goals of the integrated-key
setting is to strengthen a weak compression function, potentially contradicting our
proof approach (i.e., we prove that a construction preserves xxx, given its compression
function preserves xxx, but we know that the compression function does not preserve
xxx). This means that we are making slightly strong assumptions on the compression
functions, which is the case, except that while strengthening hash functions is one
motivation of using the integrated-key approach, it is not the only nor the main one.
Indeed, the Integrated-key setting is mainly used to convert keyless hash functions into
dedicated-key ones for applications requiring the latter (not necessarily to strengthen
the former). As discussed in section 4.2, the integrated-key setting will only strengthen
a function as much as its dedicated-key variant does, meaning that the integrated-key
variant of a keyless function will only provide as much security as what its dedicated-key
variant can provide, but not better. Therefore, to simplify the proof, we will follow the
general standard proof approach and assume that both the compression and integration
functions preserve xxx to prove that the iMD constructions also preserve xxx.
4.4.1 Collision Resistance (CR)
One can argue that since the iMD constructions introduce minor modifications to the
(strengthened) Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, and the latter is collision resistant [55],
then the iMD constructions are also collision resistant. In this section we formalise
this argument. That is, given a key K, we prove that F (M) 6= F (M ′) holds as long as
M 6= M ′, except with negligible probability, where F ∈ {x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD}.
Theorem 4.4.1 (CR of x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD). Let the keyless compression func-
tions fx : fy : fc : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be (tfx ,m + n, fx)-cr, (tfy ,m +
n, fy)-cr, (tfc ,m + n, fc)-cr, and let the keyed integration functions g1 : {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be (tg1 ,m + k, g1)-cr, (tg2 , n +
k, g2)-cr. Then, x-iMD
fx,g1,g2, y-iMDfy ,g2, c-iMDfc,g2 accessing {fx, g1, g2}, {fy, g2},
{fc, g2}, respectively, are (tx, L, x)-cr, (ty, L, y)-cr, (tc, L, c)-cr, such that:
1. for x-iMD: x ≤ fx + g2 + g1 , and tx ≤ (tfx+tg2+tg1 )−3`·τfxτg1−τg23
2. for y-iMD: y ≤ 2g2 + fy , and ty ≤
(tfy+2tg2 )−τg2 (3`·τfy+1)
3
3. for c-iMD: c ≤ 2g2 + fc , and tc ≤ (tfc+2tg2 )−τg2 (3`·τfc+1)3
where τfx , τfy , τfc are the costs of calling the compression functions fx, fy, fc, and
τg1 , τg2 are the costs of calling the integration functions g1 and g2, respectively, L =
max{|M |, |M ′|}, ` = d(L + 1 + β)/me, β is the length of the encoding of L, and m is
the length of a single message block.
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Proof. Since the iMD constructions use strengthening (appending the length of the
message before hashing it), we have iMD(K,M) 6= iMD(K,M ′) trivially holds as long
as |M | 6= |M ′| for any iMD construction. Thus, here we will only consider the case
when |M | = |M ′|. Let Ax, Ay, Ac be (tx, L, x)-cr, (ty, L, y)-cr, (tc, L, c)-cr adversaries
against x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD, and let B1,x, B2,x, B3,x, B1,y, B2,y, B3,y, B1,c, B2,c, B3,c
be (tB1,x ,m + n, B1,x)-cr, (tB2,x , k + n, B2,x)-cr, (tB3,x , k + m, B3,x)-cr, (tB1,y ,m +
n, B1,y)-cr, (tB2,y , k+n, B2,y)-cr, (tB3,y , k+n, B3,y)-cr, (tB1,c ,m+n, B1,c)-cr, (tB2,c , k+
n, B2,c)-cr, (tB3,c , k+n, B3,c)-cr, adversaries against the compression functions fx, fy, fc
and the integration functions g1, g2, as defined in figures 4-2, 4-3, 4-4. In the x-iMD, y-
iMD, c-iMD games, the adversaries {B1,x, B2,x, B3,x}, {B1,y, B2,y, B3,y}, {B1,c, B2,c, B3,c}
run the adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac, respectively, as follows:
• adversaries B1,x, B1,y, B1,c attack fx, fy, fc to find internal collisions,
• adversaries B2,x, B2,y, B2,c attack the last (randomising) application of the inte-
gration function g2 to find a collision in the final hash value,
• adversary B3,x attack the iterative internal calls of g1 in the x-iMD game, while
adversaries B3,y, B3,c attack the iterative internal calls of g2 in the y-iMD and
the c-iMD games (B3,y and B3,c are identical except that one of them attack the
y-iMD game while the other attack the c-iMD game).
Throughout the games, adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac output message pairs M 6= M ′ which are
then parsed by adversaries B1,x, B2,x, B3,x, B1,y, B2,y, B3,y, B1,c, B2,c, B3,c into blocks
and hashed iteratively. The probabilities that a collision is found in those games are
then the probabilities that adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac succeed in outputting collisions. Con-
versely, if adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac found a collision, this implies that at least one of the
adversaries B1,x, B2,x, B3,x, B1,y, B2,y, B3,y, B1,c, B2,c, B3,c succeeded in their collision
games. That is, generally, collisions in the iMD constructions must be the result of
collisions in the internal compression function, the internal integration function, or the
last finalisation call of the integration function. This holds as long as we make the
explicit assumption that the output of all functions are uniformly distributed, which is
a common assumption in most cryptographic proofs (see section 1.3), especially that
the output of one function is usually fed to the input of another.
In the x-iMD game, the probability that B1,x and B2,x will succeed are the collision
probabilities of fx and g2 respectively, that is AdvcrB1,x = fx and Adv
cr
B2,x = g2 .
Similarly, the probability thatB3,x will succeed is the collision probability of the internal
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Adversary B1,x
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ax(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = fx(g1,K(xi), yi−1)
zi = yi
z′i = fx(g1,K(x
′
i), y
′
i−1)
z′i = y
′
i
if zi = z′i ∧ (g1,K(xi), yi−1) 6=
(g1,K(x′i), y
′
i−1);
then α = i; break;
end for
if α = 0
then return ⊥
else return
(xα, yα−1), (x′α, y′α−1)
Adversary B2,x
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ax(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = fx(g1,K(xi), yi−1)
zi = yi
z′i = fx(g1,K(x
′
i), y
′
i−1)
z′i = y
′
i
end for
if g2,K(z`) = g2,K(z′`)∧
zi 6= z′i
then α = 1
if α = 0,
then return ⊥
else return
(x`, y`−1), (x′`, y
′
i−`)
Adversary B3,x
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ax(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = fx(g1,K(xi), yi−1)
zi = yi
z′i = fx(g1,K(x
′
i), y
′
i−1)
z′i = y
′
i
if g1,K(xi) = g1,K(x′i)∧
xi 6= x′i
then α = i; break;
end for
if α = 0,
then return ⊥
else return
(xα, yα−1), (x′α, y′α−1)
Figure 4-2: Adversaries B1,x, B2,x, B3,x in the CR game
Adversary B1,y
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ay(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = fy(xi, g2,K(yi−1))
zi = yi
z′i = fy(x
′
i, g2,K(y
′
i−1))
z′i = y
′
i
if zi = z′i ∧ (g2,K(xi), yi−1)
∧(g2,K(x′i), y′i−1);
then α = i; break;
end for
if α = 0,
then return ⊥
else return
(xα, yα−1), (x′α, y′α−1)
Adversary B2,y
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ay(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = fy(xi, g2,K(yi−1))
zi = yi
z′i = fy(x
′
i, g2,K(y
′
i−1))
z′i = y
′
i
end for
if g2,K(z`) = g2,K(z′`)
∧zi 6= z′i
then α = 1
if α = 0
then return ⊥
else return
(x`, y`−1), (x′`, y
′
`−1)
Adversary B3,y
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ay(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = fy(xi, g2,K(yi−1))
zi = yi
z′i = fy(x
′
i, g2,K(y
′
i−1))
z′i = y
′
i
if g2,K(yi−1) = g2,K(y′i−1)
∧xi 6= x′i
then α = i; break;
end for
if α = 0
then return ⊥
else return
(xα, yα−1), (x′α, y′α−1)
Figure 4-3: Adversaries B1,y, B2,y, B3,y in the CR game
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Adversary B1,c
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ac(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = g2,K(fc(xi, yi−1))
zi = yi
z′i = g2,K(fc(x
′
i, y
′
i−1))
z′i = y
′
i
if (xi, yi−1) 6= (x′i, y′i−1)∧
fc(xi, yi−1) = fc(x′i, y
′
i−1)
then α = i; break;
end for
if α = 0
then return ⊥
else return
(xα, yα−1), (x′α, y′α−1)
Adversary B2,c
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ac(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = g2,K(fc(xi, yi−1))
zi = yi
z′i = g2,K(fc(x
′
i, y
′
i−1))
z′i = y
′
i
end for
if g2,K(z`) = g2,K(z′`)
∧zi 6= z′i
then α = 1
if α = 0
then return ⊥
else return
(x`, y`−1), (x′`, y
′
`−1)
Adversary B3,c
K
$←− K;α = 0
{M,M ′} ← Ac(K)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
x1, . . . , x` ← Pads(M ′)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for i = 1 to i = ` do
zi = g2,K(fc(xi, yi−1))
zi = yi
z′i = g2,K(fc(x
′
i, y
′
i−1))
z′i = y
′
i
if fc(xi, yi−1) 6= fc(x′i, y′i−1)
∧zi = z′i; then α = i
break;
end for
if α = 0
then return ⊥
else return
(xα, yα−1), (x′α, y′α−1)
Figure 4-4: Adversaries B1,c, B2,c, B3,c in the CR game
integration function g1, that is AdvcrB3,x = g1 . Succinctly,
Pr[CollAx ] = Pr[CollB1,x ] + Pr[CollB2,x ] + Pr[CollB3,x ]
AdvcrAx = Adv
cr
B1,x + Adv
cr
B2,x + Adv
cr
B3,x
= Advcrfx + Adv
cr
g2 + Adv
cr
g1
≤ fx + g2 + g1
The success probabilities of B1,y, B2,y, B3,y in the y-iMD game are similar to those
in the x-iMD game above, except that in y-iMD the internal integration function is g2
instead of g1, that is AdvcrB3,y = g2 . Succinctly,
Pr[CollAy ] = Pr[CollB1,y ] + Pr[CollB2,y ] + Pr[CollB3,y ]
AdvcrAy = Adv
cr
B1,y + Adv
cr
B2,y + Adv
cr
B3,y
= Advcrfy + Adv
cr
g2 + Adv
cr
g2
≤ fy + g2 + g2 ≤ 2g2 + fy
In the c-iMD game, the integration function g2 is located behind the compression
function fc, so for B1,c, if a collision is found in fc, it will propagate through g2 and will
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generate an internal collision, this happens with probability AdvcrB1,c = fc . Similarly,
it is easy to see that B2,c and B3,c succeed with probability g2 each. Succinctly,
Pr[CollAc ] = Pr[CollB1,c ] + Pr[CollB2,c ] + Pr[CollB3,c ]
AdvcrAc = Adv
cr
B1,c + Adv
cr
B2,c + Adv
cr
B3,c
= Advcrfc + Adv
cr
g2 + Adv
cr
g2
≤ fc + g2 + g2 ≤ 2g2 + fc
The running time tx of x-iMD is the running time of the adversary Ax (which out-
puts the collision). The latter is calculated based on the running times ofB1,x, B2,x, B3,x,
which call adversary Ax as part of their execution, thus, intuitively, the running time of
Ax is less than the running times of B1,x, B2,x, B3,x, where the running time of the latter
is the time of hashing the messages M,M ′. However, occasionally, B1,x, B2,x, B3,x will
terminate before hashing the whole message (if they find a collision). Therefore, the
running time of B1,x, B2,x, B3,x is B1,x +B2,x +B3,x ≤ 3(τAx + `(τfxτg1)) + τg2 , where
τfx , τg1 , τg2 are the costs of running fx, g1, g2, respectively, and ` = d(L+1+β)/me such
that L = max{|M |, |M ′|}, β is the length of the encoding representing L in bits and m
is the length of a single message block5. We multiple τfxτg1 by 3 because all adversaries
execute fx and g1 iteratively, but add one instance of g2 because only adversary B2,x
executes the finalisation call of g2. Finally, solving for τAx , we get:
τAx ≤
(B1,x +B2,x +B3,x)− 3` · τfxτg1 − τg2
3
The running times of τAy , τAc in the y-iMD, c-iMD games are calculated similarly.
τAy ≤
(B1,y +B2,y +B3,y)− 3` · τfyτg2 − τg2
3
≤ (B1,y +B2,y +B3,y)− τg2(3` · τfy − 1)
3
τAc ≤
(B1,c +B2,c +B3,c)− 3` · τfcτg2 − τg2
3
≤ (B1,c +B2,c +B3,c)− τg2(3` · τfc − 1)
3
This completes the proof.
5We add an extra 1 bit to L and β to adhere to the padding rules.
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4.4.2 2nd Pre-image Resistance (Sec)
2nd pre-image resistance is directly implied by collision resistance (every collision re-
sistant hash function is also 2nd pre-image resistant) [135]. This holds if we assumed
that the underlying compression function is collision resistant. However, collision resis-
tance is a much stronger assumption than 2nd pre-image resistance, and since a central
goal in cryptography is to develop proofs based on as weak assumptions as possible, in
this section we prove that the iMD constructions are 2nd pre-image resistant assum-
ing that the compression/integration functions possess weaker-than collision resistance
properties. That is, given a key K and a message M , we prove that an adversary
cannot find a 2nd message M ′ such that F (K,M) = F (K,M ′), except with negligible
probability, where F ∈ {x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD}. One may think that since our iMD
constructions are variants of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, and the keyed Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction is not 2nd pre-image resistant [14], then this implies that our
iMD constructions are not 2nd pre-image resistant too (as the two are indistinguishable
due to the result in chapter 6). We show that this is not the case. While we consider
our iMD constructions close variants of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, they are
not identical to it due to the addition of a finalisation call to the integration function
g2 in the iMD constructions. However, for technical reasons (which we will discuss
later) we were still unable to prove the Sec security of our iMD constructions based on
the assumption that the compression functions are only 2nd pre-image resistant (Sec).
Instead, we assume that the compression functions possess a property that is weaker
than collision resistance (but slightly stronger than Sec), namely that the compression
functions are fixed suffix 2nd pre-image resistant (s-Sec); we still assume, nevertheless,
that the integration functions are (the weaker) 2nd pre-image resistant (Sec). We first
define the s-Sec notion.
Definition 4.4.2 (Fixed Suffix 2nd Pre-image (s-Sec)). A function F is said to
be s-Sec if given a message M ||S and its hash value F (M ||S), it is infeasible for
any (computationally bounded) adversary A to find a 2nd message M ′||S such that
F (M ||S) = F (M ′||S) while M ′ 6= M and S is an arbitrary suffix string of fixed length.
We can now proceed to prove that the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions are Sec
secure given that their compression functions are s-Sec secure and their integration
functions are Sec secure.
Theorem 4.4.3 (Sec of x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD). Let the keyless compression func-
tions fx : fy : fc : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be (tfx ,m + n, fx)-s-sec, (tfy ,m +
n, fy)-s-sec, (tfc ,m + n, fc)-s-sec, and the keyed integration functions g1 : {0, 1}k ×
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{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be (tg1 ,m + k, g1)-sec, (tg2 , n +
k, g2)-sec, then the constructions x-iMD
fx,g1,g2, y-iMDfy ,g2, c-iMDfc,g2 with access to
{fx, g1, g2}, {fy, g2}, {fc, g2}, are (tx, L, x)-sec, (ty, L, y)-sec, (tc, L, c)-sec, such that:
• for x-iMD: x ≤ ` ·(g1 +fx) ·g2(2−`), and tx ≤ (tfx + tg1)−2(` ·τfxτg1 +τg2)
• for y-iMD: y ≤ ` · fyg2(2− `), and ty ≤ (tfy + tg2)− 2(` · τfyτg2 + τg2)
• for c-iMD: c ≤ ` · (g2 + fc) · g2(2− `), and tc ≤ (tfc + tg2)−2(` · τfcτg2 + τg2)
where τfx , τfy , τfc are the costs of calling the compression functions fx, fy, fc, and τg1 , τg2
are the costs of calling the integration functions g1, g2, respectively, L = max{|M |, |M ′|},
M ′ is a 2nd pre-image of M , ` = d(L + 1 + β)/me, β is the length of the encoding of
L, and m is the length of a single message block.
Proof. Let Ax be (tAx , L, Ax)-sec adversary against x-iMD that upon receiving a mes-
sage M and a key K, it outputs a 2nd pre-image M ′ with probability x, such that
x-iMD(K,M) = x-iMD(K,M ′), and M 6= M ′. Also, let Bx be (tBx ,m + n, Bx)-s-sec
adversary against the compression function fx of x-iMD and Gg1 , Gg2 be (tGg1 , k +
m, Gg1 )-sec, (tGg2 , k + n, Gg2 )-sec adversaries against the integration functions g1, g2,
respectively. Let Ay, Ac and By, Bc be defined similarly for y-iMD, c-iMD, and fy, fc.
We define composite adversaries Dx, Dy, Dc representing the composition of the com-
pression and the integration functions (fx ? g1), (fy ? g2), (fc ? g2), respectively, where ?
is a composition operation and is construction dependant. Formally, let the adversaries
Dx, Dy, Dc be (tDx ,m+n, Dx)-sec/s-sec, (tDy ,m+n, Dy)-sec/s-sec, (tDc ,m+n, Dc)-
sec/s-sec, which are formally defined in figure 4-5.
General Approach. First, we describe the general Sec attack and use a slightly
clearer (but informal) notation than the one used in the definitions of figure 4-5. We
refer to the composite adversary attacking the composition of the compression and the
integration functions as D (this represents Dx, Dy, Dc). We also refer to the adversary
attacking the iMD constructions as A (which represents Ax, Ay, Ac). We will later
decompose D and distinguish between the different A’s. The attack proceeds as follows:
1. D generates a random message M $←− {0, 1}λ of length λ and pads it appropriately
using Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthening Mstrengthened = Pads(M), where Pads is
as defined in figure 3-1.
2. D is then given an m-bit message block challenge xˆ $←− {0, 1, }m which he needs
to embed in Mstrengthened.
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3. D now needs to construct a key and a new message with xˆ embedded in.
4. D chooses a random index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}, where ` = Mstrengthened/m (the num-
ber of blocks inMstrengthened) andm is the length of a single block inMstrengthened.
5. D embeds xˆ in Mstrengthened by replacing the i-th message block in Mstrengthened
with xˆ, thus, for example, the modified message becomes Mˆstrengthened = {x1, . . . ,
xi−1, xˆ, xi+1, . . . , x`}, for ` ≥ 5 and 1 < i < `.
6. D then generates a random key K $←− {0, 1}k, unpads Mstrengthened and submits
both K and Mmodified = Pads(Mˆstrengthened)−1 to A.
7. Since A is a 2nd pre-image adversary, it will return a 2nd pre-image with proba-
bility A, that is M ′
$←− A(K,Mmodified). This means that necessarily at least one
of the blocks of M ′ collides with one of the blocks in Mmodified. Then with prob-
ability 1/`, the colliding block in Mmodified will be the i-th (embedded earlier)
block, that is Mmodified[i] = xˆ. Thus,
Advsec/s-secD = 1/` ·AdvsecA
where D’s advantage is taken over the Sec and s-Sec games since it is a composi-
tion of B, whose advantage is taken over a s-Sec game, and G, whose advantage
is taken over a Sec game. Solving for A, we then have:
AdvsecA = ` ·Advsec/s-secD
Recall that A’s advantage should also account for the final randomisation call of
g2 (this is absent in D’s advantage since D is not affected by this call). However,
this finalisation call of g2 is made only once after processing all the ` message
blocks, so we should not multiple g2’s Sec advantage by ` because it is used only
in the last block to finalise the hash output. Thus, the advantage of A is:
AdvsecA = ` ·Advsec/s-secD ·
(
AdvsecGg2 − (`− 1)Adv
sec
Gg2
)
= ` ·Advsec/s-secD ·
(
AdvsecGg2 −
(
` ·AdvsecGg2 −Adv
sec
Gg2
))
= ` ·Advsec/s-secD ·
(
AdvsecGg2 − ` ·Adv
sec
Gg2
+ AdvsecGg2
)
= ` ·Advsec/s-secD ·
(
2 ·AdvsecGg2 − ` ·Adv
sec
Gg2
)
= ` ·Advsec/s-secD ·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
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To simplify the expression, here we multiple all the advantages by `, and then
subtract ` − 1 from the advantage of the last g2 call to remove the extra in-
stances that were multiplied implicitly in the expression. We now calculate the
Advsec/s-secD for every iMD construction and obtain the full Sec Advantage.
Before we derive the exact advantages of each iMD construction, it remains to discuss
why we used the s-Sec notion on the compression functions fx, fy, fc. Recall that we
are deriving the advantages of adversary A against the iMD constructions in terms of
the advantage of adversaries B and G against the compression functions fx, fy, fc and
the integration functions g1, g2, respectively. However, in the Sec attack above, while
we were embedding xˆ in the original message to produce a 2nd pre-image, there was
no way to manipulate the corresponding chaining variable at the location where xˆ was
being embedded such that when it is concatenated with xˆ, the compression function
will return a 2nd pre-image. The s-Sec notion (as defined in definition 4.4.2) solves this
problem by fixing the chaining variable.
Advantage of x-iMD. Recall that in x-iMD the message block is pre-processed by
g1 before being passed to fx. Thus, when we embed xˆ in the i-th position of M by
replacing mi with xˆ, we get a 2nd pre-image if:
1. m1 and xˆ collide at g1, that is g1(K,mi) = g1(K, xˆ), or
2. m1 and xˆ do not collide at g1, i.e., g1(K,mi) 6= g1(K, xˆ), but then their g1 outputs
g1(K,mi), g1(K, xˆ) collide at fx, that is fx(g1(K,mi), X) = fx(g1(K, xˆ), X), while
g1(K,mi) 6= g1(K, xˆ), where X ∈ {0, 1}n is some fixed string.
In case (1), we only need to account for the Sec advantage of g1 (that g1 will return
a 2nd pre-image), while in case (2) we need to account for the s-Sec advantage of fx.
Thus the Sec advantage of Ax is:
AdvsecAx = ` ·Advsec/s-secDx ·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
= ` ·
(
AdvsecGg1 + Adv
s-sec
Bx
)
·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
≤ ` · (Gg1 + Bx) · Gg2 (2− `)
≤ ` · (g1 + fx) · g2(2− `)
Advantage of y-iMD. Similar analysis can be used to derive the Sec advantage of
adversary Ay in the Sec game against y-iMD, except here g1 is not involved which
makes the calculation even easier. Also, in y-iMD the integration function g2 is applied
to the chaining variable input of fy and so does not affect the s-Sec advantage of fy,
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meaning that the advantage of g2 does not have to be accounted for in the overall
advantage of the game. That is,
AdvsecAy = ` ·Advs-secDy ·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
= ` ·Advs-secBy ·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
≤ ` · ByGg2 (2− `)
≤ ` · fyg2(2− `)
Advantage of c-iMD. The advantage of c-iMD resembles that of x-iMD except g1
in x-iMD is replaced by g2 in c-iMD. That is, the block xi is first embedded in the
message, but a second pre-image is found if:
1. mi and xˆ collide at fc, or
2. mi and xˆ do not collide at fc, such that fc(mi, X) 6= fc(xˆ, X), where mi 6= xˆ, but
their fc outputs collide at g2, that is g2(K, fc(mi, X)) = g2(K, fc(xˆ, X)), where
X ∈ {0, 1}n is some fixed string.
Case (1) implies that the s-Sec game of fc is successful, and case (2) implies that the
Sec game of g2 is successful. Succinctly,
AdvsecAc = ` ·Advsec/s-secDc ·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
= ` ·
(
AdvsecGg2 + Adv
s-sec
Bc
)
·AdvsecGg2 (2− `)
≤ ` · (Gg2 + Bc) · Gg2 (2− `)
≤ ` · (g2 + fc) · g2(2− `)
The time complexity (the adversarial running time) of Dx, Dy, Dc is the execution
time of Ax, Ay, Ac in addition to two evaluations of x-iMD or y-iMD or c-iMD (to hash
the message and its 2nd pre-image), where the latter implicitly include a finalisation
call to g2. That is, tDx = tAx + 2(` · τg1τfx + τg2). Since tDx = tBx + tGg1 , and solving
for tAx , we get tAx = tBx + tGg1 − 2(` · τg1τfx + τg2), where τfx , τg1 , τg2 are the costs of
calling fx, g1, g2, respectively. tAy and tAc are calculated similarly.
4.4.3 Pre-image Resistance (Pre)
Unlike CR and Sec, it turned out that providing Pre proofs in the standard model is
inherently difficult. Thus, in this section, we instead prove that the iMD constructions
are Pre in the random oracle model (where fx, fy, fc, g1, g2 are modelled as ROs), but
first we define two notions that we will use in the proof.
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Adversary Dx(xˆ)
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}λ
x1, x2, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for j = 1 to j = ` do
zj = fx(g1,K(xj), yj−1)
yi = zj
end for; i $←− {1, 2, . . . , `}
Pads(M)← replace(xi, xˆ)
M˜ ← unpad(Pads(M))
M ′ ← A(K, M˜)
for j = 1 to j = ` do
z′j = fx(g1,K(x
′
j), y
′
j−1)
y′j = z
′
j
if xi 6= x′j ∧ zi = z′j
then return (x′i, y
′
i−1)
else return ⊥
end for
Adversary Dy(xˆ)
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}λ
x1, x2, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for j = 1 to j = ` do
zj = fy(xj , g2,K(yj−1))
yj = zj
end for; i $←− {1, 2, . . . , `}
Pads(M)← replace(xi, xˆ)
M˜ ← unpad(Pads(M))
M ′ ← A(K, M˜)
for j = 1 to j = ` do
z′j = fy(x
′
j , g2,K(y
′
j−1))
y′j = z
′
j
if xi 6= x′j ∧ zi = z′j
then return (x′i, y
′
i−1)
else return ⊥
end for
Adversary Dc(xˆ)
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}λ
x1, x2, . . . , x` ← Pads(M)
y0 = y′0 = IV
for j = 1 to j = ` do
zj = g2,K(fc(xj , yj−1))
yj = zj
end for; i $←− {1, 2, . . . , `}
Pads(M)← replace(xi, xˆ)
M˜ ← unpad(Pads(M))
M ′ ← A(K, M˜)
for j = 1 to j = ` do
z′j = g2,K(fc(x
′
j , y
′
j−1))
y′j = z
′
j
if xi 6= x′j ∧ zi = z′j
then return (x′i, y
′
i−1)
else return ⊥
end for
Figure 4-5: (Composite) Adversaries Dx, Dy, Dc in the Sec game
Definition 4.4.4 (Full inversion). The full invasion of a function F , denoted inv(F ),
implies retrieving an input of F from knowledge of a corresponding output. Formally,
let F be a function, then given Y , inv(F (Y )) = M , where F (M) = Y .
Definition 4.4.5 (Partial inversion). The partial invasion of a function F , denoted
p-inv(F ), implies retrieving part of the function’s input from knowledge of only its
output. Formally, let F (M) = Y be a function returning Y on input M , and let
|M | > λ, then p-invλ(F (Y )) = Mλ, where Mλ is the λ most significant bits of M .
A particular output Y may have more than one image M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, such that
F (M1) = F (M2) = · · · = F (Mn) = Y , thus the full and partial inversions of Y may
return any (part of any) image. Full and partial inversions are not particularly new
notions, but we formally define them here since we will explicitly use them in the proof.
Theorem 4.4.6 (Pre of x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD). Let the keyless compression func-
tions fx : fy : fc : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and the keyed integration func-
tions g1 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be mod-
elled as Random Oracles, then x-iMDfx,g1,g2, y-iMDfy ,g2, c-iMDfc,g2 with access to
{fx, g1, g2}, {fy, g2}, {fc, g2}, respectively, are (tx, qx, x)-pre, (ty, qy, y)-pre, (tc, qc, c)-
pre, such that:
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• x = q5x(`− 1)/22(2m+n), and tx = qAx ((`− 1)τfxτg1 + τg2) + τfxτg1
• y = q5y(`− 1)/22(m+n)+n, and ty = qAyτg2
(
(`− 1)τfy + 1
)
+ τfy
• c = q5c (`− 1)/22(m+2n), and tc = qAcτg2 ((`− 1)τfc + 1) + τfcτg2
for any number of queries qx, qy, qc, where ` is the number of blocks in the message to be
inverted, which is known, τfx , τfy , τfc are the costs of calling the compression functions
fx, fy, fc and τg1 , τg2 are the costs of calling the integration functions g1, g2.
Proof. Let Ax, Ay, Ac be (tAx , qAx , Ax)-pre, (tAy , qAy , Ay)-pre, (tAc , qAc , Ac)-pre ad-
versaries against x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD, respectively. Given a hash value x-iMDK(M) =
Y and a random key K ∈ {0, 1}k, Ax inverts Y after qAx queries to x-iMD with proba-
bility Ax ; adversaries Ay and Ac function similarly. In order for adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac
to be able to invert a given Y , they have to invert the underlying primitives from which
x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD are built. That is, x-iMD iteratively calls a composite function
consisting of the keyless compression function fx : {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}n and the keyed
integration function g1 : {0, 1}k+m → {0, 1}m, then finalises the hashing process with
a call to the integration function g2 : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}n. Similarly, y-iMD accesses
fy : {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}n and g2 : {0, 1}k+n → {0, 1}n and iteratively processes the
message by calling the composition of fy and g2 then finalises the process with a sin-
gle call to g2; c-iMD functions similarly. We assume that Ax, Ay, Ac know the length
of M . This also means that Ax, Ay, Ac know how many blocks there will be after
padding, let ` be this number. In all constructions, Ax, Ay, Ac should first be able to
invert the finalisation call of g2, then invert the composition of the compression and
integration functions for as many blocks as the message to be recovered M consists
of. Finally, Ax, Ay, Ac need to only partially invert the first application of the com-
pression/integration composite function because they already know part of it, which
is the IV, and are only interested in recovering the message part. Thus, the inversion
probabilities are calculated as follows6:
AdvpreAx = Pr[inv(g2)] · (`− 1)Pr[inv(fx) · inv(g1)] · Pr[p-invm(fx) · inv(g1)]
=
qAx
2n
· (`− 1)
( qAx
2m+n
· qAx
2m
)
·
(qAx
2m
· qAx
2m
)
=
qAx
2n
· (`− 1) q
2
Ax
22m+n
· q
2
Ax
22m
=
qAx
2n
· q
4
Ax
(`− 1)
24m+n
=
q5Ax(`− 1)
22(2m+n)
6Since the RO does not exhibit collisions, there is only 1 input that will produce a given output,
so the probability that an adversary A will find the input for a giving output at output space (range)
of size 2n is 1/2n, and after making qA queries to the RO, this probability becomes qA/22.
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AdvpreAy = Pr[inv(g2)] · (`− 1)Pr[inv(fy) · inv(g2)] · Pr[p-invm(fy)]
=
qAy
2n
· (`− 1)
( qAy
2m+n
· qAy
2n
)
· qAy
2m
=
q5Ay(`− 1)
22(m+n)+n
AdvpreAc = Pr[inv(g2)] · (`− 1)Pr[inv(fc) · inv(g2)] · Pr[p-invm(fc) · inv(g2)]
=
qAc
2n
· (`− 1)
( qAc
2m+n
· qAc
2n
)
·
(qAc
2m
· qAc
2n
)
=
q5Ac(`− 1)
22(m+2n)
We multiply all the probabilities because this is a join probability, i.e., all the inversions
(events) have to occur in order for the Pre attack to success. Let τfx , τfy , τfc be the
costs of calling fx, fy, fc and τg1 , τg2 be the costs of calling g1, g2. Then the running
times of adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac are:
tAx = qAxτg2 + qAx(`− 1)τfxτg1 + τfxτg1 = qAx ((`− 1)τfxτg1 + τg2) + τfxτg1
tAy = qAyτg2 + qAy(`− 1)τfyτg2 + τfy = qAyτg2
(
(`− 1)τfy + 1
)
+ τfy
tAc = qAcτg2 + qAc(`− 1)τfcτg2 + τfcτgc = qAcτg2 ((`− 1)τfc + 1) + τfcτg2
The running times reflect the fact that both fx and g1, in case of x-iMD, and fc and g2
in the case of c-iMD, are called to invert the first message block in M since both the
compression and the integration functions in x-iMD and c-iMD need to be inverted in
order to obtain the message block input of the first iteration. However, in y-iMD, g2 is
placed at the chaining variable input of fy, thus it only suffices to partially invert fy to
obtain the first message block. Although the adversaries actually only partially invert
this first iteration, they still make the call to the compression/integration functions,
which, obviously, should be accounted for in the running time of the adversaries.
4.5 Summary
As a result to numerous recent attacks against the conventional keyless hash functions,
designers are now more inclined to construct their hash functions in the keyed setting,
which creates families of hash functions and, generally, provides better security guar-
antees. However, while it would be uneconomical to abandon today’s popular keyless
hash functions, converting them to keyed functions without modifying their keyless
primitives seems difficult. In this chapter, we proposed an easy and simple fix to this
problem by introducing a separate function accompanying the compression function
to handle the key input independently outside the compression function, we call this
setting the integrated-key setting. We further proposed 3 integrated-key constructions
and proved that they are collision, pre-image and 2nd pre-image resistant.
68
Chapter 5
Indifferentiability of the iMD
Constructions
In chapter 4 we introduced and formalised the integrated-key setting, where
keyless hash functions are seamlessly transformed into keyed variants, which
creates keyed hash functions out of “unmodified” keyless primitives. In this
chapter, we adopt the iMD constructions, proposed in chapter 4, and prove
that they are indifferentiable from random oracle. We show in details how to
develop such indifferentiability proofs in the integrated-key setting. Our in-
differentiability proof is generic and can be applicable to other hash functions
constructed in this setting if they exhibit sufficient structural similarities to
the iMD constructions.
5.1 Introduction
A classical problem in the hash function literature is how to formally argue about the
security of a hash function without the presence of keys [134]. This problem, along with
numerous cryptanalytic results [154, 155, 156] on some of the most popular keyless hash
functions, clearly demonstrate that there are inherent weaknesses in the keyless design
approach. A simple solution is to instead shift to keyed hash functions, but adopting
new hash functions is neither economical nor straightforward. In most cases, it is much
more convenient (and cheaper) to patch an existing hash function rather than shifting to
a new one, but then the underlying building blocks of a keyless hash function will need
to undertake non-trivial modifications to adapt for the key input. That is, a typical
keyless hash function Hh : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, with access to a keyless compression
function f : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, accepts a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ of variable-
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length, divides it into m-bit blocks (pads if necessary), and hash the blocks iteratively
by repeatedly calling f . In contrast, the compression function in a typical keyed setting
is keyed h : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}m×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, where the key K ∈ {0, 1}k is processed
alongside the other inputs. Clearly, converting f to h, without major modifications to
the underlying structure of f , is difficult, if at all possible. In chapter 4 we proposed
the integrated-key approach as a moderate solution to this problem which seamlessly
turns keyless hash functions into keyed ones without touching the underlying keyless
compression function. In this setting, a dedicated mixing function is introduced to
handle the key input independently outside the compression function. One of the most
important properties that hash functions should preserve is being indifferentiable from
a random oracle (RO). In this chapter, we show that the iMD constructions preserve
this property.
Chapter Outline. This chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2 we recall the
iMD constructions from chapter 4, then in section 5.3 we briefly describe the indifferen-
tiability framework due to Coron et al. [48], but for a comprehensive discussion about
this framework see section 2.3. Section 5.4 is the main part of this chapter where we
provide a detailed indifferentiability proof of the iMD constructions.
5.2 The iMD Constructions (Recalled)
As shown in chapter 3, most of the popular hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA-1) are
based on the (keyless) Merkle-Damg˚ard construction [111, 55]. Thus, in chapter 4,
we proposed several integrated-key constructions, called the iMD constructions, based
on the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction and proved that they preserve several important
security properties. In this chapter, we further show that the iMD constructions are in-
differentiable from RO. Although both the compression1 and the integration functions
can be visualised as a single entity, to obtain more accurate indifferentiability bounds,
we make an explicit separation between the two and show how indifferentiability proofs
are generally carried out in the integrated-key setting. Figure 5-1 recalls the definitions
of the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions from chapter 4 with slight modification in
x-iMD, where Pads(.) is a suffix-free padding (e.g., as defined in figure 3-1).
Formally, x-iMDfx,gx , y-iMDfy ,gy , c-iMDfc,gc : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, where
fx, fy, fc : {0, 1}m×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, gx : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, gy, gc : {0, 1}k×
1Most compression functions utilise the Davies-Meyer (DM) or the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO)
constructions, but we will assume that this is implicit and is hidden inside the (keyless) compression
function, so the output of the compression function f : x × y → c is actually c = c′ ⊕ x for DM and
c = c′ ⊕ y for MMO, where c′ is the output of the compression function before applying DM or MMO.
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x-iMDfx,gx(K,M) :
M1...M` ← Pads(M)
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = fx(gx(K,Mi), yi−1)
return y = gx(K, 0m−n||y`)
y-iMDfy ,gy(K,M) :
M1...M` ← Pads(M)
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = fy(Mi, gy(K, yi−1))
return y = gy(K, y`)
c-iMDfy ,gc(K,M) :
M1...M` ← Pads(M)
y0 = IV
for i = 1 to ` do
yi = gc(K, fy(Mi, yi−1))
return y = gc(K, y`)
Figure 5-1: Pseudocode for the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Instead of giving x-iMD a dedicated function to handle the last
finalising call, we use its own integration function gx and pad its input with m−n 0 bits.
This should not affect its security arguments, but will simplify the indifferentiability
proof (where we ignore the time it takes to do this padding). We do not have this
issue with y-iMD and c-iMD, so the definitions of y-iMD and c-iMD in figure 5-1 are
identical to those in figure 4-1 of chapter 4.
5.3 The Indifferentiability Framework
Proofs in the standard model (where adversarial resources are limited) can become
extremely difficult for sufficiently complex cryptosystem. This fact motivated Bel-
lare and Rogaway [26] to propose a formalism of the well known Random Oracle
Model (ROM) which assumes the presence of a publicly accessible ideal primitive that
when given an input, returns a random output. However, recent separation results
[40, 119, 20, 41, 108, 100] questioned the soundness of this model since, in practice,
ROs are being instantiated by hash functions, which may not always behave like ROs.
Consequently, based on the notion of indifferentiability by Maurer et al. [108], in [48]
Coron et al. introduced their hash function indifferentiability framework where a hash
function is proven indifferentiable from RO and thus is expected to behave like one. In
this framework, a distinguisher D (which plays the role of an adversary) is given oracle
access to two (separate) systems, we call the first system the real system, consisting
of a compression function and the construction under consideration (which needs to
be proven indifferentiable from RO), and we call the second system the ideal system,
consisting of a RO and a simulator (where the latter simulates the behaviour of the
compression function of the real system at the ideal system). Indifferentiability proofs
can be conducted in either the Random Oracle Model (ROM) or the Ideal Cipher
Model (ICM). The difference between these two approaches is that in the ROM, the
ideal compression function at the real system is modelled as RO, while it is modelled as
an ideal block-cipher in the ICM. In the latter case, the ideal block-cipher can receive
both forward and inverse queries because block-ciphers are invertible). Regardless of
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the adopted model, proofs in the indifferentiability framework proceed in two steps (as
discussed in section 2.3): first, we propose the simulator (simulating a compression
function or an ideal cipher), and then we prove that D’s view is similar when it inter-
acts with the real system as it is when it interacts with the ideal system (D cannot
distinguish between the two systems); see [43] for examples and discussions of how
indifferentiability proofs are developed in both ROM and ICM. The formal definition
of the indifferentiability framework is as follows [48] (where the constructions under
consideration is referred to as a Turing machine C, the ideal compression function as
H and the random oracle as F):
Definition 5.3.1 (Indifferentiability from RO). A Turing machine C with oracle
access to an ideal primitive H is said to be (tD, tS , q, )-indifferentiable from an ideal
primitive F if there exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher D it holds that:
|Pr[DC,H = 1]− Pr[DF ,S = 1]| < 
The simulator S has oracle access to F and runs in time at most tS. The distinguisher
runs in time at most tD and makes at most q queries to C,H,F or S. C is said to
be (computationally) indifferentiable from F if  is a negligible function of the security
parameter.
5.4 Indifferentiability of the iMD Constructions
In this section, we prove that the x-iMDfx,gx , y-iMDfy ,gy , c-iMDfc,gc constructions
are indifferentiable from RO in the Ideal Cipher Model (ICM), when the compression
functions fx, fy, fc and the integration functions gx, gy, gc are modelled as ideal block-
ciphers Hx,Hy,Hc,Gx,Gy,Gc, respectively. In [50], it was shown that the ROM and
the ICM are equivalent; that is, given a scheme secure in the ROM, it remains secure
in the ICM when the ROs is replaced by ideal ciphers, and conversely, given a scheme
secure in the ICM, it remains secure in the ROM when the ideal ciphers are replaced
by ROs. We adopt the ICM because most of the popular hash functions are (explicitly
or implicitly) based on block-ciphers.
The constructions x-iMDHx,Gx , x-iMDHy ,Gy , x-iMDHc,Gc treatHx,Hy,Hc and Gx,Gy,
Gc as black-boxes such that upon receiving a message M , they partition it into equally
sized blocks x1, . . . , x` and process each block in turn throughHx,Hy,Hc and Gx,Gy,Gc.
Formally, in c-iMD, Hc receives a message block xi ∈ {0, 1}m and a chaining variable
(or IV ) yi ∈ {0, 1}n, and returns a temporary variable ci ∈ {0, 1}n, which is immedi-
ately given to Gc along with the key K ∈ {0, 1}k to finally return zi ∈ {0, 1}n (note
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that for a sequence of consecutive blocks, yi+1 = zi). In x-iMD, on the other hand, the
integration function Gx is called before Hx to process K and xi which will return ci
that, along with yi, will be given to Hx to return zi. y-iMD is similar to x-iMD, except
in this case Gy processes K with yi instead of xi, where the latter is given to Hy along
with ci (the output of Gy) to produce zi.
In the ideal system, we introduce two simulators, the compression function and
the integration function simulators SF , RF , both with oracle access to the random
oracle F . Figure 5-2 depicts the indifferentiability games for the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD
constructions, showing how the distinguisher D accesses each system (where x-iMD,
y-iMD, c-iMD are denoted by by Cˆx, Cˆy, Cˆc, respectively).
5.4.1 The Distinguisher
The distinguisher D is an adversary with oracle access to two systems (the real and
ideal systems) and whose aim is to prove that these systems can be distinguished from
each other (but not necessarily finding out which system is which, rather all D aims for
is to show that the two systems behave differently). Precisely, D is given a blind oracle
access to the systems, meaning that there is an imaginary barrier between D and the
systems preventing D from seeing the systems, as depicted in figure 5-2. Trying to fool
the systems, D carries out a set of tests on one system by repeatedly (and strategi-
cally) querying that system’s different components and observes the responses, D sets
the success conditions and outputs 1 if these tests succeed, 0 otherwise2. Simultane-
ously, D carries out the same set of tests on the other system, observes the responses
and similarly outputs 1 or 0. D fails if both systems behaved consistently and then
the two systems are said to be indifferentiable from each other. D may send either
forward or inverse queries but format them differently depending on which component
they are sent to; thus, D indeed knows what type of components it is interacting with
(e.g., compression function, integration function etc.) but it does not know to which
system they belong. In some cases, D can choose to exclusively interact with a partic-
ular system for a period of time, but it will not be able to choose which system that
would be. Forward queries may be sent to any component in any system, but inverse
queries may only be sent to Hi,Gi, SFi , RFi , i ∈ {x, y, c}; these components can receive
inverse queries because we model the compression and the integration functions as
ideal block-ciphers where these are clearly invertible. When D sends an inverse query
to a particular component, it interacts with an inverse variant of that component A−1,
where A ∈ {Hi,Gi, SFi , RFi }. D communicates with the systems through three query
2In other words, D outputs 1 if it thinks that it is interacting with, e.g., the idea system, otherwise
it outputs 0 (or vice versa depending on D’s definition).
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channels, Ch1, Ch2, Ch3, which are connected to three interfaces, if1, if2, if3, at the
barrier separating D from the real and ideal systems.
• Ch1: D uses this channel to interact with the constructions CˆHi,Gii , i ∈ {x, y, c}
and the random oracle F . This channel supports only forward queries of the
form (K,M), where K ∈ {0, 1}k and M ∈ {{0, 1}m}∗, and delivers back to D the
response z ∈ {0, 1}n. To simplify the proof, we assume that |M | is a multiple of
m, we also ignore padding rules, but the proof still holds with padding included.
• Ch2: D uses this channel to interact with the ideal compression functions Hx,Hy,
Hc and their simulators SFx , SFy , SFc . It supports both forward and inverse queries
of the form (→, c, y) and (←, z, c) for SFx , (→, x, c) and (←, z, x) for SFy , and
(→, x, y) and (←, c, x) for SFc , then delivers back to D the appropriate responses,
namely, it returns z for queries (→, c, y), (→, x, c), y for queries (←, z, c), (←, c, x),
and c for query (←, z, x), (→, x, y).
• Ch3: D uses this channel to communicate with the ideal integration functions
Gx,Gy,Gc and their simulators RFx , RFy , RFc . Like Ch2, this channel also allows
both forward and inverse queries of the form (→, x,K) and (←, c,K) for RFx ,
(→, y,K) and (←, c,K) for RFy , and (→, c,K) and (←, z,K) for RFc , then delivers
back to D the appropriate responses: x for query (←, c,K), y for query (←, c,K),
c for queries (→, x,K),(→, y,K),(←, z,K), and z for query (→, c,K).
Each channel is split into two channels past its corresponding interface, one split for the
real system and another for the ideal system. Hence, when an interface ifx receives a
query from D, it creates two identical copies of that query and sends them off the other
end through the channel’s two splits, unless D chooses to exclusively interacts with a
single system for a period of time, in which case the interface chooses that system at
random (D cannot choose which system to interact with) and starts sending D’s queries
to the components of that system until D advises otherwise. That is, the interfaces
cannot randomly switch between the systems without an explicit request from D.
5.4.2 The Proof
In this section, we adopt the Ideal Cipher Model (ICM) and prove that the construc-
tions x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD, with access to the ideal ciphers Hx,Hy,Hc,Gx,Gy,Gc are
indifferentiable from a RO, except with negligible probability.
Theorem 5.4.1 (Indifferentiability of x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD). The block-cipher
based Integrated-key constructions x-iMDHx,Gx, y-iMDHy ,Gy , c-iMDHc,Gc, with oracle
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x
ˆ
xC x xS xR
D
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Real System Ideal System
(a) D’s view in the x-iMD game
y
ˆ
yC y yS yR
D
1Ch 3Ch
Real System Ideal System
(b) D’s view in the y-iMD game
c
ˆ
cC c cS cR
D
1Ch 3Ch
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(c) D’s view in the c-iMD game
Figure 5-2: The interaction between D and the real/ideal systems in the x-iMD, y-iMD,
c-iMD games
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access to the ideal block-ciphers Hx,Hy,Hc : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and the
ideal integration functions Gx : {0, 1}k ×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m,Gy,Gc : {0, 1}k ×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, modelled as ideal block-ciphers, are (tD, tS , q1, q2, q3, x)-indifferentiable (tD, tS ,
q1, q2, q3, y)-indifferentiable (tD, tS , q1, q2, q3, c)-indifferentiable from a random oracle
F in the ideal cipher model for Hx,Hy,Hc and Gx,Gy,Gc, any tD, tS ≤ (q1 ·L/m+q2+
q3) · (m + n), any number of queries q1, q2, q3 sent by D to x-iMDHx,Gx, y-iMDHy ,Gy ,
c-iMDHc,Gc, and:
x ≤
(
2n(5((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3) + 6((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3)2)
)
/22n
+ ((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3) /22n + (((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3)) /2m
y ≤
(
7((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3) + 6((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3)2
)
/2n
+
(
22((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3)2 + ((q1 · L/m) + q2 + q3)
)
/2m+n
c ≤
(
(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)(3 · 2m + 2m+1(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3) + 1))
)
/2m+n
+
(
2n(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)2
)
/2m+n
+
(
2(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3) + 3(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)2
)
/2n
where L is the maximum length of the query q1.
Proof. We prove the indifferentiability by means of a hybrid argument. We adopt the
game-playing approach [28, 48] (described in section 2.3.1) and prove that consecutive
games are indifferentiable from each other, stating the distinguishing probability when
applicable. Each game represents a state of the system which then evolves as the proof
progresses through the games. We start with G(1), Game 1, which represents the ideal
system (consisting of the RO and simulators of the ideal compression and integration
functions) and finish with G(8) (consisting of the construction and the ideal compres-
sion and integration functions), Game 8, which represents the real system. We denote
x-iMDHx,Gx , y-iMDHy ,Gy , c-iMDHc,Gc by CˆHx,Gxx , Cˆ
Hy ,Gy
y , Cˆ
Hc,Gc
c , respectively, and prove
that they are indifferentiable from the random oracle F . Below we integrate the in-
differentiability proofs of the three constructions noting that the real/ideal systems
of each proof may consist of slightly different components, which we will often state
explicitly.
The Simulators. We first propose the required simulators. The proof requires a
total of six simulators proposed in the ideal systems to simulate components in the real
systems. Simulators SFx , SFy , SFc simulate the ideal compression functions Hx,Hy,Hc
and simulators RFx , RFy , RFc simulate the ideal integration functions Gx,Gy,Gc, respec-
tively; all simulators have oracle access to F . The proof for CˆHx,Gxx uses SFx , RFx ,
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the proof for CˆHy ,Gyy uses SFy , RFy , and the proof for Cˆ
Hc,Gc
c uses SFc , RFc . Figure 4
graphically illustrates the input/output notation for each construction, we will use this
notation extensively throughout the proof. Each simulator pair SFi -R
F
i cooperatively
c
K
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m
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k
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gc
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K
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h
c
n nn
gy
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mk
zy
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x
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Figure 5-3: Input/output notation of the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions
maintains a table T Ki , that is initially empty ⊥ but gradually grow as D interacts with
SFi -R
F
i , where i ∈ {x, y, c}. Since integrated-key hash functions are actually families
of hash functions, where the individual function members are indexed by different keys
K ∈ K, SFi and RFi will maintain different tables T Ki for different keys (members).
Without loss of generality, here we will assume that we are interacting with a single
hash function member and that the key K is fixed throughout the proof. As illustrated
in figure 5-4, all tables contain 5-tuple records of the form (xsl,pi , y
sl,p
i , c
sl,p
i , z
sl,p
i , t
sl,p
i ),
where xi ∈ {0, 1}m, yi ∈ {0, 1}n are the message block and chaining variable (or IV),
zi ∈ {0, 1}n is the output of the ideal ciphers Hx,Hy (in the case of x-iMD and y-iMD)
or the output of the idea integration function Gc (in the case of c-iMD), and ci is the
output of the ideal integration functions Gx,Gy (in the case of x-iMD and y-iMD) or
the output of the ideal cipher Hc (in the case of c-iMD), such that:
ci ∈
{0, 1}m if ci ∈ T Kx{0, 1}n if ci ∈ T Ky ∪ T Kc
The index i ∈ {0, 1, . . . } of a record specifies the location of the tuple in tables
T Kx , T Ky , T Kc , the tag ti ∈ {⊥, 0, 1} indicates whether the tuple is part of a sequence,
and if it does sl indicates to which sequence (indexed by l ∈ {⊥, 0, 1, . . . }) this tuple
belongs, and p ∈ {⊥, 0, 1, . . . } specifies the exact location of the tuple in the sequence
sl. A sequence is an ordered list of tuples such that z
sl,p−1
a = y
sl,p
b , and is rooted by the
j-th tuple where ysl,0j = IV ; note that if two consecutive tuples in a sequence do not
have to be consecutive in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc (if zsl,p−1a = ysl,pb , then “a” does not have to be
“b−1”, while they are still indexed in succession in the sequence sl). A tuple belonging
to a sequence is called sequenced tuple, otherwise it is singular. To keep track of the
number of sequences, T Kx , T Ky , T Kc maintain counters C˜Kx , C˜Ky , C˜Kc which are initially
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set to 0 but are incremented every time a tuple with y = IV is encountered (recall
that we use the notation (underscore) to denote an arbitrary tuple in a table). As per
the definitions of SFi , R
F
i , i ∈ {x, y, c} below, a sequence has to be rooted by a tuple
where ysl,0 = IV , otherwise a sequence may not be formed, even if there are tuples in
T Kx , T Ky , T Kc that can be connected. Clearly, t = ⊥ implies l = p = ⊥; in fact, t here
acts as a switch to activate or deactivate the index sl (however, we may sometimes
drop the sl, p index when referencing tuples if it is not needed). Furthermore, tuples
in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc are required to be complete (there are no tuples with missing fields).
Figures 5-5 and 5-6 formally define simulators SFi , R
F
i , i ∈ {x, y, c} and their inverse
variants; these simulators are based on two simple rule:
1. The c value is always generated by a RO. If it was given in a query, c is further
processed through a RO, that is F(c).
2. Unless given in a query, the z value is always generated by a RO.
Below we describe the simulators in more details, recall that all simulators receive both
forward and inverse queries.
.
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Figure 5-4: Samples of tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc illustrating how tuples and sequences are
organised and linked
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Simulators SFx and (SFx )−1
1. On forward query (→, c, y), SFx searches T Kx for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such that
ci = c and yi = y, if found, it returns zi. Otherwise, SFx generates a new value
for x uniformly at random x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}, then SFx proceeds to generate
z as follows:
1(a). If y = IV , then SFx makes the query F(F(c), y) to the random oracle F to
obtain z, and sets t = 0, l = C˜K + 1, p = 0.
1(b). If there is a tuple (xsl,pi , y
sl,p
i , c
sl,p
i , z
sl,p
i , t
sl,p
i ) in T Kx such that y = zsl,pi , then
SFx obtains z by querying the random oracle F(F(c), y), while setting t = 1
and indexes the new tuple by sl, p+ 1.
1(c). Otherwise, SFx obtains z by querying F(F(c), y), and sets t = ⊥, with sl
deactivated.
2. On inverse query (←, z, c), (SFx )−1 searches T Kx for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that zi = z and ci = c, if found, it returns yi. Otherwise, (SFx )−1 generates
y uniformly at random y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Kx (zˆ) ∪ IV }, where T Kx (yˆ) and
T Kx (zˆ) extract all the y and z values in the table T Kx which, along with IV, will
be excluded from the value assigned to y, and similarly generates x uniformly at
random x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}, while setting t = ⊥, with sl deactivated.
Simulators RFx and (RFx )−1
1. On forward query (→,K, x), RFx searches T Kx for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that xi = x, if found, it returns ci. Otherwise, RFx generates y uniformly at
random y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Kx (yˆ)∪T Kx (zˆ)∪ IV }, then query F on x to obtain c, that
is c← F(K,x), and finally query F on y and c to obtain z, that is z ← F(y, c),
while setting t = ⊥ with sl deactivated.
2. On inverse query (←,K, c), (RFx )−1 searches T Kx for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that ci = c, if found, it returns xi. Otherwise, (RFx )−1 generates both x and y
uniformly at random: x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}, y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Kx (yˆ)∪T Kx (zˆ)∪IV },
and then generates z by querying F that is z ← F(F(c), y). Finally, it sets t = ⊥
with the index sl deactivated.
Simulators SFy and (SFy )−1
1. On forward query (→, x, c), SFy searches T Ky for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such that
xi = x and ci = c, if found, it returns zi. Otherwise, SFy generates y uniformly
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at random y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (zˆ) ∪ IV }. Then SFy obtains z by querying
F as follows: z ← F(x,F(c)), while setting t = ⊥, with sl deactivated.
2. On inverse query (←, z, x), (SFy )−1 searches T Ky for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that zi = z and xi = x, if found, it returns ci. Otherwise, (SFy )−1 generates
y uniformly at random y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (zˆ) ∪ IV }, and queries F to
obtain c such that c← F(K, y), while setting t = ⊥, with sl deactivated.
Simulators RFy and (RFy )−1
1. On forward query (→,K, y), RFy searches T Ky for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such that
yi = y, if found, it returns ci. Otherwise, RFy generates x uniformly at random
x
$←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}, and query F to generate c← F(K, y), then RFy proceeds
to generate z as follows (recall that z has to be generated to complete the new
tuple):
1(a). If y = IV , then RFy makes the query F(x, c) to the random oracle F to
obtain z, and sets t = 0, l = C˜K + 1 (increment the counter C˜) and p = 0.
1(b). If there is a tuple (xsl,pi , y
sl,p
i , c
sl,p
i , z
sl,p
i , t
sl,p
i ) in T Kc such that y = zsl,pi , then
RFy obtains z by querying the random oracle F(T ||x, c), where:
T = xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,p−1||xsl,p
which is a chain of queries rooted by the tuple indexed by sl, 0. Once the
new tuple is created, RFy indexes it by sl, p+ 1 while setting tsl,p+1 = 1.
1(c). Otherwise, RFy obtains z by querying F(x, c), and sets t = ⊥, with sl deac-
tivated.
2. On inverse query (←,K, c), (RFy )−1 searches T Ky for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that ci = c, if found, it returns yi. Otherwise, (RFy )−1 generates both x and y
uniformly at random: x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Ky (xˆ)}, y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Ky (yˆ)∪T Ky (zˆ)∪IV },
and then generates z by querying F such that z ← F(x,F(c)). Finally, it sets
t = ⊥ with the index sl deactivated.
Simulators SFc and (SFc )−1
1. On forward query (→, x, y), SFc searches T Kc for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such that
xi = x and yi = y, if found, it returns ci. Otherwise, SFc creates a new tuple
by querying F for c on input (x, y), that is c ← F(x, y), then SFc proceeds to
generate z as follows (recall that z has to be generated to complete the new tuple):
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1(a). If y = IV , then SFc makes the query F(K, c) to the random oracle F to
obtain z, and sets t = 0, l = C˜K + 1 (increment the counter C˜) and p = 0.
1(b). If there is a tuple (xsl,pi , y
sl,p
i , c
sl,p
i , z
sl,p
i , t
sl,p
i ) in T Kc such that y = zsl,pi , then
SFc obtains z by querying the random oracle F(K,T ||x), where:
T = xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,p−1||xsl,p
which is a chain of queries rooted by the tuple indexed by sl, 0. Once the
new tuple is created, SFc indexes it by sl, p+ 1 while setting tsl,p+1 = 1.
1(c). Otherwise, SFc obtains z by querying F(K, c), and sets t = ⊥, with sl
deactivated.
2. On inverse query (←, c, x), (SFc )−1 searches T Kc for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that xi = x and ci = c, if found, it returns yi. Otherwise, (SFc )−1 generates
y uniformly at random y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Kc (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (zˆ) ∪ IV }, where T Kc (yˆ) and
T Kc (zˆ) extract all the y and z values in the table T Kc which, along with IV, will
be excluded from the value assigned to y, obtains z by querying F(K,F(c)), and
sets t = ⊥, with sl deactivated.
Simulators RFc and (RFc )−1
1. On forward query (→,K, c), RFc searches T Kc for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such that
ci = c, if found, it returns zi. Otherwise, RFc generates both x and y uniformly at
random: x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kc (xˆ)}, y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Kc (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (zˆ) ∪ IV }, and then
queries F to generate z ← F(K,F(c)). Finally, it sets t = ⊥ with the index sl
deactivated.
2. On inverse query (←,K, z), (RFc )−1 searches T Kc for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such
that zi = z, if found, it returns ci. Otherwise, (RFc )−1 generates x and y uniformly
at random: x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kc (xˆ)}, y $←− {0, 1}n\{T Kc (yˆ)∪T Kc (zˆ)∪IV }, and then
generates c by querying F on input (x, y): c ← F(x, y). Finally, it sets t = ⊥
with the index sl deactivated.
The Indifferentiability Proof. We now construct the games. Throughout the
proof, P xi , P
y
i , P
c
i denote the probabilities that D outputs 1 in game G(i) of the in-
differentiability proofs of CˆHx,Gxx , Cˆ
Hy ,Gy
y , Cˆ
Hc,Gc
c , respectively. Figure 5-7 depicts the
state of the systems in each game.
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Simulator SFx : (→, c, y)
if (ci, yi) ∈ T Kx ∧ (c, y) = (ci, yi) then
return zi
else x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}
if y = IV then
t = 0, l = C˜k + 1, p = 0
return z ← F(F(c), y)
else if y = zsl,pi , z
sl,p
i ∈ T Kx then
t = 1, p = p+ 1
return z ← F(F(c), y)
else z ← F(F(c), y), t = ⊥
Simulator (SFx )−1 : (←, z, c)
if (zi, ci) ∈ T Kx ∧ (z, c) = (zi, ci)
return yi
else return
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Kx (zˆ) ∪ IV }
x
$←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}, t = ⊥
Simulator SFy : (→, x, c)
if (xi, ci) ∈ T Ky ∧ (x, c) = (xi, ci), then
return zi
else
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (zˆ) ∪ IV }
return z ← F(x,F(c))
t = 0
Simulator (SFy )−1 : (←, z, x)
if (zi, xi) ∈ T Ky ∧ (z, x) = (zi, xi), then
return ci
else
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (zˆ) ∪ IV }
return c← F(K, y)
t = ⊥
Simulator SFc : (→, x, y)
if (xi, yi) ∈ T Kc ∧ (x, y) = (xi, yi), return ci
else return c← F(x, y)
if y = IV, then
t = 0, l = C˜k + 1, p = 0, z ← F(K, c)
else if y = zsl,pi , z
sl,p
i ∈ T Kc , then
t = 1, p = p+ 1
T = xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,p−1||xsl,p
z ← F(K,T ||x)
else z ← F(K, c), t = ⊥
Simulator (SFc )−1 : (← c, x)
if (ci, xi) ∈ T Kc ∧ (c, x) = (ci, xi), return yi
else return
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Kc (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (zˆ) ∪ IV }
z ← F(K,F(c)), t = ⊥
Figure 5-5: Simulators SFx , (SFx )−1, SFy , (SFy )−1, SFc , (SFc )−1
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Simulator RFx : (→,K, x)
if xi ∈ T Kx ∧ x = xi, return ci
else
t = ⊥
c← F(K,x)
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Kx (zˆ) ∪ IV }
return z ← F(y, c)
Simulator (RFx )−1 : (←,K, c)
if ci ∈ T Kx ∧ c = ci, return xi
else
t = ⊥
x
$←− {0, 1}m\{T Kx (xˆ)}
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Kx (zˆ) ∪ IV }
return z ← F(F(c), y)
Simulator RFy : (→,K, y)
if yi ∈ T Ky ∧ y = yi, return ci
else return c← F(K, y)
x
$←− {0, 1}m\{T Ky (xˆ)}
if y = IV then
t = 0, l = C˜k + 1, p = 0, z ← F(x, c)
else if y = zsl,pi , z
sl,p
i ∈ T Ky then
t = 1, p = p+ 1
T = xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,p−1||xsl,p
z ← F(T ||x, c)
else z ← F(x, c), t = ⊥
Simulator (RFy )−1 : (←,K, c)
if ci ∈ T Ky ∧ c = ci, return yi
else return
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (zˆ) ∪ IV }
x
$←− {0, 1}m\{T Ky (xˆ)}
z ← F(x,F(c)), t = ⊥
Simulator RFc : (→,K, c)
if ci ∈ T Kc ∧ c = ci, return zi
else t = ⊥, x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kc (xˆ)})
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Kc (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (zˆ) ∪ IV }
return z ← F(K,F(c))
Simulator (RFc )−1 : (←,K, z)
if zi ∈ T Kc ∧ z = zi, return ci
else t = ⊥, x $←− {0, 1}m\{T Kc (xˆ)}
y
$←− {0, 1}n\{T Kc (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (zˆ) ∪ IV }
return c← F(x, y)
Figure 5-6: Simulators RFx , (RFx )−1, RFy , (RFy )−1, RFc , (RFc )−1
Game 1. This is the RO game where D is exclusively interacting with the ideal
system. Let
P x1 = Pr[D
F ,SFx ,RFx = 1]
P y1 = Pr[D
F ,SFy ,RFy = 1]
P c1 = Pr[D
F ,SFc ,RFc = 1]
83
5.4. The Indifferentiability proof 5. Indifferentiability of the iMD Constructions
D D D D
D D D D
iS iS
iS iS iS iS
iR
iR iR iR iR
iS iS
1,iF 1,iF 1,iF1,iS 1,iS 1,iR
1,iR1,iS 2,iF 2,iF2,iS 3,iS 3,iR iC i i2,iR
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4
Game 5 Game 6 Game 7 Game 8
Figure 5-7: A depiction showing how the system’s state evolves through the games in
the indifferentiability proof of CˆHx,Gxx , Cˆ
Hy ,Gy
y , Cˆ
Hc,Gc
c
Game 2. In this game we introduce dummy relay algorithms F1,x, F1,y, F1,c placed
between D and F in the CˆHx,Gxx , CˆHy ,Gyy , CˆHc,Gcc proofs, respectively. These algorithms
relay queries from D to F and relay responses back from F to D. Obviously, the view
of D in G(2) is not affected by the introduction of F1,x, F1,y, F1,c, thus:
P x2 = Pr[D
FF1,x,S
F
x ,R
F
x = 1] = P x1
P y2 = Pr[D
FF1,y ,S
F
y ,R
F
y = 1] = P y1
P c2 = Pr[D
FF1,c,S
F
c ,R
F
c = 1] = P c1
Game 3. In this game we introduce slightly modified replicas of SFx , SFy , SFc (and
their inverse variants), still with oracle access to F . D will now interact with the
modified simulators SF1,x, SF1,y, SF1,c which, upon receiving a query, create a new tuple
(x, y, c, z, t) but explicitly abort if any of the following failure conditions is satisfied:
1. On forward queries SF1,x(→, c, y), SF1,y(→, x, c), SF1,c(→, x, y), the simulators create
the new tuple (x, y, c, z, t), but the following collisions occur:
1(a). Fixed point: either in SF1,x, SF1,y, SF1,c, it is the case that z = IV , or in
SF1,x, SF1,c, it is the case that z = y.
1(b). Prefix collision: in SF1,x, SF1,y, SF1,y, it is the case that z = yi for some yi ∈
T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (yˆ).
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1(c). Internal collision: there is a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc such that:
i. when SF1,x receives (→, c, y), the following hold: z = zi ∧ (c, y) 6= (ci, yi).
ii. when SF1,y receives (→, x, c), the following hold: z = zi∧(x, c) 6= (xi, cii).
iii. when SF1,c receives (→, x, y), the following hold: c = ci∧(x, y) 6= (xi, yi),
or z = zi ∧ c 6= ci.
2. On inverse queries (SF1,x)−1(←, z, c), (SF1,y)−1(←, z, x), (SF1,c)−1(←, c, x), the sim-
ulators create the new tuple (x, y, c, z, t), but the following collisions occur:
2(a). Fixed point: in (SF1,c)−1, it is the case that z = IV .
2(b). Prefix collision: in (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (SF1,c)−1, it is the case that z = yi for
some yi ∈ T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (yˆ).
2(c). Internal collision: there is a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc such that:
i. when (SF1,y)−1 receives (←, z, x), the following hold: c = ci ∧ y 6= yi.
ii. when (SF1,c)−1 receives (←, c, x), the following hold: z = zi ∧ c 6= ci.
2(d). Partial query collision: there is a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc such
that:
i. when (SF1,x)−1 receives (←, z, c), the following hold: c 6= ci ∧ z = zi.
ii. when (SF1,y)−1 receives (←, z, x), the following hold: x 6= xi ∧ z = zi.
iii. when (SF1,c)−1 receives (←, c, x), the following hold: x 6= xi ∧ c = ci.
Clearly, failure conditions 1(a) and 2(a) are similar. In this case, there are two
types of fixed points, (i) when z = IV , and (ii) when z = y. Generating zi = IV may
indeed happen but with very low probability since in the case of SF1,x and SF1,y, there
is only one combination of c and y or x and c, respectively, that will cause z = IV ;
similarly, in the case of SF1,c, there is one value of c (combined with the fixed key K)
that will cause z = IV . That is, unless given as part of a query, z is always generated
by a RO (according to the definitions of the simulators), but while generating it, we
cannot instruct the RO to exclude IV from the possible values it may return for z.
Similarly, the fixed point z = y (the output collides with the input) can only happen
when querying SF1,x and SF1,c. In both cases, y is given as part of the query, but we
do not know what RO query would generate the given y, and since z (in both cases)
is generated by a RO, it may be the case that the inputs used to generate z are
the ones that would generate y. Even though in SF1,x the y value is actually part
of the R input that generates z, there is nothing stopping the RO from output y
(part of its input) as this is equally random. Clearly, none of the inverse simulators
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(SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (SF1,c)−1 may output z = y since z is given as part of their queries
(and in the case of (SF1,c)−1, y is generated excluding the value of z). When calculating
the probability of all these failure conditions we should account for queries sent to both
SFi and R
F
i since they cooperatively add tuples to T Ki whenever they are queried,
where i ∈ {x, y, c}. However, since it is possible that new queries will not create new
tuples (if they match existing tuples), the probability is upper bounded by q2 + q3/2n,
where q2 are queries sent to SF1,i, (S
F
1,i)
−1 and q3 are queries sent to RF1,i, (R
F
i,i)
−1, where
i ∈ {x, y, c}. We do not account for q1 in this probability because the q1 queries are sent
to F1, F2, F3 which, at this stage, do not contribute in updating the tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc ,
respectively, and so they will not affect the probability of finding collisions there.
Failure conditions 1(b) and 2(b) are similar. However, in this case z may collide
with any yi belonging to any tuple in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc , but since not all queries will add
new tuples to the table, this probability is upper bounded by the birthday attack
[128], that is ≤ (q2 + q3)2/2n. When creating a new tuple (x, y, c, z, t) upon receiving
a query, there are two types of prefix collisions, either y = zi or z = yj for some
zi, yj ∈ T Kx , T Ky , T Kc . In the first type, if zi is sequenced (part of a sequence) and
y = zi, then the simulators connect the tuple of the newly queried y with the tuple
of the matching zi (the i-th tuple) and no collision occurs (recall that only simulators
SF1,x, SF1,c, RF1,y can create/extend sequences because they are the only simulators who
receive y as part of their queries). But what if zi is not sequenced? In this case, the
simulators will treat it as a sequenced tuple that is part of a sequence consisting of
only one tuple, itself (the i-th tuple). Connecting the newly created tuple with the i-th
tuple will create an “unrooted” sequence, one that has no route tuple with y = IV , but
this will not affect the indifferentiability proofs, as we will see later. This leaves the
second type of prefix collision, z = yj , which applies to SF1,x, SF1,y, SF1,c and their inverse
variants. To see why this is the case, we discuss how such collision may be generated
in T Kx , which is maintained by SF1,x, (SF1,x)−1, RF1,x, (RF1,x)−1, similar argument apply for
T Ky and T Kc . Simulator SF1,x receives y as part of its query and then creates a new
tuple if necessary, but other simulators have no way to exclude the y value that SF1,x
received when they generate their z values as the latter is generated by a RO which
may output the value of the previously queried y with probably (q2 + q3)2/2n.
Failure conditions 1(c) and 2(c), on the other hand, allude to a more fundamental
problem when the simulators receive the c and z values from D rather then gener-
ating them. These values should ideally be generated by a RO, but on queries to
SF1,x, (SF1,x)−1, SF1,y, (SF1,c)−1, (RF1,x)−1, (RF1,y)−1, RF1,c, the value of c is chosen by D and
is given as part of the query, similarly for z when D queries (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1.
In these situations, since we cannot invert c and z to obtain the RO inputs that gen-
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erated them, we generate these inputs uniformly at random (recall that when creating
a new tuple, all fields of that tuple have to be generated, even if they were not part of
the particular query that triggered the tuple to be created), but that does not mean
that if these inputs were supplied to a RO, it will return the corresponding c and
z that were sent to the simulators by D earlier, this behaviour may lead to internal
collisions. Below we analyse all internal collision scenarios corresponding to simula-
tors SF1,x, SF1,y, SF1,c and their inverse variants (as outlined in failure conditions 1(c) and
2(c) above, respectively). In all scenarios, the simulators receive queries of a particu-
lar format (depending on the receiving simulator) from D and creates the new tuple
(x, y, c, z, t).
1. SF1,x: simulator SF1,x receives c as part of its query (→, c, y), so if c exists in T Kx ,
no new tuple will be created and thus no collision. However, when D sends the
query (←, zi, ci) to (SF1,x)−1, the latter has no way to know what value of yi
(in combination of the given ci) would generate the given zi, so it generates yi
uniformly at random, but it is likely that F(F(ci), yi) 6= zi. If D later sends the
query (→, c, y) to SF1,x, the latter generates z by z = F(F(c), y), a collision then
occurs if z = zi while (c, y) 6= (ci, yi).
2. SF1,y: simulator SF1,y receives c as part of its query (→, x, c), so if c exists in T Ky ,
no new tuple will be created and thus no collision. However, when D sends the
query (←, zi, xi) to (SF1,y)−1, the latter has no way to know what value of ci (in
combination of the given xi) would generate the given zi, so it generates ci by
ci = F(K, yi), where yi is generated uniformly at random, but it is likely that
F(F(ci), yi) 6= zi. If D later sends the query (→, x, c) to SF1,y, the latter generates
z by z = F(x,F(c)), a collision then occurs if z = zi while (x, c) 6= (xi, ci).
3. SF1,c: When D sends the queries (←, ci, xi) and (→,K, cj) to (SF1,c)−1 and RF1,c,
respectively, both (SF1,c)−1 and RF1,c have no way to know what values of xi, yi
and xj , yj would generate the given ci and cj , so they generate xi, yi and xj , yj
uniformly at random, but it is likely that F(xi, yi) 6= ci and F(xj , yj) 6= cj . If
D later sends the query (→, x, y) to SF1,c, the latter generates c by c = F(x, y),
then a collision occurs if c = ci or c = cj while (x, y) 6= (xi, yi) or (x, y) 6=
(xj , yj). Similarly, when D sends the query (←,K, zi) to (RF1,c)−1, the latter has
no way to know what value of ci would generate the given zi, so it generates ci by
ci = F(xi, yi) (while generating xi, yi uniformly at random). If D later sends the
query (→, x, y) to SF1,c, the latter generates z by z = F(K, c), where c = F(x, y),
a collision then occurs if z = zi while c 6= ci.
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4. (SF1,x)−1: simulator (SF1,x)−1 cannot generate any collision because it accepts
queries of the format (←, z, c) where both c and z are given, so if they exist
in T Kx , no new tuple will be generate and thus no collision.
5. (SF1,y)−1: simulator (SF1,y)−1 cannot generate collisions in the value of z because
it receives it as part of its query (←, z, x), so if a given z matches an existing zi in
T K1,y, no new tuple will be generate and thus no collision. However, when D sends
the queries (→, xi, ci) and (←,K, cj) to SF1,y and (RF1,y)−1, respectively, both SF1,y
and (RF1,y)−1 have no way to know what values of yi and yj would generate the
given ci and cj , so they generate yi and yj uniformly at random. If D later sends
the query (←, z, x) to (SF1,y)−1 , the latter first generates y uniformly at random
and then generates c by c = F(K, y), a collision then occurs if c = ci or c = cj
while y 6= yi or y 6= yj .
6. (SF1,c)−1: simulator (SF1,y)−1 cannot generate collision in the value of c because
it receives it as part of its query, so if a given c matches an existing c in T Kc ,
no new tuple will be generate and thus no collision. However, when D sends the
query (←,K, zi) to (RF1,c)−1, the zi is given in the query, so there is no way for
(RF1,c)−1 to know what value of ci would generate the given zi, so it generates
ci by ci = F(xi, yi), where xi, yi are generated uniformly at random. If D later
sends (←, c, x) to (SF1,c)−1, the latter generates z by z = F(K,F(c)), a collision
then occurs if z = zi while c 6= ci.
Scenarios 1,2 and 3 above are the failure conditions 1(c).i., 1(c).ii. and 1(c).iii.,
respectively, while scenarios 5 and 6 are the failure conditions 2(c).i. and 2(c).ii., re-
spectively (probability of scenario 4 is 0, as discussed above). Failure conditions 1(c).ii.
and 1(c).iii. may occur with probability ≤ (q2 + q3)2/2m+n; in this case, we should
consider the collision probability of a combination of x ∈ {0, 1}m and c ∈ {0, 1}n (in
the case of 1(c).ii.) or x ∈ {0, 1}m and y ∈ {0, 1}n (in the case of 1(c).iii.) since it is the
combination what causes the collision not the individual instances of x, y or c, x. Fol-
lowing similar argument, failure condition 1(c).i. occur with probability ≤ (q2+q3)2/22n
as the colliding strings in this case are both of length n-bits, that is, we should consider
the collision probability of a combination of c ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}n. In all the
failure conditions of 1(c), the collision occurs by two colliding strings, each consists of
two values, where the combination of these two values in each string is what causes the
collision; this is discussed above and reflected on their probabilities. On the other hand,
in failure conditions 2(c).i. and 2(c).ii., the two colliding strings consist of a single value
each (y ∈ {0, 1}n in the case of 2(c).i. and c ∈ {0, 1}n in the case of 2(c).ii.). Thus,
both failure conditions 2(c).i. and 2(c).ii. may occur with probability ≤ (q2 + q3)/22n.
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Finally, failure condition 2(d) covers collisions caused by partially matched queries.
For example, if a simulator received a 2-string query (x, y), it first searches its corre-
sponding table for a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) such that (x, y) = (xi, yi), here both x and
y should match xi and yi, respectively. However, if one of these two strings (either x
or y) was a match (with xi or yi), the simulator will ignore it and proceed to generate
a new tuple. This is not an issue if the simulator received a forward query because
forward queries generate either c or z, so there will be no collision as along as one of the
received strings is distinct (unless one of the other failure conditions is satisfied). On
the other hand, this becomes problematic when the simulators receive inverse queries
because in this case they will receive c or z as part of the query and this may lead to
a collision. We now consider all the inverse simulators (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (SF1,c)−1 and
show how such collisions can occur:
1. (SF1,x)−1: when simulator (SF1,x)−1 receives the query (z, c), if there is tuple
(xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) ∈ T Kx , then no new tuple will be created. On the other hand,
if c = ci and z 6= zi, a new tuple will be created, but this will not generate a colli-
sion since z 6= zi. However, if it is the other way round, c 6= ci and z = zi, a new
tuple will be created, but this time it will cause a collision since (c, y) 6= (ci, yi)
while z = zi.
2. (SF1,y)−1: following the same argument, when simulator (SF1,y)−1 receives the query
(z, x), new tuple will be created even if there is a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) ∈ T Ky such
that x 6= xi while z = zi, this will obviously lead to a collision since (x, c) 6= (xi, ci)
while z = zi.
3. (SF1,c)−1: with simulator (SF1,c)−1, partial query collision leads to a collision in the
c value, but this obviously results in a collision with the z value since, according
to (SF1,c)−1 definition, z ← F(K,F(c)), so as long as there is a collision in c, there
will also be a collision in z.
All the scenarios in failure condition 2(d) occur with probably bounded by the birthday
attack. In 2(d).i. the collision occurs due to c ∈ {0, 1}n, thus the probably is bound
by (q2 + q3)2/2n. On the other hand, in failure conditions 2(d).ii. and 2(d).iii., the
collisions occur due to x ∈ {0, 1}m, so the probability is bounded by (q2 + q3)2/2m.
Note that partial query collisions cannot occur with simulators RF1,i and (R
F
1,i)
−1 (where
i ∈ {x, y, c}) because these simulators accept a single string (in addition to the fixed
key K), so if it matches one of the existing tuple, it will be detected immediately.
Other than the failure conditions above, we prove that collisions in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc
cannot occur. As there are two types of tuples in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc (sequenced and sin-
gular), there are four possible collision scenarios, namely: collisions between tuples
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from different sequences, collisions among tuples within the same sequence, collisions
among singular tuples, and collisions between sequenced and singular tuples; these are
covered by lemmas 5.4.2, 5.4.4, 5.4.6 and 5.4.7, respectively. These proofs apply for
both the modified S simulators in this game, and the modified R simulators in G(5);
that is, in G(5) we will modify the simulators RFx , RFy , RFc (and their inverse variants)
and introduce failure conditions similar to the ones we introduced in this game, then
the distinguishing probability of G(5) will be the success probability of the failure
conditions there, other than those failure conditions, the following lemmas prove that
RF1,x, RF1,y, RF1,c (and their inverse variants) cannot generate collisions.
Lemma 5.4.2 (Collision freeness among sequences). For any two sequences, Seq1
and Seq2, in a table T Ki that is maintained by the simulators SF1,i, (SF1,i)−1, RF1,i, (RF1,i)−1,
a tuple in Seq1 cannot collide with another in Seq2, where i ∈ {x, y, c}.
Proof. Let sh and sf index two different sequences, Seq1 and Seq2, in the table T Ki , i ∈
{x, y.c}, consisting of u and v tuples, respectively, and let Seq1 be rooted by the i-th
tuple while Seq2 be rooted by the j-th tuple:
Seq1 = (x
sh,0
i , y
sh,0
i , c
sh,0
i , z
sh,0
i , t
sh,0
i ) . . . (x
sh,u, ysh,u, csh,u, zsh,u, tsh,u)
Seq2 = (x
sf ,0
j , y
sf ,0
j , c
sf ,0
j , z
sf ,0
j , t
sf ,0
j ) . . . (x
sf ,v, ysf ,v, csf ,v, zsf ,v, tsf ,v)
where ysh,0i = y
sf ,0
j = IV and h 6= f . A collision between tuple (xa, ya, ca, za, ta)
in Seq1 and tuple (xb, yb, cb, zb, tb) in Seq2 occurs when za = zb while (xa, ya, ca) 6=
(xb, yb, cb). Thus, we need to show that whenever a sequenced tuple is created, it
cannot collide with any other existing sequenced tuple. Here our discussion is based
on the assumption that the z value of a tuple is being generated by the simulators, but
in simulators (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1, the z value is given to the simulators as part
of the queries. These simulators, however, will only generate singular tuples while here
we are only concerned with sequenced tuples. In fact, the only simulators that will
generate sequences are SF1,x, RF1,y, SF1,c, so it suffices to investigate how these simulators
generate their z values because if there is a collision, they are the only ones that could
have cause it. The easiest way to do this is to observe the input that the simulators
use to generate their z values and prove that z will be unique as long as these inputs
are unique (generated in a collision-free manner).
Simulator SF1,x generates its z by F(F(c), y), simulator RF1,y generates its z by
F(T ||x, c), and simulator SF1,c generates its z by F(K,T ||x), where T is a sequence
of x’s. We now show that the inputs (F(c), y), (T ||x, c), (K,T ||x) are prepared in a
collision-free manner (i.e., they are unique) which will immediately imply that the z
values they will generate are also collision-free since the latter is generated by a RO.
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• SF1,x(→, c, y): in this case, the z value is created by the query (F(c), y) to the
random oracle F , so we show that both c and y are unique. It is clear that
here the y value cannot collide with any existing y value because the simulator
receives y as part of its query. If there is an existing tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) ∈ T Kx
such that yi = y, then SF1,x will only create a new tuple if c 6= ci, otherwise if
c = ci, then (c, y) = (ci, yi) and a new tuple will not be created. This also includes
the case when y = IV , where a new tuple will only be created if c 6= ci. This
mean that the SF1,x simulator guarantees a total collision freeness, which implies
that F(F(c), y) 6= F(F(ci), yi) will hold for any (ci, yi) ∈ T Kx , which immediately
implies zi 6= zj .
• RF1,y(→,K, y): this simulator creates its z value by querying F with (T ||x, c),
where T is a sequence of the x’s of the preceding tuples in the sequence to which
the new query belongs. It is easy to see that T is unique for a particular z because
this sequence of x’s will only occur for that particular query. On the other hand,
c here is being generated by F(K, y), which implies that as long as y 6= yi for
some yi ∈ T Ky , then F(K, yi) 6= F(K, yj) holds, which, in turn, implies ci 6= cj ,
and this will always be the case since y here is received as part of the query and
if it matches any yi ∈ T Ky , no new tuple will be created.
• SF1,c(→, x, y): in this simulator, the z value is created by querying (K,T ||x) to
the random oracle F , where K is a fixed key and T is a sequence of x’s. In this
case, the collision freeness of z solely depends on the value T , which, as discussed
above, is unique for any particular query.
Finally, it is easy to see that these results will also generalise to cases when there
are multiple sequences in T Ki where i ∈ {x, y, c}.
Corollary 5.4.3 (Prefix collision freeness among sequences). If any of the ta-
bles T Ki maintained by the simulators SF1,i, (SF1,i)−1, RF1,i, (RF1,i)−1, where i ∈ {x, y, c},
contains two different sequences Seq1 and Seq2, then any tuple in Seq1 cannot be a
prefix of any tuple in Seq2, and vice versa.
Proof. The proof follows from lemma 5.4.2. A tuple (xsh,pa , y
sh,p
a , c
sh,p
a , z
sh,p
a , t
sh,p
a ) in
Seq1 cannot be a prefix of another tuple (x
sf ,q
b , y
sf ,q
b , c
sf ,q
b , z
sf ,q
b , t
sf ,q
b ) in Seq2, that is
zsh,pa cannot equal to y
sf ,q
b , because if that was the case, then this is merely a collision
between zsh,pa and zsf ,q−1 since y
sf ,q
b = z
sf ,q−1, and as shown in lemma 5.4.2, a collision
cannot occur in this case. Clearly, the other way round also holds; no tuple from Seq2
may be a prefix to another in Seq1. Also, a sequence cannot be a prefix of itself. That
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is, given a sequence Seq3 rooted at the i-th tuple and has a tail at the j-th tuple, then
yi 6= zj holds since yi = IV . However, with probability 1/2n (where n = |zj |), it might
be the case that zj = IV , but this is covered in failure conditions 1(a) and 2(a), which
also covers prefix collisions within a single sequenced tuple.
Lemma 5.4.4 (Collision freeness within a single sequence). If any of the tables
T Ki maintained by the simulators SF1,i, (SF1,i)−1, RF1,i, (RF1,i)−1, where i ∈ {x, y, c}, con-
tains a sequence Seqpi, then any tuple in that sequence cannot collide with any other
tuple in the same sequence.
Proof. Recall that the only simulators generating sequences are SF1,x, RF1,y, SF1,c. Let
Seqpi = (x
sl,0
a , y
sl,0
a = IV, c
sl,0
a , z
sl,0
a , t
sl,0
a ) . . . (xsl,n, ysl,n, csl,n, zsl,n, tsl,n) be a sequence
containing n > 1 tuples and rooted by the a-th tuple. An internal collision in the
sequence sl implies that there exists zsl,i = zsl,j , where i 6= j and i, j ∈ {0, . . . , n}. In
RF1,y and SF1,c, this happens if the following equality holds:
xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,i−1||xsl,i = xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,j−1||xsl,j
Since z is being generated by the random oracle F , this is only possible if i = j. On the
other hand, in SF1,x, an internal collision happens between two tuples (xp, yp, cp, zp, tp)
and (xq, yq, cq, zq, tq) belonging to the same sequence if zp = zq. This can happen only
if (cp, yp) = (cq, yq), which is not possible since both c and y are given to SF1,x as part of
the query and would only cause a new tuple to be created if there is no existing tuple
matching the queried c and y.
Corollary 5.4.5 (Ancestors and descendants of sequenced tuples). In any of
the tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc , a single tuple cannot be part of more than one sequence. More
generally, a single tuple in T Ki , i ∈ {x, y, c} cannot have more than one descendant
tuple and more than one parent tuple.
Proof. The proof follows from lemmas 5.4.2 and 5.4.4. Let the i-th tuple indexed
by sl, p be the parent of the tuple indexed by sl, p + 1 of the sequence l, that is
zsl,pi = y
sl,p+1. The only way the tuple sl, p can have another descendant sl, k is
when zsl,pi = y
si,k, which implies that ysi,p+1 = ysi,k, but this cannot happen because
collisions and prefixes cannot occur as shown in lemmas 5.4.2 and 5.4.4. Similarly,
and following the same argument, tuple sl, p with parent sl, p− 1 cannot have another
parent sl, k′ because this implies zsl,p−1 = zsl,k
′
= ysl,pi , which cannot occur.
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Lemma 5.4.6 (Collision freeness among singular tuples). In any of the tables
T Ki maintained by the simulators SF1,i, (SF1,i)−1, RF1,i, (RF1,i)−1, where i ∈ {x, y, c}, colli-
sions cannot occur between two singular tuples within the same table.
Proof. A collision in this context means there are two tuples (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti = ⊥) and
(xj , yj , cj , zj , tj = ⊥), such that zi = zj while (xi, yi, ci) 6= (xj , yj , cj). However, since
z is always being generated by the random oracle F (unless given by D), zi = zj will
only hold if the inputs given to F to generate zi and zj are identical. In lemma 5.4.2 we
considered how sequenced tuples are being generated by SF1,x, SF1,c, RF1,y, in this proof,
we need to consider the other simulators which generate singular tuples (in addition to
SF1,x, SF1,c, RF1,y since these can also generate singular tuples), these are:
(SF1,x)
−1, SF1,y, (S
F
1,y)
−1, (SF1,c)
−1, (RF1,y)
−1, RF1,x, (R
F
1,x)
−1, RF1,c, (R
F
1,c)
−1
In all these cases, unless given by D, the value of z is generated based on c, so it only
suffices to prove that in each case, the way c is being generated is collision-free to imply
that z will be collision-free. Precisely, zi of a singular tuple can either by generated by
zi = F(X, ci) or z = F(X,F(ci)), where X ∈ {K,xi, yi}. Therefore, we now have two
possible inputs to z, making four possible collision scenarios:
• zi = F(X, ci), zj = F(X, cj): the only simulator that generates zi = F(X, ci) is
RF1,x, so we show that RF1,x cannot generate ci = cj while i 6= j. It is easy to
see that this is always the case since RF1,x uses F to generate ci = F(K,xi), cj =
F(K,xj), so as long as (K,xi) 6= (K,xj), then ci 6= cj will hold, which is always
the case since RF1,x receives xi in the query and will only use it to create a new
tuple if there is no xj ∈ T Kx such that xi = xj .
• zi = F(X,F(ci)), zj = F(X,F(cj)): apart from RF1,x, all other simulators that
generate singular tuples generate z as F(X,F(ci)), so we only need to show that
F(ci) 6= F(cj) will always hold if ci 6= cj . In all simulators generating singular
tuples, ci is given in the query, so upon receiving a query (X, ci), the simulators
first check if there is a tuple (xj , yj , cj , zj , tj) ∈ T Kx , T Ky , T Kc such that ci = cj ,
if it does, they do not create a new tuple. Thus, as long as ci 6∈ T Kx , T Ky , T Kc ,
then F(ci) 6= F(cj) follows implying zi 6= zj . An even simpler argument is that
F(ci) 6= F(cj) trivially holds as long as ci 6= cj because F is a random oracle.
• zi = F(X,F(ci)), zj = F(X, cj) or zi = F(X, ci), zj = F(X,F(cj)): here we only
need to show that F(ci) 6= cj , where i 6= j, to imply F(X,F(ci)) 6= F(X, cj).
We know that cj in F(X, cj) is being generated by F(xj , yj) or F(K,xj) or
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F(K, yj). Thus, we have F(ci) = F(xj , yj) or F(ci) = F(K,xj) or F(ci) =
F(K, yj), none of which can hold since {0, 1}n 6= [{0, 1}m||{0, 1}n], {0, 1}n 6=
[{0, 1}k||{0, 1}m], {0, 1}n 6= [{0, 1}k||{0, 1}n], respectively.
It remains to discuss the case when z is given in the query, which can happen only
with (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1, but it is easy to see that (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1
will not generate collisions because, upon a new query, they will first check T Kx , T Ky , T Kc ,
respectively, for any tuple with a similar z and would only create a new tuple if no such
z exists. This covers all possible collision scenarios among singular tuples.
Lemma 5.4.7 (Collision freeness between singular and sequenced tuples). If
any of the tables T Ki maintained by the simulators SF1,i, (SF1,i)−1, RF1,i, (RF1,i)−1, where
i ∈ {x, y, c}, contains a sequence Seqpi, then no singular tuple within the same table
may collide with any tuple in Seqpi.
Proof. Here we have two cases: either the newly generated tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) is sin-
gular while colliding with an existing sequenced tuple (xj , yj , cj , zj , tj), or the other way
round (collision implies zi = zj). Either way, according to the definition of simulators
SF1,k, R
F
1,k, k ∈ {x, y, c}, regardless of whether it was singular or sequenced tuple, z will
always be generated by F (unless it is given by D). Let (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti = ⊥) be a
singular tuple while (xsl,pj , y
sl,p
j , c
sl,p
j , z
sl,p
j , t
sl,p
j = 1) be a sequenced tuple, with p ≥ 1.
In this case, zi = F(X, ci) or zi = F(X,F(ci)), where X ∈ {K,xi, yi}, while zj =
F(K,xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,p−1||xsl,p) when generated by SF1,c or zj = F(cj , xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . .
||xsl,p−1||xsl,p) when generated by RF1,y or zj = F(cj , yj) when generated by SF1,x. When
zj is generated by SF1,c, RF1,y, unless ci = xsl,0||xsl,1|| . . . ||xsl,p−1||xsl,p, zi 6= zj will
always hold. Similarly, when zj is generated by SF1,x, zj 6= zi will hold as long as
(cj , yi) 6= (ci, yi) also holds, which is always the case as such collision would have been
detected by SF1,x before creating the j-th or i-th tuple (whichever queried last). It is
also possible that the sequence l contains only one tuple, that is, only the root tuple
(xsl,0j , y
sl,0
j = IV, c
sl,0
j , z
sl,0
j , t
sl,0
j ), in which case a collision occurs if zi = z
sl,0
j , which
is not possible as long as ci 6= csl,0j since both zi, zj are generated by F and c is al-
ways involved in their generation process. According to the definition of the simulators
SF1,k, R
F
1,k, k ∈ {x, y, c}, unless c is given by D, it will be generated by F . If c is se-
quenced it is generated by F(x, y) or F(K, y), otherwise if c is singular it is generated
by F(K, y) or F(K,x) or F(x, y). It is easy to see that the fact that ysl,0j = IV while
yi 6= IV always holds (otherwise yi would not be singular) implies that the following
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also hold (and thus any cj 6= ci).[
F(x, y) 6= F(K, y)
]
,
[
F(x, y) 6= F(K,x)
]
,
[
F(K, y) 6= F(K,x)
]
To complete the proof, it remains to investigate cases when c is given in a query.
In all simulators generating singular tuples, when c is given by D, c is not directly
used to generate z, rather, zi = F(X,F(ci)), X ∈ {xi, yi}, so a collision between a
singular tuple and a sequenced one implies F(ci) = csl,0j should hold3, which, for the
case of SF1,c, RF1,y, can be rewritten as F(ci) = F(xsl,pj ||ysl,pj ) and F(ci) = F(K||ysl,pj ),
but clearly ci 6= xsl,pj ||ysl,pj and ci 6= K||ysl,pj , since {0, 1}n 6= {0, 1}m||{0, 1}n and
{0, 1}n 6= {0, 1}k||{0, 1}n, respectively. For the case when cj is generated by SF1,x,
F(ci) 6= F(cj) still holds because F(ci) 6= F(F(cj), yj) since {0, 1}n 6= {0, 1}n||{0, 1}n.
Finally, it is trivial to see that (SF1,x)−1, (SF1,y)−1, RF1,c)−1 will not generate collisions,
even though they accepts z from D, because if a queried z already exists in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc
no new (colliding) tuple will be created.
Finally, the probability of this game is the sum of the probabilities of the failure con-
ditions of SF1,x, SF1,y, SF1,c (and their inverse variants):
P x3 = Pr[D
FF1 ,S
F
1,x,R
F
x = 1]
≤ (2n((q2 + q3) + (q2 + q3)2) + (q2 + q3))/22n
P y3 = Pr[D
FF1 ,S
F
1,y ,R
F
y = 1]
≤ ((q2 + q3)(2m+1(q2 + q3) + 2m+1 + 2n(q2 + q3) + 1))/2m+n
P c3 = Pr[D
FF1 ,S
F
1,c,R
F
c = 1]
≤ ((q2 + q3)(3 · 2m + 2m+1(q2 + q3) + 2n(q2 + q3) + 1)))/2m+n
Game 4. Similar to G(3), in this game we introduce slightly modified replicas of the
simulators RFx , RFy , RFc , still with oracle access to F . The distinguisher D will now
interact with the modified simulators RF1,x, RF1,y, RF1,c which, upon receiving a query,
create the new tuple (x, y, c, z, t) but explicitly abort if any of the following failure
conditions is satisfied:
1. On forward queriesRF1,x(→,K, x), RF1,y(→,K, y), RF1,c(→,K, c), the simulators cre-
ate the new tuple (x, y, c, z, t), but the following collisions occur:
1(a). Fixed point: in RF1,x, RF1,y, RF1,c, it is the case that z = IV , and in RF1,y, it is
also the case that z = y.
3Recall that the only simulators generating sequences are SF1,x, R
F
1,y, S
F
1,c and that R
F
1,y, S
F
1,c generate
c by F(K, y),F(x, y), respectively, while SF1,x receives c as part of its queries.
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1(b). Prefix collision: in RF1,x, RF1,y, RF1,c, it is the case that z = yj for some yj ∈
T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (yˆ) ∪ T Kc (yˆ).
1(c). Internal collision: there is a tuple (xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc such that:
i. when RF1,x receives (→,K, x), the following hold: ci = c ∧ xi 6= x.
ii. when RF1,y receives (→,K, y), the following hold: ci = c ∧ yi 6= y.
2. On inverse queries (RF1,x)−1(←,K, c), (RF1,y)−1(←,K, c), (RF1,c)−1(←,K, z), the sim-
ulators create the new tuple (x, y, c, z, t), but the following collisions occur:
2(a). Fixed point: in (RF1,x)−1, (RF1,y)−1, it is the case that z = IV .
2(b). Prefix collision: in (RF1,x)−1, (RF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1, it is the case that z = yj for
some yj ∈ T Kx (yˆ) ∪ T Ky (yˆ).
2(c). Internal collision: we show that (RF1,x)−1, (RF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1 cannot generate
collisions, see below.
As illustrated in G(3), failure conditions 1(a) and 2(a) occur with probability (q2 +
q3)/2n each. Simulators RF1,x, RF1,y, RF1,c are susceptible to the first fixed point type
(when z = IV ), while only simulator RF1,y is susceptible to the second fixed point type
(when z = yi), in the latter case simulators RF1,x, RF1,c are not susceptible to the second
fixed point type because they generate their y value uniformly at random excluding all
existing values of z and y in tables T Kx , T Kc . Thus, failure condition 1(a) occurs for
simulators RF1,x, RF1,c with probability (q2 + q3)/2n, while it occurs for simulator RF1,y
with probability 2(q2 + q3)2/2n. Similar analysis apply for failure condition 2(a).
Following the same argument in G(3), both failure conditions 1(b) and 2(b) are
at most the birthday bound (q2 + q3)2/2n and are applicable to all simulators in this
game. In particular, all simulators except (RF1,c)−1 generate their z values by querying
a RO, meaning that they cannot force the RO to exclude the existing y values in
the tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc from the newly generated z value. In the case of (RF1,c)−1, z
is given as part of the query and the simulator only checks whether there is a tuple
(xi, yi, ci, zi, ti) ∈ T Kc such that z = zi before creating a new tuple, it, however, does not
check for z = yi, so this prefix collision can still happen with probability (q2 + q3)2/2n.
We now discuss in details failure conditions 1(c) and 2(c).
1. RF1,x: When D sends the query (→, c, y) to SF1,x, the latter has no way to know
which x generated the given c, so it generates x uniformly at random, but it is
most likely that F(K,x) 6= c. When D later sends the query (→,K, xi) to RF1,x,
the latter generates ci = (K,xi). A collision occurs if ci = c ∧ xi 6= x.
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2. RF1,y: When D sends the query (→, x, c) to SF1,y, the latter has no way to know
which y generated the given c, so it generates y uniformly at random, but it is
most likely that F(K,x) 6= c. When D later sends the query (→,K, yi) to RF1,y,
the latter generates ci = (K,xi). A collision occurs if ci = c ∧ yi 6= y.
3. Simulators RF1,c, (RF1,x)−1, (RF1,y)−1, (RF1,c)−1 do not generate any collision because
the queries made to them by D contain either c or z values, which if they match
any of the existing c or z values in T Kx or T Ky or T Kc , no new tuple is generate
and thus no collision.
Scenarios 1 and 2 are are failure conditions 1(c).i. and 2(c).ii., respectively. Failure
condition 1(c).i. may occur with probability ≤ (q2 + q3)/2m since the probably is taken
over range size of 2m (i.e., x ∈ {0, 1}m). In this case, x is generated uniformly at
random and is assumed to have generated the c value that was sent the query (→, c, y),
but when later D sends a query with xi (i.e. (→,K, xi)) and it turned out that xi
is the value that really generates the previously sent c when given to a RO, then
x and xi collide at c, this happens with probability 1/2m since there is only one x
value generating a particular c; after q2 + q3 queries, the probability is (q2 + q3)/2m.
Following similar argument, scenario 2(c).i. may occur with probability ≤ (q2 + q3)/2n
since the collision occurs between strings of size n-bit, (i.e., y ∈ {0, 1}n). Finally, failure
condition 2(c) occur with probability 0, as discussed in scenario 3 above. Thus, the
final probability of G(4) is:
P x4 = Pr[D
FF1 ,S
F
1,x,R
F
1,x = 1] ≤ (2(q2 + q3) + 2(q2 + q3)2) /2n + (q2 + q3) /2m
P y4 = Pr[D
FF1 ,S
F
1,y ,R
F
1,y = 1] ≤ (3(q2 + q3) + 3(q2 + q3)2) /2n
P c4 = Pr[D
FF1 ,S
F
1,c,R
F
1,c = 1] ≤ (q2 + q3 + 2(q2 + q3)2) /2n
Game 5. In this game, we modify the relay algorithms FF1,x, FF1,y, FF1,c to make them
dependant on (SF1,x, RF1,x), (SF1,y, RF1,c), (SF1,c, RF1,c) instead of F , and thus simulating the
constructions CˆHx,Gxx , Cˆ
Hy ,Gy
y , Cˆ
Hc,Gc
c , respectively (as defined in figure 5-1). We prove
that FF1,x, FF1,y, FF1,c and F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x , F
S1,y ,R1,y
2,y , F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c (the modified relay algorithms)
behave consistently as long as the sequenced tuples in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc are preserved.
Lemma 5.4.8 (Indistinguishability of G(5)). The modified relay algorithms intro-
duced in G(5), FS1,x,R1,x2,x , F
S1,y ,R1,y
2,y , F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c , with access to the simulators (S
F
1,x, R
F
1,x),
(SF1,y, RF1,c), (SF1,c, RF1,c), respectively, are either indistinguishable or behave consistently
with FF1,x, FF1,y, FF1,c, relay algorithms with oracle access to a random oracle F .
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Proof. LetX = x1||x2|| . . . ||xn be a message consisting of n m-bit blocks, and letK be a
fixed k-bit key. When X is given as a query, FF1,c processes it as a whole by sending it to
the random oracle F , that is FF1,i(K,X) = F(K||x1||x2|| . . . ||xn) and then z ∈ {0, 1}n is
obtained, where K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key and i ∈ {x, y, c}. First, we prove that FF1,x(K,X)
is indistinguishable from FS1,x,R1,x2,x (K,X). Indistinguishability here means that the
distinguisher D cannot distinguish between responses from FF1,x and F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x (except
with negligible probability), but not necessarily require the two responses to be identical
for similar queries. In fact, FF1,x(K,X) = F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x (K,X) never holds. To see why,
suppose X = x1 ∈ {0, 1}m and K ∈ {0, 1}k, now FF1,x(K,x1) = F(K||x1) = v1 while
F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x (K,x1) = S
F
1,x(Y,R
F
1,x(K,x1)) = F(Y,F(K,x1)) = v2 for some Y ∈ {0, 1, }n.
Clearly, v1 6= v2 always holds since[
F(K||x1) = F({0, 1}k+m)
]
6=
[
F(K||F(y1||x1)) = F({0, 1}k+n)
]
This will also apply when X = x1, x2, . . . , xn. Furthermore, in F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x , getting every
input block xi preprocessed by RF1,x thwarts other distinguishing attacks. Next, we
prove FF1,c(K,X) = F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c (K,X), the proof of F
F
1,y(K,X) = F
S1,y ,R1,y
2,y (K,X) is
similar. Unlike FF1,c, F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c processes an incoming query by first partitioning it into
blocks and then processes each block separately through SF1,c and RF1,c. Formally, when
F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c receives the query (K,X), it beings by dividing X into x1, x2, . . . , xn and then
querying SF1,c(IV, x1). Once SF1,c receives this query it immediately creates a sequence in
T Kc rooted with the tuple (xi = x1, yi = IV, ci, zi, ti = 0) where ci and zi are obtained
based on the definition of SF1,c. The simulator SF1,c will then return ci to F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c which
will immediately send it to RF1,c(K, ci) and eventually gets zi. At this stage F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c
has completed processing the first block x1, so it proceeds to process the second block
SF1,c(zi, x2). Once SF1,c receives this new query, it detects it as a sequenced tuple and links
the new tuple (xj = x2, y = zi, cj , zj , tj = 1) to the root tuple (the i-th tuple). Note
that zj is not created randomly, instead SF1,c queries the random oracle F(K,x1||x2) to
obtain this value. The process continues until reaching xn which will create the tuple
(x = xn, y , c , z , t = 1) where z = F(K,x1||x2|| . . . ||xn) = FF1,c(K,X).
It follows then that this game is a syntactical rewrite of the pervious game and
the view of D will not change when it interacts with (FF1,x or F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x ) and (F
F
1,y
or FS1,y ,R1,y2,y ) and (F
F
1,c or F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c ), except that we now have to account for queries
q1 ∈ {{0, 1}m}∗ since these will update the tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc . Previously, when
calculating the probabilities we only considered queries q2 and q3 because they were
the only queries that will access and interact with the tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc . However,
accounting for q1 is slightly less straightforward than q2 and q3 since q1 have a variable
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length. Let L denote the maximum length of q1 (we assume that L is divisible by
m). What we are concerned about here is how many times a single q1 query accesses
and probably updates T Kx , T Ky , T Kc because this is what affects the probability, and
we obtain this number by L/m, where m is the length of a single block (recall that
a query q1 will be partitioned into several m-bit blocks which will then be processed
sequentially in order by FS1,x,R1,x2,x , F
S1,y ,R1,y
2,y , F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c ). Additionally, in this game
F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x , F
S1,y ,R1,y
2,y , F
S1,c,R1,c
2,c make extra finalising calls to R1,x, R1,y, R1,c, and thus
the probability of collisions in these calls need to be accounted for4, which is implicit
with the q1 queries. Therefore, the final probability of this game is the sum of the
failure conditions in G(3) and G(4) given the additional q1 queries.
P x5 = Pr[D
FF2 ,S
F
1,x,R
F
1,x = 1]
≤ (2n(3(q1 · L/m) + 5(q1 · L/m)2) + (q1 · L/m))/22n + ((q1 · L/m)) /2m
P y5 = Pr[D
FF2 ,S
F
1,y ,R
F
1,y = 1]
≤ (5(q1 · L/m) + 5(q1 · L/m)2)/2n + (22(q1 · L/m)2 + (q1 · L/m)) /2m+n
P c5 = Pr[D
FF2 ,S
F
1,c,R
F
1,c = 1]
≤ ((q1 · L/m)(3 · 2m + 2m+1(q1 · L/m) + 2n(q1 · L/m) + 1)))/2m+n
+
(
(q1 · L/m) + 2(q1 · L/m)2
)
/2n
Game 6. In this game we modify simulators SF1,i, R
F
1,i, (S
F
1,i)
−1, (RF1,i)
−1, i ∈ {x, y, c}
to remove their dependency on F making them self-dependant (they now generate all
their responses independently and uniformly at random); the new simulators S2,x, R2,x,
S−12,x, R
−1
2,x, S2,y, R2,y, S
−1
2,y , R
−1
2,y, S2,c, R2,c, S
−1
2,c , R
−1
2,c are defined in figures 5-8 and 5-9.
Unlike G(3) and G(4), where we modified the S and R simulators separately in different
games, we had to modify both simulators simultaneously in this game because they are
accessing the same shared table T Kx , T Ky , T Kc and a single simulator is no longer gener-
ating a full tuple for every query it receives. That is, if we only modify one of them, the
table will suffer from inconsistencies since then one of the simulators will interact with it
differently than the other. Although the new simulators S2,i, R2,i, S−12,i , R
−1
2,i , i ∈ {x, y, c}
still access the tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc , respectively, they no longer check for any failure
condition, and they do not need to because they guarantee collision-freeness as we
prove below. Also, as stated above, they are not required to generate complete tuples
every time they are queried, that is, a query to S2,x or S−12,x will create the c, y, z fields
4A subtle technical issue is when F
S1,x,R1,x
2,x calls R1,x to finalise an n-bit string (R1,x originally
handles m-bit strings). To resolve this problem, in section 5.2 we propose padding the n-bits by 0
m− n bits, which will not affect the proof, and have a negligible effect on the running time.
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of a tuple (setting x = ⊥), a query to S2,y or S−12,y will create x, c, z (setting y = ⊥),
and a query to S2,c or S−12,c will create x, y, c (setting z = ⊥), while a query to R2,x or
R−12,x will create x, c (setting y = z = ⊥), a query to R2,y or R−12,y will create y, c (setting
x = z = ⊥), and finally a query to R2,c or R−12,c will create c, z (setting x = y = ⊥).
Thus, unlike SF1,i, R
F
1,i, (S
F
1,i)
−1, (RF1,i)
−1, with S2,i, R−12,i , S
−1
2,i , R
−1
2,i , i ∈ {x, y, c} at least
two queries are now required in order to create a new complete tuple in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc .
Since we do not need to check for sequenced and singular queries, as queries from FS2,R22
will now be already in sequence, and direct queries to S2,i, R−12,i , S
−1
2,i , R
−1
2,i , i ∈ {x, y, c}
will automatically be singular (as per their definitions in figures 5-8 and 5-9), simula-
tors S2,i, R−12,i , S
−1
2,i , R
−1
2,i will now drop the field t from T Kx , T Ky , T Kc . The easiest way
to calculate the distinguishing probability of this game is to observe the differences
between the simulators S2,i, R2,i, S−12,i , R
−1
2,i and S
F
1,i, R
F
1,i, (S
F
1,i)
−1, (RF1,i)
−1, i ∈ {x, y, c},
and demonstrate how changes in the new simulators may affect D’s view from G(5) to
G(6).
Simulator S2,x : (→, c, y)
if (ci, yi, zi) ∈ T Kx ∧ (c, y) = (ci, yi)
return zi
else return
z
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Kx (zˆ) ∪ T Kx (yˆ) ∪ IV }
Simulator S2,y : (→, x, c)
if (xi, ci, zi) ∈ T Ky ∧ (x, c) = (xi, ci)
return zi
else return
z
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Ky (zˆ) ∪ T Ky (yˆ) ∪ IV }
Simulator S2,c : (→, x, y)
if (xi, yi, ci) ∈ T Kc ∧ (xi, yi) = (x, y)
return ci
else return
c
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Kc (cˆ)}
Simulator S−12,x : (←, c, z)
if (ci, yi, zi) ∈ T Kx ∧ (c, z) = (ci, zi)
return yi
else return
y
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Kx (zˆ) ∪ T Kx (yˆ) ∪ IV }
Simulator S−12,y : (←, x, z)
if (xi, ci, zi) ∈ T Ky ∧ (x, z) = (xi, zi)
return ci
else return
c
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Ky (cˆ)}
Simulator S−12,c : (←, x, c)
if (xi, yi, ci) ∈ T Kc ∧ (xi, ci) = (x, c),
return yi
else return
y
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Kc (zˆ) ∪ T Kc (yˆ) ∪ IV }
Figure 5-8: Simulators S2,x, S−12,x, S2,y, S
−1
2,y , S2,c, S
−1
2,c
Basically, there are two main differences between the new simulators S2,i, R2,i, S−12,i , R
−1
2,i
and the old ones SF1,i, R
F
1,i, (S
F
1,i)
−1, (RF1,i)
−1, i ∈ {x, y, c}:
1. A new single query to the new simulators does not result in creating a full tuple.
2. The c and z values are no longer being generated by a RO, instead they are
always being generated uniformly at random.
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Simulator R2,x:(→,K, x)
if (xi, ci) ∈ T Kx ∧ xi = x
return ci
else return c $←− {1, 0}n\{T Kx (cˆ)}
Simulator R2,y:(→,K, y)
if (yi, ci) ∈ T Ky ∧ yi = y
return ci
else return c $←− {1, 0}n\{T Ky (cˆ)}
Simulator R2,c : (→,K, c)
if (ci, zi) ∈ T Kc ∧ ci = c
return zi
else return
z
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Kc (zˆ) ∪ T Kc (yˆ) ∪ IV }
Simulator R−12,x : (←,K, c)
if (xi, ci) ∈ T Kx ∧ ci = c, return xi
else return x $←− {1, 0}n\{T Kx (xˆ)}
Simulator R−12,y : (←,K, c)
if (yi, ci) ∈ T Ky ∧ ci = c
return yi
else return
y
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Ky (zˆ) ∪ T Ky (yˆ) ∪ IV }
Simulator R−12,c : (←,K, z)
if (ci, zi) ∈ T Kc ∧ zi = z
return ci
else return c $←− {1, 0}n\{T Kc (cˆ)}
Figure 5-9: Simulators R2,x, R−12,x, R2,y, R
−1
2,y, R2,c, R
−1
2,c
However, even these changes do not affect D’s view in this game because they will not
cause collisions. Below, we prove that this game, with the modifications introduced to
the simulators, is collision-free.
Lemma 5.4.9 (Collision freeness of G(6)). Simulators S2,i, S−12,i , R2,i, R
−1
2,i accessed
by FS2,i,R2,i2,i , where i ∈ {x, y, c}, guarantee collision, prefix and fixed-point freeness.
Proof. Collisions between two tuples (xp, yp, cp, zp), (xq, yq, cq, zq), p 6= q, occur if yp =
zq or zp = zq or yp = yq, while fixed points occur if yi = zi or zi = IV , where i ∈ {p, q}.
We show that as long as FS2,i,R2,i2,i use S2,i, S
−1
2,i , R2,i, R
−1
2,i , where i ∈ {x, y, c}, to process
any query they receive, the collision and fixed point scenarios above are impossible.
The proof follows from the definitions of S2,i, S−12,i , R2,i, R
−1
2,i . Any yp of any tuple
may not collide with any yq of any other tuple or any zp of the same tuple, or any
zq of any other tuple because yp is always begin generated uniformly at random as
follows: yp
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Ki (yˆ) ∪ T Ki (zˆ) ∪ IV }, which excludes values of all the y and
z fields of the tuples already exist in T Ki , i ∈ {x, y, c}. Similarly, a new zi value is
generated as follows: z $←− {1, 0}n\{TK(zˆ) ∪ TK(yˆ) ∪ IV }, which again excludes all the
values of the y and z fields of the tuples already exist in T Ki , i ∈ {x, y, c} and thus
thwarts any possible collision with them. Therefore, collisions between any y and any
z in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc are impossible. This also immediately implies that prefix collisions
(where y = z) are impossible too. Fixed-point-freeness follows since both y and z are
generated excluding IV and other existing values of y and z in T Kx , T Ky , T Kc .
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Consequently, since the view of D will only change if collisions were found in the
previous game, the probability in G(6) is the probability that the simulators SF1,i, R
F
1,i,
(SF1,i)
−1, (RF1,i)
−1, i ∈ {x, y, c} in G(5) will output collisions while the modified simula-
tors S2,i, S−12,i , R2,i, R
−1
2,i in G(6) will not, which is 0. Thus,
P x6 = Pr[D
F
S2,x,R2,x
2,x ,S2,x,R2,x ] = P x5
P y6 = Pr[D
F
S2,y,R2,y
2,y ,S2,y ,R2,y ] = P y5
P c6 = Pr[D
F
S2,c,R2,c
2,c ,S2,c,R2,c ] = P c5
Game 7. In this game we remove the shared tables T Kx , T Ky , T Kc and modify the sim-
ulators S2,i, S−12,i , R2,i, R
−1
2,i , i ∈ {x.y, c} to maintain their own separate private tables.
The new simulators S3,i, S−13,i , R3,i, R
−1
3,i maintain the new tables T Ki,S (maintained by
S2,i, S
−1
2,i ), and T Ki,R (maintained by R2,i, R−12,i ), where i ∈ {x, y, c}. These new tables
contain tuples of the format (c, y, z) for T Kx,S , (x, c) for T Kx,R, (x, c, z) for T Ky,S , (y, c) for
T Ky,R, (x, y, c) for T Kc,S , (c, z) for T Kc,R. The definitions of the new simulators S3,i, S−13,i , R3,i,
R−13,i are similar to the definitions of the simulators S2,i, S
−1
2,i , R2,i, R
−1
2,i in figures 5-8 and
5-9, except that the new simulators now update and refer to their values from their
own (unshared) tables. Since the new simulators S3,i have no access to T Ki,R and R3,i
have no access to T Ki,S , one may be inclined to think that cp ∈ T Ki,S , cq ∈ T Ki,R such that
cp = cq implies a collision. However, this is not the case, the field c here acts as a
connecting variable to link the two tables. In fact, FS3,i,R3,i2 will always create this
linking c among T Ki,S and T Ki,R to process its queries.
Lemma 5.4.10 (Collision freeness within query tables). The tables T Ki,S and T Ki,R,
maintained separately by simulators S3,i and R3,i, respectively, where i ∈ {x, y, c}, may
not exhibit collisions in the common field c.
Proof. A genuine collision in the c field means either T Ki,S has cp = cq while p 6= q or T Ki,R
has ca = cb while a 6= b; but, this cannot happen because both S3,i and R3,i generate c
excluding all the other c values of the existing tuples in their respective tables, that is,
c
$←− {1, 0}n\{T Ki,S(cˆ)}, c $←− {1, 0}n\{T Ki,R(cˆ)}. Thus, there may at most be one value of
c in a table, but that value may exist in both tables which does not imply a collision,
rather it acts as a connecting point between the two tables.
Even though collisions of c may not be encountered, prefix collisions and fixed
points are still possible. For example, when S3,y generates z, it has no way to exclude
the values of y (to prevent a prefix collision) because there is no y field in T Ky,S and it
has no access to T Ky,R. Similar arguments apply for other simulators (i.e., there is no
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single table that contains both y and z fields). Also, a fixed point, where y = z, cannot
be prevented for the same reason. To simulate practical configurations of the ideal
cipher and integration function, we also cannot exclude the IV when generating z or
y, making a fixed point such as y = IV or z = IV possible. Therefore, the probability
in this game is the probability that the simulators will output either prefix collision,
or fixed points. Since the occurrence probability of a prefix collision can be upper
bounded by the birthday attack, the overall probability of this game is:
P x7 = Pr[D
F
S3,x,R3,x
2,x ,S3,x,R3,x ] ≤ ((q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)2 + 2(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)) /2n
P y7 = Pr[D
F
S3,y,R3,y
2,y ,S3,y ,R3,y ] ≤ ((q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)2 + 2(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)) /2n
P c7 = Pr[D
F
S3,c,R3,c
2,c ,S3,c,R3,c ] ≤ ((q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)2 + 2(q1 · L/m+ q2 + q3)) /2n
where the 2 instances of (q1 · L/m + q2 + q3)/2n signify the 2 possible fixed points,
namely y = IV or z = IV .
Game 8. We can now replace FS3,x,R3,x2,x ,FS3,y ,R3,y2,y ,FS3,c,R3,c2,c by CˆHx,Gxx , CˆHy ,Gyy , CˆHc,Gcc
and S3,x, S3,y, S3,c by Hx,Hy,Hc, and R3,x, R3,y, R3,c by Gx,Gy,Gc. Clearly, the distin-
guishing probability of this game is similar to the previous one as the view of D does
not change by the replacements as detailed above:
P x8 = Pr[D
CˆHx,Gxx ,Hx,Gx = 1] = P x7
P y8 = Pr[D
Cˆ
Hy,Gy
y ,Hy ,Gy = 1] = P y7
P c8 = Pr[D
CˆHc,Gcc ,Hc,Gc = 1] = P c7
Finally, we add the distinguishing probabilities calculated throughout the proof and
obtain the full distinguishing bound for each construction. The running time of the
simulator is (number of queries)× (largest query), that is tS ≤ (q1·L/m+q2+q3)·(m+n)
and is similar in all games. This completes the proof.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we proved that the iMD constructions, proposed in chapter 4, are indif-
ferentiable from RO when their underlying primitives are modelled as ideal primitives.
We developed a generic proof based on the popular game-playing technique showing
that a distinguisher cannot differentiate between systems representing our iMD con-
structions and another representing a RO.
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Chapter 6
Indistinguishability and
Unforgeability of the iMD
Constructions
In this chapter, we conclude the contributions of the thesis by discussing the
indistinguishability and unforgeability of the integrated-key hash functions.
We first show that hash functions constructed in the integrated-key setting
are indistinguishable from their variants in the conventional dedicated-key
setting which (using the result from chapter 5) implies that they are also im-
mediately indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Functions (PRF). We then
use this result to further show that the previously proposed x-iMD, y-iMD,
c-iMD constructions are unforgeable when used as Message Authentication
Code (MAC), which is a central hash functions application.
6.1 Introduction
In chapters 4 and 5, we introduced the integrated-key setting where a keyless hash
function is transparently transformed to a keyed hash function, creating a family of
functions indexed by different keys. We then proposed several integrated-key construc-
tions (called the iMD constructions) and proceeded to prove that they preserve various
important hash function security properties, from collision resistance, pre-image resis-
tance and 2nd pre-image resistance to being indifferentiable from RO. In this chapter,
we conclude the security analysis of the iMD constructions by providing discussions and
proofs on their indistinguishability and unforgeability (these proofs may also be appli-
cable to other integrated-key hash functions exhibiting similar structures to the iMD
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constructions). Although the results are logically separate, in the unforgeability proof
we used the indistinguishability result to model the composition of the compression
and integration functions as a single entity.
Indistinguishability. In the first part of this chapter we show that the iMD con-
structions are indistinguishable from their variants in the dedicated-key setting. That
is, if we visualise the compression functions and integration functions of the iMD con-
structions as single black-box entities, accepting a message block and a key input, then
we basically obtain the iMD variants in the dedicated-key setting. Obviously, since the
only difference between the iMD constructions is where each construction places its
integration function around the compression function, this abstraction makes x-iMD,
y-iMD, c-iMD identical. To argue about the indistinguishability between the iMD con-
structions and their dedicated-key variant, we use a collision-based proof approach that
adopts the indistinguishability framework due to Maurer [107] (this framework is based
on the notion of random systems, which we generalise in section 6.2):
Definition 6.1.1 (Indistinguishability). The random systems F and R are said to
be (computationally) indistinguishable if for any distinguisher D with access to both F
and R (but does not know which system is which), the distinguishing advantage:
∣∣Pr[DFk → 1]− Pr[DRk → 1]∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter k.
In definition 6.1.1, the security parameter k is basically the number of queries the
distinguisher D sends to the systems before deciding to output either 1 or 0. Outputting
1 means that D believes that it is interacting with a particular system and outputting 0
means that D believes it is interacting with the other system. While it is not necessarily
always the case, D is usually programmed to output 1 when it thinks it is interacting
with the real system (the system that needs to be proven indistinguishable from another
ideal system) and outputs 0 to indicate that it thinks it is interacting with the ideal
system. For D to succeed, it should be able to make many correct guesses, this will
maximise the distinguishing advantage as per definition 6.1.1. In particular, we aim
to prove that a distinguisher D cannot distinguish between two, identically-packaged,
keyed hash function CfK and Cˆf,gK , one with access to a keyed compression function fK
(representing a dedicated-key hash function), while the other with access to a keyless
compression function f and a keyed integration function gK (representing an integrated-
key hash function); we denote such indistinguishability by Cfk ./ Cˆf,gk . This naturally
implies fK ./ (f ? gk), where ? is some composition operation.
105
6.1. Introduction 6. Indistinguishability and Unforgeability
Indistinguishability here is the right notion because the adversary is given a black-
box access to both systems and it should not be able to distinguish between them.
Unlike the indifferentiability framework [108], the indistinguishability framework does
not allow the adversary to access the internal components of a system and here we aim
to show that if we model the composition of the compression function and integration
function as a single component, no adversary will be able to (computationally) distin-
guish it from a single component with the same domain and range (i.e., a dedicated-key
compression function; one that naturally accepts a key).
Message Authentication Code. As discussed in section 2.5, MACs (Message Au-
thentication Code) are cryptographic primitives used to preserve data integrity and
authenticity. Basically, a MAC algorithm accepts a message M and a (secret) key K
and produces a tag T , that is, MAC(K,M) = T . Once T is produced, a sender trans-
mits the message-tag pair (M,T ) to a receiver which, in turn, verifies the integrity
of the message M using a verification algorithm. The verification algorithm accepts
the received message-tag pair (M ′, T ′) and outputs 1 if MAC(K,M ′) = T ′, in which
case the receiver accepts M ′, otherwise it output 0, in which case the receiver rejects
M ′. MACs preserve integrity because if M (the original message) was tampered with
in transit, MAC(K,M) 6= T with high probability. MACs also preserve authenticity
because only parties who have access to the secret key K can generate a valid message-
tag pair. One of the most common approaches for designing MACs is based on hash
functions, the prime example is HMAC [21]. In this approach, a secretly keyed1 hash
function FK : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n is used to produce the tag.
MAC schemes need to be unforgeable, which means that no adversary A can forge
a message-tag pair (M ′, T ′) such that MAC(K,M ′) = T ′, without access to the secret
key K. In particular, A is given access to a MAC scheme which it can query by sending
messages and receive the corresponding tags. After a number of such queries, A outputs
a message M ′ that was never queried to the MAC scheme, and claims that a particular
T ′ is the tag of M ′. Formally, the advantage (success probability) of an adversary A
against a MAC scheme built from a keyed hash function FK (the probability that A
will succeed in forging against FK) is as follows:
AdvmacFK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K, (M,T ) $←− AFK : FK(M) = T ∧M not queried
]
According to the definition, an adversary A succeeds in the unforgeability game as long
1In MAC, the hash function has to be keyed and the key should remain secret. This, however, does
not preclude keyless hash functions from being used as MACs as there are ways to key them, such as
using the IV as a key or appending the key to the message [81], though these may be forgeable [48].
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as it manages to create a message-tag pair that will pass the verification process, in this
case the scheme is said to be forgeable, even if the adversarially created message-tag
pair is completely different than the one originally sent by a genuine party. Note that
here a sender transmits the message M in plaintext because MAC only aims to test
whether M has been somehow altered (maliciously or inadvertently) in transit.
To prove the unforgeability of a hash-based MAC scheme, some existing analysis,
e.g., [22, 19, 159], made unnecessarily strong assumptions on the compression function
modelling it as a Pseudorandom Function (PRF) [76]. However, since in cryptography
it is always desirable to carry out proofs based on as weak assumptions as possible, we
will prove the unforgeability of our constructions based on the sole assumption that
the underlying primitive is a good MAC, which is strictly weaker assumption than
PRF. Bellare and An [7] followed this approach while proving the unforgeability of
their Nested Iteration (NI) mode. Similarly, Maurer and Sjo¨din introduced a general
unforgeability proof approach and used it to prove that their Chain Shift (CS) and
Rotate Shift (RS) constructions [109] are unforgeable.
Chapter Outline. This chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.2, we prove that
a hash function constructed in the integrated-key setting is (computationally) indistin-
guishable from its variant in the dedicated-key setting, which implies that they are also
indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Functions (PRF). Using this indistinguishability
result, we further prove in section 6.3 that the iMD constructions are unforgeable.
6.2 Composition and Indistinguishability
Essentially, in an integrated-key hash function, both the compression function f and
the integration function g can be visualised as a single composite entity R that, when
treated as a black box, is a dedicated-key compression function (a compression function
that admits a key). Thus, intuitively, proofs for f ? g can naturally be reduced to R,
where ? is some composition operation. In this chapter, we formalise this argument. To
provide concrete security analysis, we model R as a generalised random system (GRS),
which is a generalisation of Maurer’s random systems notion introduced in [107].
Definition 6.2.1 (Generalised Random System (GRS)). A Generalised Random
System (X1 . . .Xn → Y1 . . .Ym)-R is a transformation that given an input Ui = {XUi1 ∈
X1, . . . , XUin ∈ Xn}, returns a conditionally probabilistic output Vi = {Y Vi1 ∈ Y1, . . . ,
Y Vim ∈ Ym}. R is stateful if R(Ui) = PRVi|U iV i−1 (future outputs depend on previous in-
put/outputs) and stateless if R(Ui) = PRVi|Ui (future outputs depend on only the current
inputs) for i ≥ 1, where U i = U1, . . . , Ui and V i−1 = V1, . . . , Vi−1. A GRS may either
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be atomic (cannot be decomposed to sub GRS’) or composite (formed by the composition
of several atomic or composite GRS’ and can be decomposed).
Compared to Maurer’s notion of random systems, the GRS notion covers a wider
range of applications where cryptosystems accept several input parameters and return
more than one output. As stated in definition 6.2.1, GRS’ are characterised by their
type and input/output spaces. In this chapter, we will always attribute the GRS’ to
single output space Y and either single X or double (X ,K) input spaces, while using
both atomic or composite GRS’ as necessary. We use the notation (X ,Y)-R to denote
an atomic GRS R, and the notation (X ,Y)-SF?G to denote a composite GRS S formed
by the composition of F and G sub GRS’ (F and G can themselves be either atomic
or composite). Composition of GRS’ can be parallel or sequential, but in this chapter
we only consider sequential composition, which can further be full or partial.
Definition 6.2.2 (Full sequential composition). A GRS (X1 . . .Xn → Y1 . . .Ym)-
R is a full sequential composite GRS if it is formed by the composition of k sub GRS’
(X1 . . .Xn,Z1 . . .Zp)-F1, (Z1 . . .Zp,V1 . . .Vq)-F2, . . . , (G1 . . .Gr,Y1 . . .Ym)-Fk, where k
> 1, denoted by RF1◦F2◦···◦Fk , such that RF1◦F2···◦Fk(Ui) = Fk(. . .F2(F1(Ui)) . . . ),
where Ui = {XUi1 ∈ X1, . . . , XUin ∈ Xn}. Generally, RF◦G 6= RG◦F.
Definition 6.2.3 (Partial sequential composition). A GRS (X1 . . .Xp → Y1 . . .
Yq)-P is a partial sequential composite of GRS’ (Z1 . . .Zn,V1 . . .Vm)-G, and (X1 . . .Xp,
Y1 . . .Yq)-F, denoted PGMFzc , where z ∈ {R,L},|X1 . . .Xp| = a, |Y1 . . .Yq| = b, |Z1 . . .Zn|
= c, |V1 . . .Vm| = d, and a > c, if it is formed by composing F and G as follows:
PGMFzc =
F(G([Ui]c)||[Ui]a−c) if z = R,F([Ui]a−c||G([Ui]c)) if z = L.
where |Ui| = c-bits, Ui = {XUi1 ∈ X1, . . . , XUin ∈ Xn} and [Ui]c (respectively, [Ui]c)
denotes the most (respectively, least) significant c-bits of Ui. If z = R, the composition
is called right composition, otherwise it is left composition. Similarly, PFMG is formed
by composing F with part of G. Generally, PFMG 6= PGMF.
6.2.1 Indistinguishability from the Dedicated-key Setting
Using Maurer’s indistinguishability framework [107], we prove that the following sys-
tems are indistinguishable: (1) R and AF◦G, (2) R and BGMFRm , (3) R and C
GMF
Ln ,
where F represents a compression function and G represents an integration function.
The systems AF◦G,BGMFRm ,C
GMF
Ln represent the composite systems formed by compos-
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ing the compression function and integration function in the c-iMD, x-iMD y-iMD
constructions, respectively, while R represents a dedicated-key compression function.
Theorem 6.2.4 (Integrated-key Dedicated-key Indistinguishability). The ato-
mic GRS (X ,K → Y)-R is (tA, qA, A)-indistinguishable from the composite GRS
(X ,K → Y)-AF1◦G1, (tB, qB, B)-indistinguishable from the composite GRS (X ,K →
Y)-BG2MF2Rm , (tC, qC, C)-indistinguishable from the composite GRS (X ,K → Y)-CG3MF3Ln ,
where:
1. A ≤ q2A/2n, and tA ≤ qA(τF1 + τG1)
2. B ≤ q2B/2m, and tB ≤ qB(cmn · τF2 + τG2)
3. C ≤ q2C/2n, and tC ≤ qC(cmn · τF3 + τG3)
given a distinguisher D sending any number of queries qA, qB, qC of the form (X,K) to
the systems and receiving responses Y , where X ∈ X , K ∈ K, Y ∈ Y, and |X| = m+n,
|K| = k, |Y | = n. The GRS (X ,K → Y)-AF1◦G1 is a full sequential composite sys-
tem formed by the composition of (X → Y)-F1 and (Y,K → Y)-G1, while GRS’
(X ,K → Y)-BG2MF2Rm and (X ,K → Y)-CG3MF3Ln are partial sequential composite sys-
tems, formed by composing (Xm,K → Xm)-G2, (Xm||X n → Y)-F2, and (X n,K →
X n)-G2, (Xm||X n → Y)-F3, respectively. The parameters τR, τF, τG1 , τG2 , τG3 are the
costs of calling R, (F1, F2, F3), G1, G2, G3, respectively, and cmn is a small constant
representing the delay caused by partitioning Xm+n = (Xm||Xn).
Proof. Let D be a distinguisher with access to two systems, and whose aim is to
distinguish between them. D sends queries of the form (X,K) ∈ (X ,K) and receives
responses of the form Y ∈ Y, where |X| = m+ n bits, |K| = k-bits, and |Y | = n-bits.
Also, let (X ,K → Y)-R be an atomic GRS.
For (1), let (X ,K → Y)-AF1◦G1 be a composite GRS formed by the full sequential
composition of the atomic GRS’ (X → Y)-F1 and (Y,K → Y)-G1. For (2) and (3),
let (X ,K → Y)-BG2MF2Rm and (X ,K → Y)-CG3MF3Ln be composite GRS’ formed by the
partial composition of the atomic GRS’ (Xm,K → Xm)-G2, (Xm+n → Y)-F2, and
(X n,K → X n)-G3, (Xm+n → Y)-F3, respectively, where |X ∈ X | > |Y ∈ Y| and
|X | = m + n. The 3 distinguishing instances of D, defined in figure 6-1, succeed in
their respective games if they detect differences in how R and AF1◦G1 ,BG2MF2Rm ,C
G3MF3
Ln
behave when responding to their queries. We use the notation DX./Y to refer to a
distinguisher D trying to distinguish between the two systems X and Y ; thus, we
define three distinguishers: DR./A, DR./B, DR./C , see figure 6-1.
First, D fixes a key K ∈ K and sends random queries (X1,K), (X2,K), . . . (Xq,K)
to R, AF1◦G1 , BG2MF2Rm , C
G3MF3
Ln
, where Xi ∈ X . Figure 6-2 depicts the internal view of
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Distinguisher DR./A :
K
$←− K
for i = 1 to qA do
Xi
$←− X\Xi−1
Y Ri ← R(Xi,K)
Y Ai ← AF1◦G1(Xi,K)
end for
if Y Ri = Y
R
j ∧
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qA
then DR → 1
else if Y Ai = Y
A
j ∧
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qA
then DA → 1
Distinguisher DR./B :
K
$←− K
for i = 1 to qB do
Xi
$←− X\Xi−1
Y Ri ← R(Xi,K)
Y Bi ← BG2MF2(Xi,K)
end for
if Y Ri = Y
R
j ∧
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qB
then DR → 1
else if Y Bi = Y
B
j ∧
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qB
then DB → 1
Distinguisher DR./C :
K
$←− K
for i = 1 to qC do
Xi
$←− X\Xi−1
Y Ri ← R(Xi,K)
Y Ci ← CG3MF3(Xi,K)
end for
if Y Ri = Y
R
j ∧
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qC
then DR → 1
else if Y Ci = Y
C
j ∧
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qC
then DC → 1
Figure 6-1: Distinguishers DR./A, DR./B, DR./C
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Figure 6-2: Internal structures of systems R, AF1◦G1 , BG2MF2 , CG3MF3
systems R, AF1◦G1 , BG2MF2Rm , C
G3MF3
Ln
and illustrates how they process queries received
from D. We model D as a non-adaptive distinguisher such that D generates queries it
intends to send to the systems before starting the game2. For (1) we let D first interact
with R and outputs 1 every time it finds a collision (i.e., there are Xi and Xj such
that R(Xi,K) = R(Xj ,K) while Xi 6= Xj and i > j, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qA}), then
D interacts with AF1◦G1 and outputs 1 whenever it finds a collision. If the number of
collisions in R is similar to the number of collisions in AF1◦G1 , the advantage of D is
minimised, otherwise it implies that either R outputs more collisions than AF1◦G1 or
AF1◦G1 outputs more collisions than R, both cases increase the distinguishing advan-
tage of DR./A. That is, in conventional indistinguishability proofs, it is usually the case
that some real system is argued indistinguishable from another idealised one, but in
our case, the GRS R (representing a keyed compression function) is not ideal and may
generate collisions, so one way to argue about its indistinguishability is to adopt this
2Compare non-adaptive distinguishers with the adaptive ones where the latter generate its queries
in real time during the game such that later queries are generated based on responses of earlier queries.
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collision-based approach, where the number of collisions occurring in one system should
be about the same number of collisions occurring in another for the two systems to be
deemed indistinguishable. In the R system, collisions depend solely on the structure of
the GRS R since R is an atomic GRS, but this is clearly not the case with the AF1◦G1
system as it is a full sequential composition of F1 and G1. Thus, collisions in AF1◦G1
may be the result of (i) collisions in F1, or (ii) collisions in G1.
Adv./R,A(D) =
∣∣Pr[DR → 1]− Pr[DA → 1]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr[CollR]− Pr[CollAF1◦G1 ]∣∣
= |Pr[CollR]− (Pr[CollF1 ] + Pr[CollG1 ])|
≤ ∣∣(q2/2n)− ((q2/2n) + (q2/2n))∣∣ ≤ q2/2n
In BG2MF2Rm and C
G3MF3
Ln
the orientation of the composition is slightly different than
AF1◦G1 . In the partial sequential GRS BG2MF2Rm , the rightmost m-bit part of the input
Xm+n = Xm||Xn is first processed by G2 which will then return an intermediate m-
bit string to be concatenated with (the untouched) Xn part of the input and then the
whole string is processed by F2. Like AF1◦G1 , collisions in BG2MF2 may be the result
of either (i) collisions in G2, or (ii) collisions in F2.
Adv./R,B(D) =
∣∣Pr[DR → 1]− Pr[DB → 1]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr[CollR]− Pr[CollBG2MF2 ]∣∣
= |Pr[CollR]− (Pr[CollG2 ] + Pr[CollF2 ])|
≤ |(q2/2n)− ((q2/2m) + (q2/2n)) | ≤ q2/2m
The distinguishing advantage of DR./C is similar. The running time of DR./A is q (the
number of queries D makes) multiplied by the cost of calling F1 and G1. The running
times of DR./B and DR./C are calculated similarly, except that in this case the input
is first partitioned to Xm||Xn, hence we include a small constant cm,n to account for
the cost of partitioning the input in DR./B and DR./C , respectively.
It now follows that as long as R and Z are indistinguishable, where Z ∈ {AF1◦G1 ,
BG2MF2Rm ,C
G3MF3
Ln
}, then any cryptosystem (i.e., hash function) HZ, with access to Z,
is at least as secure as the cryptosystem HR, with access to R. This is immediate from
the result in [108]. Lemma 6.2.5 states this explicitly (using slightly different notation).
Lemma 6.2.5. Any cryptosystem H(P) using P as a component is at least as secure
as the cryptosystem H(R) obtained from H(P) by replacing P with R, if and only if
R and P are indistinguishable.
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6.2.2 Indistinguishability from PRF
A hash function is PRF-Pr (Pseudorandom Function Preserving) if there is no adversary
able to distinguish it from a random function, where the latter is a function that has
been chosen randomly based on given domain and range (this does not imply that the
output of the function should be random). That is, given a family of hash functions
HK , an adversary with a black-box access to HK should not be able to distinguish a
randomly chosen member function ofHK from a genuinely random function. Succinctly,
AdvprfHK (A) =
∣∣∣Pr [K $←− K : AHK → 1]− Pr [R $←− Func(Dom,Rng) : AR → 1]∣∣∣
where R is a randomly chosen function from the set of all functions with domain Dom
and range Rng.
In [161] it was shown that if a dedicated-key hash function is PRO-Pr (indiffer-
entiable from Pseudorandom Oracle), then it is trivially PRF-Pr. Since in section
6.2.1 the iMD constructions were shown to be indistinguishable from their variants
in the dedicated-key setting, and in chapter 5 it was shown that they are indifferen-
tiable from RO, then this immediately implies that the iMD constructions are also
indistinguishable from a PRF (i.e., that they are PRF-Pr). Precisely, in 6.2.1 it
was shown that the composition of a keyless compression function f : {0, 1}m+n →
{0, 1}n and a keyed integration function, either g1 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m or
g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, is indistinguishable from a dedicated-key compres-
sion function fK : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}n, which implies that the construc-
tions x-iMDfx,g1,g2 , y-iMDfy ,g2 , c-iMDfc,g2 , with access to fx, fy, fc, g1, g2, are actually
dedicated-key function as long as the compositions fx ?g1, fy ?g2, fc ?g2 are accessed in
a black-box manner, that is x-iMDfx,g1,g2 , y-iMDfy ,g2 , c-iMDfc,g2 , are indistinguishable
from iMDfK . Additionally, if we remove the last call to g2 in the iMDfK constructions,
they become the plain Merkle-Dam˚ard in the dedicated-key setting, which was shown
to be PRF-Pr in [25].
6.3 Unforgeability of the iMD Constructions
When proving the unforgeability of a construction, the underlying compression function
needs to be keyed appropriately. Thus, in our iMD constructions, we cannot give direct
access for an adversary A to the keyless compression functions fx, fy, fc of the x-iMD,
y-iMD, c-iMD constructions. Instead, in each construction we treat the keyless com-
pression function and the keyed integration function as a single composite component
for which we can give A oracle access to (indeed, we can do that as per our indistin-
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guishability result in section 6.2.1). For the rest of the chapter, the iMD constructions
have black-box access to hx, hy, hc : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}n, and are denoted by
x-iMDhx,g2 , y-iMDhy ,g2 , c-iMDhc,g2 , where hx = g1 M fx, hy = g2 M fy, hc = fc ◦ g2 and
g1 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
Theorem 6.3.1 (Unforgeability of x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD). Let the keyed com-
posite functions hx, hy, hc : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m+n → {0, 1}n be (thx , qhx ,m+ n, hx)-mac,
(thy , qhy ,m + n, hy)-mac, (thc , qhc ,m + n, hc)-mac, respectively, and let the keyed in-
tegration function g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be (tg2 , qg2 , n + k, g2)-mac. Then,
the integrated-key constructions x-iMDhx,g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, y-iMDhy ,g2 :
{0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, c-iMDhc,g2 : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n are (tx, qx, L, x)-
mac, (ty, qy, L, y)-mac, (tc, qc, L, c)-mac, respectively, such that:
• x =
(
q2x+qx+2
2
)
· hx · g2 , y =
(
q2y+qy+2
2
)
· hy · g2 , c =
(
q2c+qc+2
2
)
· hc · g2
• qi ≤ qhi−e(L)e(L)+1 , ti = thi − ((qi + 1) · e(L) · τhi − τhi)− (qi − 1) · τg2
where i ∈ {x, y, c}, τhx , τhy , τhc , τg2 are the costs of calling hx, hy, hc, g2, respectively,
and e(L) is the number of m-bit blocks in a message of length L.
Proof. At this level of abstract, we can argue that x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD are structurally
identical due to our indistinguishability result in section 6.2.1. However, in this proof
we will make an explicit distinction between them and derive their advantages based
on their own compression-integration composite functions. Let the composite functions
hx, hy, hc be (thx , qhx , n+m, hx)-mac, (thy , qhy , n+m, hy)-mac, (thc , qhc , n+m, hc)-
mac, respectively. We now build adversaries Ax, Ay, Ac against x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD
that call adversaries Bx, By, Bc who attack hx, hy, hc, and then derive the forging ad-
vantages of x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD from the advantages of these adversaries.
Adversaries. Let Ax be a (tAx , qAx , L, Ax)-mac adversary (forger) against x-iMD
that makes qAx queries of size at most L (each) to x-iMD and finds a forgery with
probability Ax during time at most tAx ; let Ay and Ac be defined similarly for y-iMD
and c-iMD. Also, let Bx be a (tBx , qBx , n + m, Bx)-mac adversary against hx finding
forgeries with probability Bx after sending qB queries of size m+ n (each) to hx, with
running time at most tBx ; let By and Bc be defined similarly for y-iMD and c-iMD.
Finally, let Gg2 be a (tGg2 , qGg2 , k+n, Gg2 )-mac adversary against g2 that finds forgeries
in g2 with probability Gg2 after sending qGg2 queries of size n (each) to g2 with running
time at most tGg2 .
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Unforgeability Advantage. Following the general approach due to Maurer and
Sjo¨din [109] (also used in [25]), our unforgeability proof proceeds in 3 steps:
1. First, we propose a set of forging strategies S which instruct an adversary (forger)
in how to forge against the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions.
2. Then, we prove that this set of forging strategies S is complete; that is, if an
adversary succeeded in finding a forgery, this implies that at least one of the
strategies in S was successful (i.e., no forgery can be created unless one of the
forging strategies in S has been used and is successful).
3. Finally, we calculate the success probability (advantage) of the adversary in forg-
ing against x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD. The adversary’s advantage is based on the size
of S. Obviously, the more strategies the set contains, the higher the probabil-
ity that the adversary will succeed in finding a forgery that corresponds to one
of those strategies. As stated earlier, if an adversary found a forgery, it must
have been generated by one of those strategies, so a forging strategies set S with
minimal size means that the adversary has less chance to succeed.
To simplify the following discussion, we abstract the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD construc-
tions and their adversaries. Essentially, when we give x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD access
to the composite functions hx, hy, hc, these constructions become structurally identi-
cal. Thus, we will denote the x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions by iMD and the
adversaries attacking them Ax, Ay, Ac by A. Similarly, we will refer to the composite
functions hx, hy, hc by h and the adversaries attacking them Bx, By, Bc by B. We will
later decompose and state the bounds for each construction.
In order to obtain the forging bound of iMD, we derive the forging advantage of
A (who attacks iMD) in terms of B (who attacks h). Specifically, B picks a strategy
si ∈ S, runs A according to si and obtains A’s forging advantage in terms of its own
(i.e., B’s) forging advantage. Let the number of calls to h required to process all the qA
queries that A sends during its running time tA be `A (i.e., `A ≤ qA · e(L), where e(L)
is the number of blocks in a message of length L), then the set of forging strategies is
defined as follows:
S =
{
{(i, w) : w ∈ Rng(h)} ∪ {(i, j) : 1 ≤ j < i ≤ `A} ∪ {(`A, z) : z ∈ Rng(h)}
}
where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , `A} and Rng(h) is the range of h which is {0, 1}n. In particular, S
contains 3 types of strategies:
1. (i, w), i ∈ {1, . . . , `A}, w ∈ {0, 1}n: in these strategies B predicts that the i-th
application of h will return w.
114
6.3. Unforgeability of the iMD Constructions 6. Indistinguishability and Unforgeability
2. (i, j), 1 < j < i, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , `A}: here B predicts that there is a collision between
two internal applications of h, that is, the output of some earlier application (the
j-th) of h equals the output of the i-th application of h for different inputs.
3. (`A, z), z ∈ {0, 1}n: this is a single strategy where B predicts the output of A (the
`A-th application of h), the prediction in this case is z. This strategy is similar
to the na¨ıve strategy in [109].
Once the simulation is started, B at some point forcefully terminates the simulation
according to the chosen forging strategy si ∈ S, then returns a forgery message M and
a tag T , such that iMD(M) = T , which are both decided based on si. Let M (i) denote
the m + n bit string that would be the input to the i-th application of h, precisely
M (i) = mi||yi−1, where mi is the i-th block of a query and yi−1 is the output of the
(i − 1)-th application of h. In the strategy (i, w), B stops the simulation right before
A’s i-th query to h, and returns (M (i), w). Similarly, in the strategy (i, j), B stops the
simulation right before A’s i-th query and returns (M (i), yj), where yj is the output of
a previous (in this case the j-th) application of h (i.e., j < i), that is yj = h(M (j)).
Finally, if strategy (`A, z) was chosen, B waits until the very last application of h and
right before processing M (`A), it terminates the simulation and returns (M `A , z), where
z is a prediction of iMD(m1||m2|| . . . ||m`A).
Lemma 6.3.2 (Completeness of S). The set of forging strategies S as defined above
is complete in the sense that if a forging adversary A is successful in finding a forgery
against iMD, then at least one strategy in S is successful.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A sending qA queries to iMD, each query
of length at most L, then with probability A, it finds a forgery. Let the number
of h applications required to process the qA queries be `A, that is q1||q2|| . . . ||qA =
m1||m2|| . . . ||m`A where m1||m2|| . . . ||m`A is the concatenation of the blocks of all
queries (note that a single query may consist of more than 1 block). Then A either
finds a forgery in the last application of h, or some internal application of h. If A finds
a forgery in the last application of h, then strategy (`A, z) is successful. Otherwise, A
finds a forgery in an internal application of h, in which case there are two possibilities:
1. A predicts a collision between two internal applications of h, specifically, the i-th
and j-th ones, where 1 ≤ j < i and i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ` − 1}, then A returns the
output of the j-th application of h as a forgery tag and what would be the input of
the i-th application of h as the forgery message, that is (M (i), yj), where yj is the
output of the j-th application of h, and M (i) is the input to the i-th application
of h. In this case, strategy (i, j) succeeds.
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2. A predicts the output of the i-th application of h to be, say, w ∈ {0, 1}n, where
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ` − 1}, and returns its prediction value w as a forgery tag, while
returning what would be the input to the i-th application of h as the forgery
message, that is (M i, w). In this case, strategy (i, w) succeeds.
For a message consisting of only one block, strategy (`A, z) succeeds where, in this case,
`A = 1. Therefore, it is clear that if A finds a forgery in iMD, then at least one of the
strategies in S is successful.
In the discussion of the forging strategies and the proof of Lemma 6.3.2, we skipped
a technicality that we elaborate on here, that is B’s success probability of generating
a valid tag when it outputs a forgery according to the various forging strategies in S.
We know that B finds a forgery in h with success probability B, but recall that iMD
further finalises its output with a call to g2, so in order for a forgery (M,T ) to be
valid (i.e., iMD(M) = T ), the tag T must have been constructed in such a way that
this finalisation call of g2 (beside the previous h calls) is accounted for. That is, if
B forcefully terminates the simulation of A before A actually finishes processing the
whole message (and B will always do), B should also call adversary Gg2 to finalise T ,
which returns a valid tag with probability Gg2 = g2 . Also, in order to obtain the
advantage of B in terms of the advantage of A, the latter has to be divided by the size
of the forging strategies |S| that B adopts in its forging game. Thus,
AdvmacB ·AdvmacGg2 =
AdvmacA
|S|
then solving for A, we get
AdvmacA = |S| ·AdvmacB ·AdvmacGg2
The size of S is the number of strategies it contains, and is calculated as follows:
strategy (i, w) contributes `A pairs (since i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `A}), strategy (i, j) contributes
(`2A − `A)/2 pairs [109], and strategy (`A, z) contributes a single pair, thus:
|S| = `A + `
2
A − `A
2
+ 1 =
2`A + `2A − `A
2
+ 1 =
`2A + `A + 2
2
Now we can obtain the success bounds of Ax, Ay, Ac based on the success probability
of Bx, By, Bc and Gg2 as well as the size of S. For x-iMD:
AdvmacBx ·AdvmacGg2 =
AdvmacAx
(`2Ax + `Ax + 2)/2
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then solving for Ax , we get:
AdvmacAx =
(
`2Ax + `Ax + 2
2
)
·AdvmacBx ·AdvmacGg2
=
(
`2Ax + `Ax + 2
2
)
·Advmachx ·Advmacg2 =
(
`2Ax + `Ax + 2
2
)
· hx · g2
The advantages of y-iMD and c-iMD follow.
Queries. Recall that in the iMD constructions, B is an adversary against h, but
in order to find a forgery in h, B runs A, then A calls h repeatedly to process its
qA queries and returns a forgery with probability A. Here we will assume that the
adversary needs at least qA queries to find a forgery, meaning that we would expect
a forgery in the query qA + 1 (note that some authors assume that the qA-th query
is the forgery query). In the worst case, A will need to call h to process all message
blocks in every query qi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qA}. Let the number of blocks in a single query of
length at most L be denoted by e(L), then the number of queries made to h should be
≤ qA · e(L). Clearly, in the worst case, A will send all its queries with the maximum
length L and then h will be queried by A at most e(L) for every query sent, thus the
total times A queries h is qA · e(L), but we also need to account for the forgery query
(when it is found). In the worst case, the forging strategy (`A, z) will succeed and a
forgery will be found in the last application of h, this gives a further e(L)−1 queries to
h (we deduct 1 from e(L) because the last application of h is not actually made when
a forgery is found, it is rather predicted according to the forging strategy, which is the
(`A, z) strategy), this gives qB ≤ qA · e(L) + (e(L) − 1). Finally, recall that there is
a finalisation call to g2 made at the end of every query (including the forgery query),
this adds further qA + 1 queries made to g2. Thus,
qB ≤ qA · e(L) + (e(L)− 1) + qA + 1
≤ qA(e(L) + 1) + (e(L)− 1) + 1
and solving for qA, we get:
qA ≤ qB − (e(L)− 1)− 1
e(L) + 1
≤ qB − e(L)
e(L) + 1
Running time. Since B runs A once and terminates when A terminates (or when it
forcefully terminates the simulation), it was suggested in [109] that tB ≈ tA, but in our
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case we have two different functions that are being accessed while processing a query,
namely the composite function h and the finalisation function g2. Since the efficiency
of these two functions are likely to differ, here we derive the running time of B and A
in terms of both h and g2. Let τh denote the cost of calling h and τg2 denote the cost
of calling g2, then:
tB = tA + ((qA + 1) · e(L) · τh − τh) + (qA − 1) · τg2
and solving for tA, we get:
tA = tB − ((qA + 1) · e(L) · τh − τh)− (qA − 1) · τg2
Basically, we count how many times h and g2 are called during the time A was running,
then multiply these by τh and τg2 , respectively. In the worst case, A will process all its
queries and will only find a forgery in the last block of the last query (query qA+ 1), in
which case strategy (`A, z) succeeds. We observe that h is being called qA · e(L) times,
but we also need to add further e(L) − 1 calls to h to account for the query that will
return a forgery. We deduct 1 from e(L) − 1 because the message block at which the
forgery is found is not further processed by h, but instead its output, which will form
the forgery tag, is predicted according to the adopted forging strategy, which is, in the
worst case, the (`A, z) strategy. Unlike h, g2 is called only once per query, so we have
qA · τg2 , again g2 is not called at the forgery query, but instead A predicts the forgery
tag to a value that has already been processed by g2, thus we multiply (qA − 1) · τg2 .
The running times for Ax, Ay, Ac are identical.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter we showed that the iMD constructions (namely, x-iMD, y-iMD, c-
iMD), proposed previously in chapter 4, are indistinguishable from their variants in the
dedicated-key setting (where the latter use keyed compression functions), then based
on the indifferentiability result in chapter 5, we showed that the iMD constructions
are also trivially indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Functions (PRF). We used this
indistinguishability result to further prove that the iMD constructions are unforgeable
when treated as MACs (in the secretly key setting, where keys are kept private). Un-
forgeability means that there is no adversary able to forge a valid message-tag pair
such that when the tag is processed by a MAC algorithm based on one of the iMD
constructions, it produces the corresponding (provided) tag. This chapter concludes
the contributions of the thesis.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Interest in cryptographic hash functions has recently spiked making it one of the most
highly active research areas in cryptography. Consequently, the literature has expanded
significantly over the last few years to the point where some considered it to be un-
manageable. In this thesis, we first tried to provide an up-to-date survey of the current
state of the art of cryptographic hash functions and then proceeded to propose a new
hash function class, which we called the integrated-key setting. We primarily proposed
the integrated-key setting as a low-effort mechanism to convert (and thus strengthen)
keyless hash functions to keyed ones. The main design goal of this approach is to
make this conversion process as transparent as possible by lifting the burden of hav-
ing to modify the internal structure of the underlying keyless primitives of the keyless
hash function to accommodate the key input. However, that does not mean that the
integrated-key setting may not be considered a dedicated design approach in its own
right, which hash functions that are being built from scratch can still adopt. We first
proposed a few Merkle-Damg˚ard based integrated-key hash functions. Security analy-
ses of these integrated-key functions have then extended over most of the thesis which
constitute our main contributions. In chapter 4, we proved that these constructions are
collision resistant, pre-image resistant and 2nd pre-image resistant. Then, in chapter 5
we showed that they are also indifferentiable from RO. Finally, in chapter 6 we showed
that these constructions are indistinguishable from their variants in the dedicated-key
setting and then used this result to prove that they are further indistinguishable from
Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) and unforgeable when they are instantiated as Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MAC) in the secret key setting. Throughout the thesis,
we hope that we succeeded in demonstrating that the integrated-key setting is not
only theoretically interesting but also practically relevant. In this chapter, the thesis
concludes with final remarks and brief discussions about how our work can be extended.
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7.1 Preservation of Other Properties
While in this thesis we provided proofs for the most common properties that the ma-
jority of hash functions applications require, as we showed in chapter 2, there are many
other hash functions properties in the literature. It would certainly be interesting to see
whether our proposed x-iMD, y-iMD, c-iMD constructions preserve these other proper-
ties. One such property is Target Collision Resistance (TCR), which some applications
may require. The term Target Collision Resistance was first coined by Bellare and
Rogaway [27] for the classical notion of universal one way hash function (UOWHF)
of Naor and Young [116]. TCR is a weaker notion than collision resistance, and thus
any CR hash function, is also a TCR [135]. That is, if we can prove that a hash func-
tion is CR given its compression function is CR, then that hash function is also TCR.
However, in some settings [27], it is desirable to have a TCR hash function based on
the assumption that its compression function is only TCR (not necessarily CR). We
expect that the plain iMD constructions are not TCR since there are strong evidence
[113] that for Merkle-Damg˚ard like constructions (which our iMD constructions are
variants of), the Sh construction [141] (which uses more key material than our iMD
constructions) is optimal. Obviously, an easy fix is to adopt the Sh keying schedule
in the iMD constructions, which is easy and does not require any modification to the
constructions since in Sh the key mask is merely XORed with the chaining variables.
7.2 Unified Message Preservation
We will also be interested in studying other properties that could have more practical
relevance. An example of such class of properties is what we call “Unified-Message
Preservation” (UMP). This class builds on the traditional collision, pre-image, 2nd
pre-image resistance notions and their “always” and “everywhere” variants proposed by
Rogaway and Shrimpton [135]. Basically, the UMP properties impose more restrictions
on the adversary A and further requires that the returned message has a particular
length because this is what would have the most practical relevance. This means
that the UMP properties are weaker than the conventional properties due to Rogaway
and Shrimpton, but they have more practical applications, and indeed making proofs
based on weaker assumptions is one of the goals in cryptography (that is, the weaker
the assumptions you make on your primitive, the more practical it is). For example,
finding a pre-image or 2nd pre-image of length different than the original message
is theoretically interesting but has little practical effect in most cases since the 2nd
message that the adversary finds may not replace the original one in some applications.
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Similarly, in collision resistance, if an adversary outputs two messages with different
lengths, he cannot use them interchangeably in all applications, potentially defeating
the practicality of the attack. Formally, the advantage definitions of the UMP variants
of collision, pre-image, 2nd pre-image and their “always” and “everywhere” variants
are as follows:
Advu-crHK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K; (M,M ′) $←− A(K) :
M 6= M ′ ∧ |M | = |M ′| ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
Advu-pre[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}m;Y ← HK(M);M ′ $←− A(K,Y ) :
|M ′| = |M | ∧HK(M ′) = Y
]
Advu-aPre[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
(K,St) $←− A;M $←− {0, 1}m;Y ← HK(M);
M ′ $←− A(Y, St) : |M | = |M ′| ∧HK(M ′) = Y
]
Advu-sec[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K;M $←− {0, 1}m;M ′ $←− A(K,M) :
M 6= M ′ ∧ |M | = |M ′| ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
Advu-aSec[m]HK (A) = Pr
[
(K,St) $←− A;M $←− {0, 1}m;M ′ $←− A(M,St) :
M 6= M ′ ∧ |M | = |M ′| ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
Advu-eSecHK (A) = Pr
[
(M,St)← A;K $←− K;M ′ $←− A(K,St) :
M 6= M ′ ∧ |M | = |M ′| ∧HK(M) = HK(M ′)
]
where M is a message, K ∈ K is a key, HK is a keyed hash function and Y is the
hash value of the message M . Note that UMP cannot be applied on the ePre property
because in ePre A generates the hash value Y uniformly at random, thus Y may not
correspond to a particular message that A needs to match its length with the length
of the pre-image message A will generate later. Strengthened variants of Rogaway’s
and Shrimpton’s properties also exist [135] as discussed in section 2.7, which we can
too derive UMP variants for. Clearly, it will be interesting to study the implications
and separations among all these variants. There are different types of implications and
separations (e.g., unconditional separation etc.), thus with this new class of properties
we expect to be able to derive yet other types of implications and separations which then
we can use to gain more understanding of the relations among the different properties.
Another interesting problem is to investigate whether the preservation of a particular
property by a particular construction prevents the preservation of another. In other
words, it will be interesting if we found that a particular construction cannot preserve
two (or more) particular properties at the same time.
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7.3 Keyless Hash Functions from Keyed Ones
In this thesis, we introduced and analysed a way of transforming keyless hash func-
tions into keyed ones without tampering with the compression function. This has been
mainly motivated by the security benefits that the keyed setting provides. However, it
might be also interesting to study the other way round (converting keyed hash functions
into keyless ones). This will be relevant for applications that require keyless hash func-
tions and cannot be adapted to use keyed ones. In this case, if we found a way to covert
a keyed hash function into a keyless variant that still enjoys adequate security margin,
we can immediately use such keyed variant in those applications. One easy solution
is to fix the key input to 0 at the keyless setting, e.g., HAIFA [66], but this does not
completely solve the efficiency waste introduced by the key input. A better approach
is, then, to expand the message blocks using the key input. For example, conventional
keyed hash functions Ch : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n use a keyed compression function
h : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n to process the message in m-bit blocks. If the
k-bit key input is not needed, then the message block can be extended to m + k bit
which will both convert Ch to keyless and improve its efficiency (since each compression
iteration now processes more message bits, which means that we would generally need
fewer compression function calls). This, however, depends on the way h mixes K with
the rest of its input and whether mixing part of M in this manner is acceptable.
7.4 Integration Function Design
While proving the various security properties of our iMD constructions, we made several
assumptions about the integration function, such as being collision resistant, RO etc.,
then our proofs hold as long as our assumptions also hold, and this is a standard proof
approach in cryptography. Although in section 4.3 we recommended the PPC1 design
paradigm [133, 63] as a potential integration function design, it worth investigating
other approaches. It is important that the chosen function is sufficiently efficient for
all practical applications and strictly more efficient than the compression function,
otherwise at least double the work will be required to process a single message block.
Although the integration function is generally conceived as a compressing primitive,
it can indeed be built from non-compressing primitives [142] as long as the efficiency
is not severely hindered. Generally, the integration function should preserve the same
properties as those preserved by the compression function, but this, in most cases,
depends on the construction and where it places the integration function.
1In the Prepend-Permute-Chop paradigm (PPC), the inputs to the function are concatenated, per-
muted and then several bits are chopped before returning the output.
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7.5 Pre Proof in the Standard Model
In chapter 4 we provided the Pre (pre-image resistance) proof of the iMD constructions
in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) where we modelled both the compression functions
and the integration functions as ROs. If we adopt the PPC paradigm (as discussed in
section 4.3) for the integration function (which is proven indifferentiable fromRO), then
the PPC-based integration function can be thought of as being part of the integrated-
key setting. On the other hand, we do not have control over the compression function
and assuming that it is indifferentiable from RO is a strong assumption. However,
we adopted the ROM approach in our Pre proof because it is inherently difficult to
develop such proofs in the standard model. In fact, it appears that proofs of the
other Pre variants (especially aPre) are also as difficult in the standard model. Thus,
an extension to this work is to investigate the plausibility of devising a generic Pre
proof approach in the standard model, which hopefully other integrated-key (and even
dedicated-key) hash functions can adopt while arguing about their own Pre security.
7.6 Final Remarks
One of the classical (and challenging) problems in the literature of cryptographic hash
functions is how to convert keyless hash functions into keyed ones since the latter has
more advantages in terms of security over the former. In this thesis, we developed
and defined a new hash function design approach in which keyless hash functions are
transparently transformed into families of hash functions by keying them, we call this
approach the integrated-key setting. Although this approach introduced an efficiency
loss, this is unfortunately inevitable in any keyed setting since in this setting an ex-
tra input (i.e., the key) is introduced and needs to be appropriately accommodated
somehow. However, in the integrated-key setting, the amount of efficiency loss highly
depends on the implementation of the integration function; this potentially makes the
integration function a customisable primitive and thus gives more freedom for imple-
menters to adjust their implementations based on the requirement of the application to
which the hash function is targeted. We proposed several integrated-key hash functions
and proved that they preserve the most commonly required properties, namely colli-
sion resistance, pre-image resistance, 2nd pre-image resistance, indifferentiable from
RO, indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) and unforgeable when
used as MACs. We also showed that the integrated-key hash functions are indistin-
guishable from their variants in the dedicated-key setting, which means that proofs in
the dedicated-key setting is reducible to the integrated-key one.
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Appendix A
Engineering Aspects of Hash
Functions
Hash functions have numerous applications in cryptography, from public key
to cryptographic protocols and cryptosystems. However, while substantial ef-
fort was invested on designing “secure” hash functions, other engineering
aspects that may affect their use in practice were inadvertently overlooked.
In this appendix, we argue that in some applications, the efficiency of hash
functions is as important as their security. Unlike most of the existing re-
lated works in the literature (which merely report on efficiency figures of
some popular hash functions without discussing how and why these results
were obtained), we not only discuss how to carry out efficiency evaluations,
but we also provide a set of optimisation guidelines to assist implementers
in optimising their implementations. We demonstrate this by adopting an
existing SHA-1/SHA-2 implementation and show how minor optimisation
can lead to significant efficiency improvements. The contents in this ap-
pendix was published in [2].
A.1 Introduction
Today, cryptographic hash functions play a major role in most cryptographic applica-
tions. Abstractly, hash functions are transformation procedures that given data, they
return (small, fixed) fingerprints. A typical hash function consists of two components:
a compression function and a construction. The compression function is a function
mapping a larger fixed-size input to a smaller fixed-size output, and the construction is
the way the compression function is being repeatedly called to process a variable-length
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message in a finite fixed-length blocks. Most of the literature is exclusively concerned
with the design and cryptanalysis of hash functions. However, while the security of
hash functions is certainly a highly important aspect, for some applications, especially
the ones processing large amount of data, the efficiency (how fast the hash function is)
is also important. Although there have been some efforts in evaluating the performance
of hash functions, e.g. [105], it is clear that this is a largely overlooked evaluation cri-
terion. Even the contributions that provide such efficiency evaluations, they generally
only make the efficiency reports, without elaborating on how to improve1 them. In this
appendix, we try to do this by considering implementations targeted for Intel platforms.
Appendix outline. This appendix is organised as follows. In section A.2, we discuss
the main factors affecting the efficiency of hash functions (and any code in general).
Section A.3 provides a concise overview of contemporary Intel platforms and some of
their advanced architectural features. Our main discussion is in section A.4 where we
investigate how to optimise code on Intel platforms; though most of these optimisation
techniques are generic and applicable to other platforms. In section A.5 we show how
to carry out performance evaluations of hash functions and present a sample SHA-
1/SHA-2 optimisation case study in which we demonstrate how minor optimisations
can greatly improve the overall efficiency of hash functions.
A.2 Efficiency Evaluation
The efficiency of any cryptographic primitive can significantly influence its popularity.
For example, Serpent [8] was one of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) com-
petition finalists and it was described by NIST (the competition organiser) as having
a high security margin. However, in the last round of the competition, Serpent failed
in favour of Rijndael [53], which was described as having just an adequate security,
because Serpent was very slow in software compared to Rijndael. In this appendix, we
will be mainly concerned with the software efficiency of hash functions (but see section
A.2.2 for a brief discussion about hardware efficiency).
A.2.1 Software Optimisation
Generally, there are two types of software optimisations, high-level and low-level op-
timisations. In high-level optimisation, a cross-platform implementation written in a
high-level language, such as C, is optimised. However, different compilers may treat
1We note that some SHA-3 submissions include optimisation discussions, e.g. [69], but these by no
means are comprehensive.
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high-level code slightly differently such that a code might be considered optimised only
if it was compiled by a particular compiler. On the other hand, low-level optimisation
involves optimising a machine (or assembly) code, and is rarely cross-platforms since
different platforms often use different instruction sets. While optimising a low-level
code is tedious and error-prone, it gives the highest degree of control over the code.
In general, efficiency requirements highly depend on the application, and thus the tar-
geted application should also be taken into account when implementing a hash function.
Software efficiency of hash functions can be influenced by several factors including, the
platform in which the hash function is executed, the compiler used to compile the hash
function code, and the executing operating system (hash functions optimised for 64-bit
operating systems are slower in 32-bit operating systems, e.g., Skein [69]).
Platforms. Both high-level and low-level optimisations are usually tuned for a spe-
cific platform. For example, in the SHA-3 competition2 the reference platform in which
the candidates were instructed to evaluated their submissions on was Intel Core 2 Duo,
thus most of the candidate submissions were especially tuned to be optimal in Intel
platforms (which mean that they may not be optimal in other platforms!). Platforms
can be roughly classified as follows:
• High-end. These are platforms with high computational and memory resources,
and usually based on 32-bit or 64-bit architectures, often with multiple processing
cores. Examples of such platforms include Intel and AMD.
• Intermediate. These are most 16-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers with moderate
computational resources (Note that some microcontrollers are low-end platforms).
Examples of such platforms include ARM and AVR.
• Low-end. These are 8-bit platforms with limited computational and memory
(usually kilobytes) resources. Examples include Smart Cards and FRID.
Compilers. Another very important factors to consider when investigating hash
functions efficiency is the sophistication of the compiler. Most of the available compilers
(commercial and open source) like Microsoft Visual Studio and GCC are sophisticated
enough to automatically optimise the code. However, these compilers sometimes apply
some optimisation techniques that may not be optimal for all platforms. Thus, it is
advisable to compile the code with several different compilers and use different optimi-
sation switches, then only choose the optimum one for a target platform, though this
2For comprehensive resource about SHA-3 competition and all its candidates, see http://ehash.
iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/The_SHA-3_Zoo.
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process may be tedious. One would think that a commercialised compiler developed by
the vendor of a particular platform would outperform other open source or third-party
commercial compilers. However, Wenzel-Benner and Graf [157] showed that this is not
always the case when they implemented several SHA-3 hash function candidates on
an ARM Cortex platform and then compiled them twice, once by ARM-CC compiler
(ARM’s own compiler) and another with GCC compiler (open source compiler). Sur-
prisingly, they found that in some cases, GCC compiled code is more efficient than that
compiled by ARM-CC.
Instruction Sets. High-level code will eventually be converted into a low-level (ma-
chine) code that consists of instructions. A platform with only several tens of instruc-
tions will most likely not perform as well as another with hundreds of instructions,
basically because no matter what optimisation techniques are applied, if no efficient
instructions exist for a particular operation, the code will need to be converted to a
series of instructions implementing that operation. Most recent platforms adopt the so-
called Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) technology, which provides instructions
allowing for parallel data execution (see section A.3.1).
A.2.2 Hardware Optimisation
Although hardware implementation and optimisation is not our main focus here, in this
section we discuss a few interesting results of recent hardware evaluation of SHA-3 can-
didates. In [150], Tillich et al. presented optimised hardware implementations of the 14
SHA-3 round 2 candidates. Their results show that Keccek and Luffa significantly out-
perform all other candidates. The authors did not make any conclusions, but we point
out that Keccek and Luffa are the only round 2 candidates adopting permutation-based
(sponge and sponge-like) constructions. Although not strictly a hardware implementa-
tion aspect, Intel has recently released a new instruction set named AES-NI [30]. Hash
functions based on AES, such as LANE, ECHO and Lesamnta, will benefit from these
instructions significantly. However, in order for a hash function to make the most of
these new AES-NI instructions, it should be based on an unmodified AES construction.
A.3 Intel Platform
The scope of this appendix is restricted to software optimisation on Intel platforms
because these appear to be the most common platforms nowadays. Currently, the most
popular Intel processors are those of families descending from the Core architecture
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which introduced many revolutionary features to improve the processing performance,
these features include:
• Wide Dynamic Execution. With Core Microarchitecture, each core can execute up
to 4 instructions simultaneously. Intel also introduced Macro-fusion and Micro-
fusion, which fuse micro-ops.
• Micro-fusion operates on low-level processor instructions called micro-operations3
(micro-ops) to fuse multiple micro-ops of the same instruction into a single
(complex) micro-op.
• Macro-fusion operates on instructions and combines common pairs into a sin-
gle micro-op. In Intel Core Microarchitecture macro-fusion is only supported
in 32-bit mode but with the introduction of Intel Microarchitecture (Ne-
halem), macro-fusion is now supported in the 64-bit mode too. Currently,
the first instruction of the marco-fused pair is restricted to CMP (compare)
or TEST (test) instructions followed by a conditional jump instruction that
checks the CF and/or ZF flags in the EFLAG register; see section A.3.2. In
Intel Core Microarchitecture, supported conditional jump instructions are:
JA/JNBE, JE/JZ, JNA/JBE, JNE/JNZ, JAE/JNB/JC and JNAE/JB/JC
— condition codes supporting unsigned values. Intel Microarchitecture (Ne-
halem) adds support to: JL/JNGE, JGE/JNL, JLE/JNG and JG/JNLE —
condition codes supporting signed values [82]; see table A.1 for description
of condition codes.
• Advanced Smart Cache. This feature allows each core to dynamically utilise up
to 100% of the (fast) L2 cache if available, which was previously not possible
resulting in an inefficient use of the cache.
• Advanced Digital Media Boost. This feature improved the execution of SIMD
instructions by allowing the whole 128-bit instruction to be executed in one clock
cycle, which used to utilise several clock cycles previously.
A.3.1 SIMD Instruction Set
In SIMD (Single Instruction, Multiple Data), a single instruction operates on multiple
data simultaneously achieving a data level parallelism. SMID instructions are especially
useful when the same operation needs to be executed repeatedly on different data (e.g.
3Note that micro-ops are executed directly by the hardware and should not be confused with normal
instructions which are themselves composed of several micro-ops
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hashing a message). In 1997, Intel introduced the MMX instruction set based on SIMD,
which was later improved by introducing the SSE (Streaming SIMD Extensions). Later
versions of SSE include: SSE2, SSE3, SSSE3, SSE4, SSE5 and recently AVX. Most
of these instructions were introduced to support heavy processing applications like
multimedia, gaming, signal processing and modelling. Today, SIMD instructions are
available in most of the recent platforms from Intel and AMD to ARM.
A.3.2 Registers in Intel Platforms
Registers are very fast storage mediums located near the processors. Below we provide
brief descriptions of some register types found in most Intel platforms:
• General-purpose Registers: these are eight 32-bit registers (EAX, EBX, ECX,
EDX, EBP, ESI, EDI, ESP) hold operands and memory pointers. In 64-bit mode,
there are sixteen 64-bit registers; these are EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, EBP, ESI,
EDI, ESP, R8D-R15D for 32-bit operands, and RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX, RBP,
RSI, RDI, RSP, R8-R15 for 64-bit operands.
• Segment Registers: these are six 16-bit registers (CS, DS, SS, ES, FS, GS) used
to hold pointers.
• MMX Registers: these are eight 64-bit registers (MM0 – MM7) introduced with
the MMX technology to perform operations on 64-bit data.
• XMM Registers: these are either eight (in 32-bit mode) or sixteen (in 64-bit mode)
128-bit registers (XMM0 – XMM15), introduced to handle the SSE 128-bit data
types.
• MXCSR Register. This is a 32-bit register used to control some of the SSEx
floating-point operations.
• EIP Register. This is a 32-bit register that holds the instruction pointer which
points to the next instruction to be executed.
• EFLAG Register : this is a single 32-bit (in 32-bit mode) register used to reflect
the results of comparison, arithmetic and other instructions by setting its flags
appropriately. In 64-bit mode, EFLAG is called RFLAG and is 64-bit, the lower
32-bit are identical to EFLGA, and the upper 32-bit are reserved.
The EFLAG register contains 1 control flag, 6 status flags, 11 system flags and the rest
are reserved bits. Below we elaborate on EFLAG’s 6 status flags, which are relevant
to the discussions in the following sections.
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Code Description Flag
O Overflow OF=1
NO No Overflow OF=1
B/NAE Below/Not Above or Equal CF = 1
NB/AE Not Below/Above or Equal CF = 0
E/Z Equal/Zero ZF = 1
NE/NZ Not Equal/Not Zero ZF = 0
BE/NA Below or Equation/Not Above CF ∨ ZF = 1
NBE/A Not Below or Equal Above CF ∨ ZF = 0
S Sign SF = 1
NS No Sign SF = 0
P/PE Parity/Parity Even PF =1
NP/PO Not Parity/Parity Odd PF = 0
L/NGE Less/Not Greater than or Equal SP ⊕ OF = 1
NL/GE Not Less than/Greater than or Equal SF ⊕ OF = 0
LE/NG Less than or Equal/Not Greater than ((SF ⊕ OF) ∨ ZF) = 1
NLE/G Not Less than or Equal/Greater than ((SF ⊕ OF) ∨ ZF) = 0
Table A.1: Intel condition codes
• Carry Flag CF: set if a carry or borrow of an arithmetic operation is generated.
• Parity Flag PF: set if the number of 1’s in the least significant byte of the result
from the previous operation is even (indicating even parity), otherwise it is unset
(indicating odd parity).
• Adjust Flag AF: this flag is primarily used in BCD (binary-coded decimal) arith-
metic and is set only if the previous operation generates a carry or borrow.
• Zero Flag ZF: set if the result of the previous operation is zero.
• Sign Flag SF: used with signed values and is set to the same value of the sign bit
(most significant bit), which is 0 if positive or 1 if negative.
• Overflow Flag OF: set if the result of an operation doesnt fit the specified desti-
nation operand (e.g. storing a 64-bit value in a 32-bit register).
These flags can be tested by other instructions by suffixing a “condition code” to
the instruction. Some condition codes are described in table A.1 [83].
As indicated in table A.1, some condition code mnemonics are synonym to oth-
ers, like B (Below) and NAE (Not Above or Equal). Intel adopts this convention for
situations where using one mnemonic is more intelligible than the other. Also, When
dealing with unsigned values, the below/above mnemonics are used; but when dealing
with signed values, the greater than/less than mnemonics are used instead.
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A.4 Intel Optimisation
Compilers, like the Intel C++ compiler, will certainly try to optimise the code, but they
might sometimes make wrong decisions. To take advantage of the available powerful
instructions, it is desirable to code directly in assembly where we have full control over
the flow of the program. However, as discussed earlier, programming in assembly is
tedious, time consuming and error-prone. Therefore, it will only worth coding the most
critical and frequently called parts of the program in assembly. These critical parts may
be a particular function that is being called very frequently, or a loop iterating many
times. For example, the performance of a hash function may significantly improve if its
compression function (which is repeatedly called) is coded in assembly. Such critical
parts can be spotted by running a performance analyser/profiler software, like Intel’s
VTune.
When optimising an implementation for a specific platform, not only it may not be
optimal for other platforms, but it also may not be optimal for different families from
the same platform. That is, a particular set of optimisation techniques targeted for
Pentium processors, for example, may not be optimal for Core or Core 2 processors.
Nevertheless, when considering Intel platforms, we believe that developing a generic
code optimised for the Intel Core Microarchitecture is, in general, likely to be an opti-
mal solution for most current and near future processors but may not be so for older
processor generations. Another solution would be to explicitly write multiple versions
of a particular code, each optimised for a different processor, then, at execution time,
the compiler uses the CPUID instruction to identify the platform it is running on and
only compiles the appropriate version of the code. This approach is, however, not
practical if the code size has to be restricted (e.g., targeting low-end platforms such as
RFID or smart cards).
In the following sections we discuss a few optimisation techniques [82, 83, 84, 86,
87, 85] developed especially to optimise code targeting Intel platforms and applicable
to most Intel Microarchitecture including Intel Core Microarchitecture, Enhanced Intel
Core Microarchitecture and Intel Microarchitecture (Nehalem); but note that some of
these techniques are generic and may also be applicable to other platforms.
A.4.1 Instruction Selection
Most of the unexpected results/errors are caused by poor selection of instructions.
Choosing which instructions to use in a program may not only affect the execution of the
program, but also its efficiency. In this section we briefly discuss a few considerations
when selecting instructions in an Intel’s platform.
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Micro-operations. Each instruction is decoded into micro-operations (micro-ops)
before it is executed. Intuitively, an instruction that decodes to less micro-ops runs
faster. Thus, since complex instructions are usually being decoded to more micro-ops
than those decoded from other simpler instructions, it is recommended to use a series
of simple instructions that decode to fewer micro-ops, than using a single complex
instruction decoding to more micro-ops.
INC/DEC instructions. In Intel, it is better to use the ADD (addition) and SUB (sub-
traction) instructions instead of INC (increment) and DEC (decrement) instructions
because INC/DEC only update a subset of the flags in the EFLAG register. This is
especially problematic when dealing with condition codes, which are dependant on the
EFLAG register’s flags. On the other hand, ADD/SUB instructions first clear all the
flags in the EFLGA register before updating the appropriate ones based on the addi-
tion/subtraction result, so if any of the flags was previously set by an earlier instruction,
it will be reset. This is not the case with INC/DEC since they only update the flags
affected by the increment/decrement result and ignore the rest of the flag, which can
create false dependency one previous instructions.
Shift/Rotate Instructions. Shift instructions are less expensive than rotate in-
structions. However, rotate by 1 has the same overhead as the shift instructions.
Hence, it might be more efficient to use a series of rotate by 1 instruction for small
number of rotations.
CMP/TEST Instructions. TEST instruction ANDs its operands and updates the EFLAG
register. If the result of the AND operation is not needed, then using TEST is better
than using the AND instruction because AND wastes extra cycles to produce the result.
TEST incurs less overhead than the CMP instruction and is preferred where possible. For
example, using the TEST instruction on a register with itself is the same as comparing
the register to zero. It is also possible to compare values with zero by condition codes
if the appropriate flags in EFLGA register were set by earlier instructions, in which
case neither TEST nor CMP is needed.
A.4.2 Optimising Branches
Branches (also called jumps) can greatly influence the performance of the program.
Branches are points in the program where the flow of the program is interrupted and
diverted. This jump instruction from a point in the program to another certainly incurs
147
considerable processing overhead. Branches present in assembly code and are compa-
rable to the condition statements (“if” statements) in high-level languages. Branches
are usually conditional (based on conditions), but they can sometimes be unconditional
where the flow of the program always jumps to where the branch points to as soon as
it reaches the branch; if the branch is executed, we say the branch is taken, other-
wise, it is not taken, a technique called branch prediction predicts whether a branch is
more likely to be taken or not taken. It is important to predict a branch especially in
pipelined processors (these are almost all the modern processors) because when pipelin-
ing instructions, the address of the following instruction has to be known before the
execution of the current one; that is, if a branch is to be taken, the following address
is going to be the address of the first instruction at the portion of the code where the
branch jumps to, otherwise, the following address is the address of the next sequential
instruction after the branch instruction. However, even with efficient branch prediction
mechanism, it is still advisable to minimise branches as much as possible because even
if a branch has been correctly predicted, there is still an overhead for actually taking
the branch. Below we discuss some guidelines for optimising branches (though, we do
not explicitly discuss any branch prediction algorithm).
It is always recommended that condition codes be used instead of branches where
possible. condition codes are dependent on the EFLAG register and are usually pro-
ceeded by CMP or TEST instructions which set the flags in EFLAG appropriately. In
particular, the instructions CMOVcc or SETcc (where cc is a condition code) are pre-
ferred over branches (note that SETcc can only set operands to 1 or 0; if different values
are required, CMOVcc is used). For example, consider the following C code:
if (x >= y) {x = 1;} else {x = 0;}
In assembly, this can be written as:
CMP eax, ebx ;compare values of eax and ebx
Jge Gtr ;if eax >= ebx, jump to ’Gtr’
MOV eax 0 ;otherwise, set eax = 0
JMP Less ;jump to ’Less’ where the
;rest of the program is
Gtr:
Mov eax 1 ;set eax = 1
Less:
...
Compare this with the following optimised code:
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CMP eax, ebx ;compare eax and ebx
CMOVge eax, #1 ;if eax >= ebx, eax = 1
CMOVl eax, #0 ;otherwise, eax = 0
A.4.3 Optimising Loops
With the advent of Core Microarchitecture, Intel introduced the Loop Stream Detector
(LSD) which expedites the execution of loops containing up to 18 instructions. When
a loop is detected, the loop instructions are stored in a special LSD buffer and the
fetch and branch prediction stages are powered off until the loop is completed. Intel
Microarchitecture (Nehalem) further improved LSD by moving it beyond the decode
stage to hold up to 28 micro-ops for immediate execution, powering off all the pipeline
stages except the execute stage; here, the LSD buffer is similar to the trace cache4.
Even with the presence of LSD, the implementer can still further optimise loops. In the
following sub sections we discuss a few generic loop optimisation techniques that can be
tuned for other platforms (not just Intel); we will either demonstrate these techniques
using high-level language examples, or Intel instructions if a particular technique is
intrinsic to Intel.
Loop unrolling. Unrolling a loop entails reducing the number of loop iterations
by increasing the size of the loop body. Since each loop incurs extra overhead for
checking the end-of-loop condition at the end of each iteration, minimising the number
of iterations does greatly optimise its execution. Unrolling a loop, however, increases
the size of the code and may congest the trace cache. Thus, it is recommended to
only unroll the frequently called loops. Intel recommends that a loop should not be
iterated more than 16 times, and if it does, it should be unrolled to keep this maximum
number of iterations [82]. For example, suppose that the operations Operation1 and
Operation2 need to be executed 8 times each, this can be written as:
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{Operation1; Operation2;}
with loop unrolling, the above code can be re-written more efficiently as:
for (i = 0; I < 4; i++){
Operation1; Operation2;
Operation1; Operation2;}
4Trace cache is part of the first-level cache and is used to hold the decoded instructions before
execution.
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This potentially saves four iterations and consequently four end-of-the-loop condition
checks. For loops that iterate many times, saving the end-of-loop condition does sig-
nificantly improve the speed of the execution.
Loop-blocking. A very effective technique for optimising loops is loop-blocking.
This technique is useful when dealing with large amount of data. If the data on which
the loop is operating is large, the cache might not be sufficient to hold the data during
the whole execution time; then it stores it in memory, which has a slow access time.
In this case, using loop blocking allows for partitioning the loop into smaller chunks
to operate on data with size small enough to fit in the cache. These chunks are then
executed in turn by reusing the cache every time a new chunk is executed. Consider
the following example with a cache of size 8 bytes (the cache can store 8 bytes at any
given time, any extra values are stored in memory):
for (i = 0; i <= 16; i++){
Function1(x[i]);}
for (i = 0; i <= 16; i++){
Function2(x[i]);}
Since the cache can only store 8 bytes, when executing Function1 only 8 bytes of
array x can be stored in the cache, the other 8 bytes will be stored in memory and will
need to be loaded for Function2. Compare this with the following code after applying
loop-blocking:
for (i = 0; i < 2; i+=8) {
for (j = i; j < min(16,8+i); j++){
Function1(x[j]);}
for (j = i; j < min(16,8+i); j++){
Function(x[j]);}}
Here, instead of operating on the 16 bytes of the array x at once, the loop is divided
into two portions of size 8 each. Function1 operates on the first 8 bytes of array x which
fit in the cache, then the same 8 bytes are transferred to Function2 to be operated on.
Once both Function1 and Function2 finish executing the first 8 bytes of array x, the
cache is purged for the other 8 bytes of array x and the same process is repeated.
Decrementing Loop. When writing a loop, it is more efficient to use a decrementing
loop rather than an incrementing one. An incrementing loop requires 3 instructions:
an addition instruction ADD to increment the loop counter, a compare instruction CMP
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to compare the loop counter to the maximum value at which the loop should termi-
nate and, a conditional branch JLE to iterate through the loop. On the other hand,
a decrementing loop will only need two instructions: a subtraction instruction SUB to
decrement the loop counter, and a conditional branch instruction JNZ; a comparison
instruction is not needed in this case since SUB will set the condition flag ZF in the
EFLAG register when it reaches zero (end of loop) which is then tested by the condi-
tional branch instruction JNZ before iterating through the loop and would only loop if
ZF is not set. For example, the program below implements a loop that calculates 5! (5
factorial).
for (i = 1; i <= 5; i++){
factorial *= i; }
which will be translated into assembly as follows:
MOV eax, #1 ;eax=1
MOV ebx, #1 ;ebx=1
Loop:
MUL eax, eax, ebx ;eax = eax * ebx
ADD ebx, ebx, #1 ;ebx++
CMP ebx, #0x05 ;ebx = 5 ?
JLE Loop ;branch if ebx <= 5
but, if we rewrite it using a decrementing loop:
for (i = 5; i >=1; i--){ factorial *=i; }
the assembly will be translated as follows:
MOV eax, #1 ;eax=1
MOV ebx, #1 ;ebx=1
Loop:
MUL eax, eax, ebx ;eax = eax * ebx
SUB ebx, ebx, #1 ;ebx--
JNZ Loop ;branch if ZF != 0
saving one instruction (one cycle) per iteration.
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A.4.4 Optimising Functions
If a particular function is frequently called, it is recommended to inline it. Inlining
a function involves creating a local copy of the function inside the calling program
and thereby eliminating the overhead of jumping outside the program and back again
repeatedly while calling it. Like loop unrolling, inlining a function increases the code
size; hence, it is advisable that only small functions are inlined for an implementation
targeting a memory-constrained platforms. For example, to optimise a hash function,
it would worth inlining only its compression function or small parts of the compression
function if they are being heavily used during the hashing process.
Moreover, the decision of whether calling a function or jumping to it can affect the
efficiency. When calling a function, more overhead is incurred because it requires a
return and the return address should be saved in the stack. On the other hand, when
jumping to a function, neither is required. Therefore, if a return from a function is not
necessary, it is recommended to jump to that function rather than calling it.
A.4.5 Optimisation for SIMD
The following techniques apply to processors supporting MMX and SSE instruction
sets; these are (mostly) processors based on Intel Core Microarchitecture, Enhanced
Intel Core Microarchitecture and Intel Microarchitecture (Nehalem) as well as a few
Pentium processors. For the code to benefit from the SSE instructions, it has to be
vectorised. Vectorisation is the process of parallelising the code to take advantage of
the inherent parallelism of SSE instructions. For example, four 32-bit double words5
can be stored in a single 128-bit XMM registers for a single SSE instruction to operate
on simultaneously.
There are several ways in which code can be optimised for MMX/SSE technologies.
The most straightforward way is to code directly in assembly. This can be either a
standalone assembly implementation or an assembly embedded in a C/C++ code using
the inlined assembly extension to C/C++. Another way is to use intrinsic functions,
which can directly access the SSE instructions using sufficiently large data types (e.g.
m128 which is 128-bit long). These functions are built-in to the compiler and will be
inlined at compilation time. However, intrinsic functions are compiler-dependant and
not portable. Alternatively, special classes [82] implemented for this purpose can also
be used, but these are, again, compiler-dependant.
Another important consideration when dealing with MMX/SSE instructions (or
5In XMM registers, a byte is 8-bits, a word is 16-bits, a double word is 32-bit, a quadword is 64-bit
and a double quadword is 128-bit, that is, a single XMM register consists of either 16 bytes, 8 words,
4 double words, 2 quadwords or 1 double quadword.
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any instruction set in general) is data alignments. It is important to align the MMX
operands to 64-bit boundaries to fit on the 64-bit MMX registers because it is very
expensive to operate on unaligned data. Similarly, SSE operands should be aligned to
128-bit boundaries to fit on the 128-bit XMM registers. One way to align unaligned data
is to pad the operands appropriately. Also, in some cases, rearranging the data may
help in aligning it. Carefully rearranging data of different sizes (and types) assigned to
structures is an example of such practice.
A.5 Performance Evaluation
Instructions are executed in clock cycles, which are the fundamental units of the CPU
clock rate. CPU’s that operate on 2.0 GHz clock rate, for example, execute 2 × 109
instructions per second. Therefore, the performance of a particular code is usually
evaluated by counting the clock cycles the CPU wastes in executing it; the fewer these
cycles, the more efficient the code. In this section, we briefly describe the most common
ways of counting CPU cycles in Intel platforms. When evaluating the efficiency of hash
functions, we usually count cycles/byte. In order to calculate how many cycles each
byte of the message takes to be hashed, the overall number of clock cycles for hashing
the whole message is first counted, then divided by the message size in bytes.
To count the clock cycle in Intel platforms, the RDTSC (Read Time Stamp Counter)
instruction is used. RDTSC indicates how many clock cycles the CPU has executed since
it was powered up or reset. There are a number of header files that can be used to
inline the RDTSC instruction, we adopt cycle.h6, which uses the function getticks()
to record cycle readings and then the function elapsed(.,.) to subtract readings and
get the actual number of cycles wasted during execution.
#include "rdtsc.h"
...
tsc_counter t1,t2,t3;
t1 = getticks(); //take first reading
run hash function ...
t2 = getticks(); //take second reading
t3 = elapsed(t2,t1); //get the difference
However, when executing the code, the CPU is not exclusively reserved for this
executing process; instead, in reality, it usually executes other processes, such as OS
transactions etc. in parallel. Consequently, if we count the clock cycles as above only
6available from: www.fftw.org/cycle.h (accessed March 2011).
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once, it is very likely that the obtained result will also include other delays not caused
by the code under evaluation. There are two common ways to improve the accuracy of
the clock cycle counting process: average count or least count.
A.5.1 Average Count
One way to count the clock cycles is to execute the code (i.e. hash function) several
times and accumulate the clock cycle readings of all executions, then the accumulated
clock cycle count is averaged. The pseudocode below illustrates this procedure.
tsc_counter t1,t2,t3;
for (x=0; x < MAX; x++) {
t1 = getticks();
run hash function ...
t2 = getticks();
t3 += elapsed(t2 - t1) //accumulate
} t4 = t3 / MAX; //average
A.5.2 Least Count
Another way is to execute the code several times and only consider the smallest cycle
count. However, in this case there is a risk of caching. When the code is first executed,
it is most likely that it will be executed from the memory, but after a few iterations,
the CPU may choose to move the code to the cache and execute it from there. The
pseudocode below illustrates this procedure.
tsc_counter t1, t2, t3, t4 = -1;
for (x=0; x < MAX; x++) {
t1 = getticks()();
run hash function ...
t2 = getticks()();
t3 = elapsed(t2 - t1);
t4 = (t4 > t3 ? t3 : t4); }
A.5.3 Demonstration
To demonstrate how optimising the code can affect the overall efficiency of the imple-
mentation, we adopted Brian Gladman’s implementations7 of SHA1 and SHA2 and
7Available from: www.gladman.me.uk (accessed March 2011).
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very slightly optimised them, then compared our optimised implementations to Glad-
man’s original ones. The experiments were carried out on Intel Core 2 Duo 3.00 GHz,
4.00 GB of RAM, running 32-bit Windows Vista Home Premium, and using GNU
GCC compiler, while hashing messages with sizes ranging from 100 to 1000,000 Bytes.
Figure A-1 plots the results. As shown in the figure, apart from some discrepancies
in SHA-384 and SHA-512 implementations for short messages, we observe a general
efficiency improvement, especially in SHA-224 and SHA-256 since these handle data
in 32-bit words, which suits our testbed OS. We also observe that the hashing rate
is higher in large messages since the processing overhead of the message initialisation
and hashing finalisation fades out. In this experiment, we deliberately only made minor
optimisation on the loops (without unrolling them and so maintaining the original code
size) to observe what effect minor optimisation can have on the efficiency of the code.
We expect even higher efficiency gain should more optimisation techniques are applied,
but that may trade off code size and coding effort.
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Figure A-1: Performance improvement after minor modification to SHA1/2 reference
implementations
A.6 Summary
While security is certainly very important, for a hash function to be practical in some
applications, it will also need to be efficient. This efficiency requirement has largely
been overlooked in the literature. In this appendix, we not only show how to evaluate
the efficiency of hash functions, we also discuss how to improve it. Although we present
a set of optimisations techniques while considering Intel platforms, most of these are
generic and apply to a wide range of platforms. Unlike most of the works in the liter-
ature, we here do not merely report on performance figures of a particular set of hash
function implementations, we rather show how to optimise them. We demonstrated
how seemingly minor optimisation may result in a great efficiency gain.
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